Publications
2012

Nonstatistical Factors Influencing Predictions of Financial
Distress and Managerial Implications in the All-Cargo Airline
Industry
Robert O. Walton
Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University, waltonr@erau.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.erau.edu/publication
Part of the Corporate Finance Commons, Finance and Financial Management Commons, and the
Transportation Commons

Scholarly Commons Citation
Walton, R. O. (2012). Nonstatistical Factors Influencing Predictions of Financial Distress and Managerial
Implications in the All-Cargo Airline Industry. Nonstatistical Factors Influencing Predictions of Financial
Distress and Managerial Implications in the All-Cargo Airline Industry, (). Retrieved from
https://commons.erau.edu/publication/1358

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Publications by an authorized administrator of Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
commons@erau.edu.

Nonstatistical Factors Influencing Predictions of Financial Distress and Managerial
Implications in the All-Cargo Airline Industry

Dissertation
Submitted to Northcentral University
Graduate Faculty of the School of Business
in Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION

by
ROBERT O. WALTON
Prescott Valley, Arizona
March 2012

Copyright 2012
Robert O. Walton

ii

Abstract
All-cargo airlines carry over 50% of global airfreight, yet they are prone to bankruptcy.
Many financial models are designed to predict a firms' financial health, but they do not
assess many nonstatistical factors that influence the prediction capability of these models.
In this study, qualitative grounded theory design was used to identify nonstatistical
factors and explore how they influence bankruptcy prediction models in the all-cargo
airline industry. In the first phase of the study, financial data from 2005 to 2009 for 17
all-cargo U.S. airlines were used to determine the bankruptcy prediction ability of the
Kroeze financial bankruptcy model. A sample of six all-cargo airlines (ABX Air, Arrow
Air, Atlas Air, Cargo 360, Gemini Air Cargo, and Kitty Hawk Air Cargo) were selected
containing a mixture of airlines for which the Kroeze model correctly and incorrectly
predicted bankruptcy. The sample was used as the starting point to explore the
nonstatistical factors using grounded theory. Data were obtained on the six airlines from
company annual reports, SEC 10K annual reports, reports from professional journals
such as Air Transport Intelligence and Traffic World, news reports and company press
releases. The data were coded and grouped into conceptual categories, which were used
in theory generation to support the emerging theory. Six categories (management, risk,
operations, competitive advantage, financial, and external factors) that relate to the
financial stability of an all-cargo airline emerged during the research. Three themes
emerged that may improve current quantitative bankruptcy prediction models. The three
themes are airline fleet type, type of aircraft flown, and aircraft utilization. The three
themes relate to the type, use, and make up of an airline’s fleet. These themes influence
bankruptcy prediction model and should be incorporated into failure prediction models to
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improve their overall accuracy. Future research should be conducted to verify these
findings on a larger population, such as all-cargo airlines that operate outside the United
States. These airlines operate under different financial regimes that may affect the
prediction models differently.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
Within the air-cargo industry, two main types of firms carry air cargo: passenger
airlines that carry cargo in the lower cargo hold of passenger aircraft and dedicated cargoonly airlines that operate freighter aircraft. Examples of all-cargo airlines include Arrow
Air, Lynden Air Cargo Airlines, and Northern Air Cargo. Such airlines carry over 50%
of the global airfreight. The demand for the carriage of air cargo can fluctuate by 15% to
20% within a year (Hellermann, 2006). This fluctuation is driven by the global economy,
which drives world trade and the amount of cargo that needs to be carried (Boeing,
2009). The fast, secure transport provided by the air-cargo industry is important to justin-time production operations and the transportation of perishable goods throughout the
world and; therefore, the world economy (Becker & Dill, 2007; Hellermann, 2006). Like
most of the aviation industry, the all-cargo airline industry operates on low margins and
is prone to bankruptcy (Boeing, 2009; Kroeze, 2005; Ribbink, Hofer, & Dresner, 2009).
Bankruptcy within the all-cargo airlines can reduce available capacity and affect the
global economy.
Many financial models found in the literature can be used to predict the financial
health of a firm, and several have been used on the passenger airline industry (Altman &
Hotchkiss, 2006; Chung & Szenberg, 1996; Kroeze, 2005; Ribbink et al., 2009). The
various bankruptcy prediction models typically use a combination of weighted financial
ratios that provide a score used to predict bankruptcy (Kroeze, 2005); however, these
statistical models do not consider nonstatistical factors that may influence their prediction
capabilities (Gudmundsson, 2002). This research was used to explore the nonstatistical
factors, which may include management, cultural factors, aircraft type, route selection,
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and market themes. All of these may influence the accuracy of the Kroeze K-Score, a
published bankruptcy prediction model. The following sections include an outline of the
problem to be addressed in this study, the goal for the study, the theoretical framework,
the research questions, and finally an overview of the significance of the study.
Background
The all-cargo airline industry comprises a small group of airline companies that
do not carry passengers, but instead, move cargo only. Air transport, highway, rail,
maritime, and pipeline are the five modes of global transportation for goods. While all
modes except pipeline can transport the same commodities, maritime and air are the only
two that can support transoceanic freight transport. Maritime transport is typically used
for the low-cost transport of goods, whereas airfreight has the benefit of speed, reliability,
and security (Boeing, 2009; Button, 2010). Changes in world air-cargo traffic are linked
to changes in the world gross domestic product (GDP); therefore, as the world economy
expands, so does the demand for air transport (Boeing, 2009; Hellermann, 2006;
International Air Transport Association [IATA], 2010a). Between 1987 and 1997,
worldwide demand for the transport of air cargo grew at an average rate of 7.1%
annually; however, this growth slowed after September 11, 2001, to an annual growth
rate of 4.1% (Boeing, 2009; IATA, 2010a). After the terrorist attacks in the United States
on September 11, 2001, the price of fuel increased, increasing the cost of air shipments
and causing companies to migrate toward less expensive road, rail, and maritime
transport (Boeing, 2009; IATA, 2010). The high costs of providing air transport and the
weak economy have pushed many all-cargo airlines to the brink of bankruptcy (Hofer,
Dresner, & Windle, 2009; IATA, 2010b).
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Of the many financial modeling techniques used to predict bankruptcy, no
agreement exists within academia or the financial industry on which is best (Hensher &
Jones, 2007; Ribbink et al., 2009; Ward, 2007). Certain bankruptcy prediction models
tend to work better than other models in certain industries, and most models need to be
calibrated to specific industry groups (Kroeze, 2005). The Altman Z-score model has
been used in bankruptcy prediction research since the late 1960s (McKee, 2007).
Altman's Z-score model uses multiple discriminant analysis to determine bankruptcy
potential and has been tested on numerous industries with positive results (Altman &
Hotchkiss, 2006; Chung & Szenberg, 1996; Kroeze, 2005; Ribbink et al., 2009; Scaggs &
Crawford, 1986). The Altman Z-score model was updated in 2006 as the Altman Z”score to improve its prediction capability; however, the model must be adjusted to
specific industries (Altman & Hotchkiss, 2006).
The Kroeze (2005) model (K-score) modified the Altman Z”-score model to
improve the bankruptcy prediction performance for the passenger airline industry;
however, the performance results of most statistical techniques used in failure prediction
modeling provide similar results, and since there appears to be little “difference in the
predictive abilities of statistical models, it is important to analyze the problems related to
their use” (Ooghe, Spaenjers, & Vandermoere, 2009, p. 8). Youn and Gu (2010)
supported Ooghe et al.’s (2009) assertion, indicating that future research on statistical
financial modeling should explore nonstatistical variables (e.g., qualitative factors) to
improve prediction accuracy. The Kroeze model has been used to predict bankruptcy in
the passenger airline industry (Kroeze, 2005), but no literature was found to indicate that
the Kroeze model has been used for bankruptcy prediction on the all-cargo airline
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industry nor, like other models, have qualitative factors been explored. This study
attempted to explore qualitative factors influencing the effectiveness of the Kroeze KScore bankruptcy prediction model for the all-cargo airline industry.
Problem Statement
The problem addressed in this study was the inability of published financial
prediction models to account for the nonstatistical factors that negatively influence
bankruptcy prediction in the all-cargo airline industry (Kroeze, 2005; Ooghe et al., 2009;
Ribbink et al., 2009; Wetter & Wennberg, 2009; Youn & Gu, 2010). Although financial
measurements are used to calculate the health of a company, there are many nonstatistical
factors influencing the fiscal viability of the company. Most, if not all, of the prediction
models fail to account for these factors. This research was used to identify and
enumerate some of the nonstatistical factors influencing the reliability and validity of the
Kroeze model (Kroeze, 2005).
The all-cargo airline industry is critical to the world economy because it provides
fast, secure trade over long distances for shippers of high value and perishable goods and
carries over 50% of global airfreight (Boeing, 2009; Hellermann, 2006; Jones & Hensher,
2005). The importance of air cargo and the impact of its loss were witnessed in April
2010 when a volcanic ash cloud shut most European airspace to flights; within days,
companies started running out of parts and had to stop production lines (IATA, 2010b).
Between 2005 and 2009, two of the 17 all-cargo airlines in the United States declared
bankruptcy and liquidated, thus removing over 10% of the firms from the market
(TranStats, 2010). In addition, bankruptcies can inflict major social and economic cost
on the world economy (Jones & Hensher, 2005). Because of the significant economic
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and social cost associated with bankruptcies, the development of accurate financial
distress forecasting techniques is important to financial institutions, users of the services,
suppliers, employees, and governments (Jones & Hensher, 2005). A better understanding
of the nonstatistical factors that lead to bankruptcy may provide airline management with
the tools needed to make better management choices. A sizeable body of literature on
financial distress prediction exists, but there is no agreement as to which modeling
technique is best, and most existing models do not consider nonstatistical variables,
which are needed to improve bankruptcy prediction (Hensher & Jones, 2007; Jones &
Hensher, 2005; Ribbink et al., 2009; Ward, 2007). Of the sizeable body of financial
distress literature, only a small portion focuses on the airline industry and even less
specifically on the all-cargo industry (Hofer et al., 2009; Jones & Hensher, 2005).
Purpose
The purpose of this qualitative grounded theory research was to explore the
nonstatistical factors influencing the accuracy of the Kroeze K-Score bankruptcy
prediction model for the all-cargo airline industry. Understanding the health of the allcargo industry is essential to government, lenders to the industry, academics, and
investors in air-cargo companies (Jones & Hensher, 2005). A grounded theory research
strategy was used to explore nonstatistical factors that confound the Kroeze model and
consequently make the model unreliable. The total population of all-cargo airlines in the
United States between 2005 and 2009 was 17 carriers (TranStats, 2010); however,
grounded theory design does not start with a specific sample, but instead, draws on
concepts and their properties and differences (Corbin & Strauss, 1990). With the
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application of emergent theory, the research identified some of the factors necessary to
predict potential bankruptcy in the all-cargo industry more accurately.
Theoretical Framework
The theoretical framework for this research is based on both theoretical and
applied material. The prediction of bankruptcy using financial ratios was first developed
in the United States at the turn of the 20th century (Altman, 1967). Aided by the
development of computers, Altman (1967) was one of the earliest researchers to use
multiple discriminant analysis (MDA) to examine corporate bankruptcy (McKee, 2007).
Since Altman’s 1967 seminal work, a number of other researchers (Chung & Szenberg,
1996; Hofer at al., 2009; Kroeze, 2005; Ribbink et al., 2009; Scaggs & Crawford, 1986)
have examined the use of MDA in bankruptcy prediction specifically in the passenger
airline industry. Most recently, Kroeze (2005) altered the Altman Z-score model to
improve the prediction ability specifically for the passenger airline industry. Most of the
researchers reported a positive relationship between the various models’ bankruptcy
prediction and actual bankruptcy events.
The neural networks (NN) approach may also be used to assess airline financial
performance. While some research has shown a positive outcome for NN (Gritta, Wang,
Davalos, & Chow, 2000), the complexity of the statistical methodology involved in an
NN approach limits its utility to individual investors, airline management, and other
stakeholders (Kroeze, 2005). Overall, past airline bankruptcy prediction models have
“not improved the understanding of failure processes much, but rather improved the
statistical methodology” (Gudmundsson, 2002, p. 21). The next step in the improvement
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of a statistically based approach is to understand the nonstatistical variables that affect the
existing models (Ooghe et al., 2009; Youn & Gu, 2010).
The use of nonstatistical variables in bankruptcy prediction has been marginally
examined (Gudmundsson, 2002, Kim & Han, 2003, Ooghe et al., 2009, Sun & Li, 2007,
Youn & Gu, 2010). Past research on nonstatistical variables have primarily focused on
attempting to quantify qualitative variables and force them into a prediction model
(Gudmundsson, 2002, Ooghe et al., 2009). However, past research has not attempted to
develop a comprehensive list of the nonstatistical variables that affect bankruptcy
prediction models (Gudmundsson, 2002). This research extended Kroeze’s (2005) work
and provided a better understanding of the nonstatistical factors as advocated by Ooghe at
al. (2009) and Young and Gu (2010).
The grounded theory method was selected as the most appropriate research
methodology to explore the qualitative factors that may influence quantitative bankruptcy
protection models. Grounded theory attempts to generate new theory directly from the
data, as opposed to testing an existing theory (Birks & Mills, 2011). The use of grounded
theory is rooted in social and behavioral science research; however, it is increasingly
being used to conduct research in other fields (Birks & Mills, 2011). Grounded theory
merges positivism and pragmatism into a systematic research approach in which constant
comparative analysis is used to build categories that are then used to explain processes
associated with the phenomena (Birks & Mills, 2011, Charmaz, 2006). Grounded theory
enables the researcher to take a fresh look at a problem and not be bound by preconceived
notions and past research (Birks & Mills, 2011).
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Research Questions
Using grounded theory design the objective of this research was to discover and
specify the nonstatistical influences that affect the accuracy of the Kroeze prediction
model in predicting bankruptcy of all-cargo airlines. The intent of grounded theory is to
explain the phenomenon in the research question using constant comparative analysis
(Glaser & Strauss, 1967). Grounded theory is used to generate new theory directly from
data, not test existing theory (Birks & Mills, 2011). To address the purpose of the study,
the following research question was explored:
Q1. What nonstatistical factors influence the K-Score bankruptcy prediction
models in the all-cargo airline industry?
Nature of the Study
The research design was a qualitative grounded theory study on nonstatistical
factors that influence the prediction accuracy of bankruptcy prediction models in the allcargo airlines. In this study, the researcher examined the Kroeze K-Score bankruptcy
prediction model and the qualitative factors that influence the model. The grounded
theory approach revealed nonstatistical factors affecting the bankruptcy prediction
accuracy of the Kroeze model in U.S.-based all-cargo airlines. This research builds on
the work of Scaggs and Crawford (1986), Kroeze (2005), Hofer et al. (2009), and others
to improve bankruptcy prediction, specifically to the all-cargo airlines bankruptcy
prediction, which is lacking in the literature.
The findings and conclusions reached by this researcher provide a better
understanding of the Kroeze K-Score bankruptcy prediction model and the model's use
within the all-cargo airline industry. Historical financial data from all-cargo companies
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was used as the input data for the Kroeze model to determine the model's accuracy. The
financial data were obtained via data mining of specific financial data from the U.S.
Department of Transportation (DOT), U.S. Bureau of Transportation Statistics, and
Research and Innovative Technology Administration (RITA) database, also known as
TranStats. Data from the period of 2005 to 2009 were inserted into the Kroeze K-score
model and the results compared to actual bankruptcy events within the industry. The
starting year for the data of 2005 was chosen to avoid the turmoil in the aviation industry
after the terrorist attacks of September 2001, and 2009 was the most current data
available at the start of this research. The results provided a baseline from which to
explore issues and features that influence the accuracy of the model. The data for the
grounded theory research were obtained from a multitude of sources, such as scholarly
articles, industry related magazines, technical papers, books, government publications,
company and industry literature, and websites (Birks & Mills, 2011; Corbin & Strauss,
1990).
Significance of the Study
Understanding the health of the all-cargo industry is important to governments,
lenders to the industry, academics, and investors in air-cargo companies (Boeing, 2009).
Additionally, auditors require a bankruptcy risk model as part of their due diligence
responsibilities (McKee, 2007). The transport of cargo by air is an important part of the
global supply chain. Air cargo provides the ability to transport finished and unfinished
goods quickly to factories dispersed around the globe and to satisfy market demand for
goods produced great distances from their markets (IATA, 2010a). Additionally, the
transport by air of perishable goods allows producers to supply flowers and fresh fruit out
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of season throughout the world (Becker & Dill, 2007; Hellermann, 2006). The health of
the air-cargo industry can have a direct impact on the ability to transport goods by air
effectively and; therefore, can directly affect the supply chain and the world economy
(Boeing, 2009; IATA, 2010a).
This study examined the nonstatistical factors that influenced the Kroeze K-score
bankruptcy prediction model, which is a variation of the Altman Z-score, a widely used
bankruptcy prediction model (Wetter & Wennberg, 2009). The Kroeze K-score model
has an advantage over the Altman model because it has been specifically calibrated to the
aviation industry (Kroeze, 2005). This research provides insight into the nonstatistical
factors that influence not only the Kroeze model, but could also affect any model based
on the Altman Z-score. This grounded theory research adds to the body of literature in
two ways. First, the research extends the literature on the financial modeling of firms and
provides another tool to determine the financial health of a company. Second, this
research adds to the body of airline-specific papers and provides all-cargo airline
management with a tool to help identify nonstatistical issues affecting the financial health
of the company, which may allow management to alter decisions to improve a firm's
financial situation.
Definitions
Below is a list of terms germane to this study.
All-cargo airlines. All-cargo airlines are airlines that specialize in transporting
only freight (Wensveen, 2007).
Altman Z”-score. The Altman Z”-score is an updated Altman Z-score
bankruptcy prediction model of the form Z” = 6.56(X1) + 3.26(X2) + 6.72(X3) +
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1.05(X4) + 3.25. In the Z”-score model, X1 = working capital/total assets, X2 = retained
earnings/total assets, X3 = operating income/total assets, and X4 = book value of
equity/total liabilities (Altman & Hotchkiss, 2006).
Bankruptcy. Bankruptcy occurs with a firm’s declaration of bankruptcy to a
judicial organization, normally when a firm’s total liabilities exceed the value of its total
assets (Altman & Hotchkiss, 2006).
Book value of equity. Book value of equity is total assets over total liabilities,
sometimes referred to as net assets (Stickney & Weil, 2000).
Cargo aircraft. Cargo aircraft are aircraft built or converted to carry only freight
(Wensveen, 2007).
Cargo revenue ton-miles. Cargo revenue ton-mile is a measure of efficiency in
the air-cargo industry calculated as revenue-generating cargo times the miles transported,
which can also be shown as revenue ton-kilometers (RTKs) (Wensveen, 2007).
Default. Default occurs when a firm violates a condition of an agreement with a
creditor, such as missing a scheduled loan or bond payment (Altman & Hotchkiss, 2006).
Distressed. Distressed firms are firms that have had consecutive financial losses,
but are not necessarily bankrupt (Ward, 2007). Most bankruptcy models predict financial
distress in a firm (Altman & Hotchkiss, 2006; Gritta & Lippman, 2010).
Failure. Failure occurs when the realized rate of return on capital is lower than
prevailing rates on similar investments (Altman & Hotchkiss, 2006).
Freight tonnes-kilometers (FTKs). Freight tonnes-kilometer is an efficiency
measurement in the air-cargo industry calculated as total freight tonnes carried times the
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total number of kilometers flown (e.g., one tonne of cargo carried one kilometer)(Boeing,
2010).
Insolvency. Insolvency occurs when a firm cannot meet its current obligations,
possibly leading to bankruptcy if the obligations cannot be covered in the short term
(Altman & Hotchkiss, 2006).
Kroeze K-score. The Kroeze K-Score bankruptcy prediction model is based on
the Altman Z”-score model, altered to improve the bankruptcy prediction capability in
the passenger airline industry. The Kroeze K-Score model is of the form K = .268(X1) +
.838(X2) + .111(X3) + έ, where X1 = working capital/total assets, X2 = retained
earnings/total assets, X3 = book value of equity/total liabilities, έ = error term, and K =
overall index (Kroeze, 2005).
Operating income. Operating income is the profit realized from a business
operation, excluding operating expenses and depreciation from gross income (“Operating
Income,” 2010). Operating income is also known as operating profit and is calculated as
gross income minus operating expenses minus depreciation (“Operating Income,” 2010).
Retained earnings. Retained earnings score is calculated as the net income over
the life of a firm, less all dividends. Retained earnings can also be stated as the owners’
equity less capital invested (Stickney & Weil, 2000).
Total assets. Total assets are the total items a firm owns, normally identified as
current or fixed, current being items that will be consumed within 1 year. Fixed assets
are expected to provide benefits for more than 1 year, such as buildings or airplanes
(“Total Assets,” 2010).
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Total liabilities. Total liabilities of a firm are the total debts or obligations, such
as accounts payable, accrued liabilities, and other debts (“Total Liabilities,” 2010).
Working capital. Working capital is calculated as the current assets minus
current liabilities. Working capital is also called net working capital or net current assets
(Stickney & Weil, 2000).
Summary
All-cargo airlines are an integral part of the global supply chain, and their
financial health is important to maintaining an efficient supply chain (Boeing, 2009;
Hellermann, 2006). Cargo airlines tend to operate on low margins and are affected by
economic cycles, so they are prone to bankruptcy (Boeing, 2009; Hofer et al., 2009;
Kroeze, 2005). Because of the significant economic cost associated with bankruptcies
and the loss of air-cargo carrying capacity, the development of an accurate financial
distress forecasting model is important to financial institutions, users of the services,
suppliers, employees, and governments (Jones & Hensher, 2005).
Using grounded theory, this research was used to explore a popular bankruptcy
prediction model to determine external factors that may influence the model's prediction
ability in all-cargo airlines. This research expands on the work of Altman and Hotchkiss
(2006), Kroeze (2005), Hofer et al. (2009), Scaggs and Crawford (1986), and others in
relation to the financial modeling of firms and specifically to the all-cargo airline
industry.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
A review of the literature reveals the need for modifications to existing
bankruptcy prediction models for the all-cargo airline industry that explore nonstatistical
factors. The use of multiple discriminant analysis (MDA) and neural networks (NN) for
predicting financial distress in firms dominates the literature (Altman, 1968; Altman &
Hotchkiss, 2006; Gritta et al., 2000; Kroeze, 2005; Scaggs & Crawford, 1986); however,
statistical models have major limitations because they do not consider nonstatistical
factors influencing the financial health of a company (Ooghe et al., 2009; Wetter &
Wennberg, 2009). Examples of some of these nonstatistical factors may include airline
management, cultural themes, and the type of aircraft and route structure the airline uses.
This literature review is organized by the following themes. In the first section,
the nature of bankruptcy is discussed and a baseline understanding of bankruptcy is
provided. In the second section, the air-cargo industry, industry economics, fleet
management, air-cargo revenue management, and the difficulties related to revenue
management within the industry are discussed. In the third section, an overview of the
current state of predicting financial distress is provided as well as a review of Hofer et
al.’s study (2009) that examined the extent to which an airline’s financial distress affects
pricing behavior is discussed. The fourth and most extensive section is a detailed
description of some of the financial models found in the literature, which is needed to
understand how the models work and how qualitative factors may affect the models.
Altman’s (1968) seminal research using MDA to predict financial distress was explored
as well as the adjusted Kroeze K-Score model. In addition, the use of NN by Gritta,
Adrangi, Adams, and Tatyanina (2008) for predicting financial distress in firms is
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reviewed. The use of statistical methods are limited in bankruptcy prediction so the fifth
section contains a discussion of nonstatistical factors that may affect a model's prediction
capability, which may include management, cultural factors, and choices in aircraft and
routes (Gudmundsson, 2002; Ooghe et al., 2009). The final section provides an overview
of the development of grounded theory from Glaser and Strauss (1967) to current
literature on the use of grounded theory by Charmaz (2006) and Birks and Mills (2011).
Nature of Bankruptcy
The word bankruptcy originated from the Latin, meaning broken bench (Beraho,
2010). In Latin, bancusis a tradesman’s bench where Roman moneylenders conducted
their trade, and ruptus means rotten or broken; thus, these two words combined mean a
place of business that is rotten or broken (Beraho, 2010). While bankruptcy as a legal
recourse has been in place for over 2,000 years, the first authoritative bankruptcy laws
were developed in 16th century England (Beraho, 2010). At that time, bankruptcy was
considered a criminal offense, but today bankruptcy is based on prevention or corporate
reorganizations (Beraho, 2010).
Legal bankruptcy results from a legal judgment in which a creditor has filed a
petition against a debtor, or a debtor has voluntarily filed a petition of insolvency
(Beraho, 2010). Jones and Hensher (2005) noted that bankruptcy could inflict a major
economic and social cost on the economy. Ward (2007) echoed Jones and Hensher
stating that “bankruptcy is a legal event and not an economic event” (p. 95). Bankruptcy
usually occurs when a company declares a state of bankruptcy to a judicial organization,
normally when a company’s total liabilities exceed the value of its total assets (Altman &
Hotchkiss, 2006); therefore, the total net worth of the company is negative and often
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leads to an attempt to reorganize the company under the legal protection of the court
system or the total liquidation of the remaining assets (Altman & Hotchkiss, 2006).
While liquidation may occur after a formal declaration of bankruptcy, the intent of
modern bankruptcy laws is for the rehabilitation of the firm. In a bankruptcy, the firm is
given the opportunity, under protection of the courts from debtors, to reorganize, remain
viable, preserve employment opportunities, and retain whatever goodwill it still possesses
(Altman & Hotchkiss, 2006; Beraho, 2010). A firm having an economic value greater
than its liquidation value is a candidate for reorganization, but if the firm's economic
value is less than its liquidation value, then liquidation is generally the best alternative
(Altman & Hotchkiss, 2006).
Formal bankruptcy protection helps the economy by protecting businesses from
devastating financial adversity (Beraho, 2010); however, Hofer et al. (2009) stated that
current U.S. bankruptcy laws are intended for the dumbest competitor and undermines
responsible management and calls for bankruptcy laws that are aimed at rewarding
success and punishing failure. “Financially distressed and bankrupt firms sell at lower
prices than their healthier competitors” (Hofer et al., 2009, p. 239) and; therefore, cause a
negative economic impact on the industry.
Before a firm enters formal bankruptcy protection or moves straight to the
liquidation process, the firm typically moves through a continuum of financial distress
that may change from day to day (Ward, 2007). According to Ward, financial distress
occurs when a company has had consecutive losses, but is not necessarily bankrupt;
therefore, financial distress is an economic situation, but not necessarily a legal event; the
legal recognition of bankruptcy can occur whether or not a firm is economically insolvent
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(Ward, 2007). While the terms failure, insolvency, and bankruptcy are all terms of
financial distress, they are often used interchangeably in the literature; however, they are
distinct (Altman & Hotchkiss, 2006).
Goldratt and Cox (2004) noted that the goal of a business is to make money.
Financial failure occurs when the realized rate of return on capital is lower than
prevailing rates on similar investments, so again, like financial distress, failure is an
economic event (Altman & Hotchkiss, 2006). Failure only occurs with a formal
declaration of bankruptcy before the courts. Since failure is an economic situation, it
may not lead to discontinuance of the firm; in fact, some firms may be in a status of
failure for many years without failing because the firm meets its current obligations
(Altman & Hotchkiss, 2006). Normally, in the case of a failure in which the company
sustains for some extended period, the decision to stay operational is based on the
expected future returns (Altman & Hotchkiss, 2006). The aviation industry is a classic
example of an industry that operates in a constant state of failure (Hofer et al., 2009). As
a whole, the aviation industry often operates close to the realm of failure and often slips
in and out of bankruptcy protection (Hofer et al., 2009; Ribbink et al., 2009; Vasigh,
Fleming, & Tacker, 2008).
Insolvency occurs when a firm cannot meet its current obligations, normally due
to a lack of liquidity (Altman & Hotchkiss, 2006). Insolvency can be a temporary
condition, but can also possibly, though not necessarily, lead to bankruptcy if obligations
cannot be covered (Altman & Hotchkiss, 2006). Insolvency is often the cause of a formal
bankruptcy filing (Altman & Hotchkiss, 2006).
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There are many reasons why a firm may fail, but it normally comes down to
negative cash flow. While management failure is normally the core reason firms fail,
there are often several contributing factors (Altman & Hotchkiss, 2006; Hofer et al.,
2009). Altman and Hotchkiss listed reasons that firms fail that are germane to the
aviation industry. The first reason is that the aviation industry is considered a chronically
sick industry; that is, the industry operates on low margins and is in a constant state of
failure (Guzhva, 2008; Hofer et al., 2009; Vasigh et al., 2008). The second reason is that
the deregulation of the aviation industry in the late 1970s removed the protective cover of
government regulation and its artificial price controls (Altman & Hotchkiss, 2006; Chung
& Szenberg, 1996; Vasigh et al., 2008). The third reason is overcapacity. During the
1990s, rising demand for air-cargo transport due to the expanding economy resulted in
air-cargo carriers' adding capacity (Hellermann, 2006); however, since the events of
September 11, 2001, and the economic downturn in the second half of the first decade of
2000, the aviation industry has been forced to reduce capacity to the determent of
passenger service and availability of cargo space for cargo operators (Becker & Dill,
2007; Bisignani, 2006; Guzhva, 2008; Hellermann, 2006; Hofer et al., 2009; Vasigh et
al., 2008). Capacity; however, is difficult to alter because it must be adjusted in
relatively large increments (Hellermann, 2006). For example, adding one freighter to a
cargo company’s fleet could increase the total capacity by 5%-20%, depending on the
size of the existing fleet (Hellermann, 2006). Lastly, a reason for aviation's high rate of
failure is that the aviation industry is highly leveraged with high fixed and labor costs
(Bisignani, 2006; Vasigh et al., 2008).
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Air-Cargo Industry
Sir Richard Branson, founder of Virgin Atlantic Airways, summed up the aviation
business: “If you want to be a millionaire, start with a billion dollars and open an airline.
Soon enough you will be a millionaire” (Vasigh et al., 2008, p. 1).
Three types of aviation companies that deal with the transport of air cargo exist:
(a) the integrators, also known as express carriers; (b) combination carriers, which are
passenger airlines that offer lower deck or belly cargo space for the transport of cargo;
and (c) the pure all-cargo air carriers (Hellermann, 2006; Wensveen, 2007). The
integrators, such as UPS, Federal Express, and DHL provide door-to-door transport as a
packaged or integrated service (Hellermann, 2006; Wensveen, 2007). Integrators
typically own or control the entire supply chain from the pickup and delivery trucks,
sorting facility, and air assets and focus on the transportation of small packages, normally
less than 100 pounds (Hellermann, 2006). The combination carriers are passenger
airlines that offer belly cargo space for the transport of cargo. Combination carriers
typically offer point-to-point air transportation for cargo and rely on freight forwarders
for pickup and delivery service (Wensveen, 2007). About half of all air cargo moved is
via belly space on passenger airlines, where a large majority of this supply is driven by
unrelated market demand, the demand for air passenger transport in this case
(Hellermann, 2006). Belly cargo is a co-product of passenger service, so the combination
carriers have a lower marginal cost and; therefore, can offer the service more cheaply
than the integrators (Wensveen, 2007). The third type of air-cargo carrier is the pure allcargo carrier. All-cargo carriers operate dedicated freighter aircraft and do not service
the passenger market. All-cargo carriers tend to deal with a small client base with most
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of the client base comprising freight forwarders that normally make large bookings
(Becker & Dill, 2007, Hellermann, 2006). Freight forwarders or intermediaries
consolidate multiple smaller shipments from various clients into larger shipments,
effectively buying cargo slots on aircraft wholesale and reselling retail to smaller shippers
(Hellermann, 2006). Freight forwarders conclude long-term contacts with all-cargo
carriers to gain lower purchasing prices, guarantee slots, and hedge against price
fluctuation (Hellermann, 2006). Except for the express carriers, the extensive use of
freight forwards essentially makes the air-cargo market a business-to-business (B2B)
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Forwarder

All-cargo

Forwarder

Combination

Shipper

Integrator

Air cargo Carrier

service (Hellermann, 2006). Figure 1 depicts the typical air-cargo supply chain.

Figure 1. Simplified diagram of the air-cargo supply chain. Adapted from "Capacity
Options for Revenue Management: Theory and Applications in the Air Cargo Industry,"
by R. Hellermann, 2006, p. 6. Copyright 2006 by Springer-Verlag Heidelberg, Germany.
Used with permission.
A number of small operators owning only a few aircraft dominate the air-cargo
industry. No definitive list of all of the world's all-cargo airlines from any source was
available. The most definitive list of U.S.-active, all-cargo airlines was adapted from the
U.S. Department of Transportation, Research and Innovative Technology Administration
(RITA) TranStats database (see Appendix A).
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According to Wensveen (2007), senior management of passenger airlines
considers freighter aircraft as unprofitable and a poor investment, especially when
compared to the cargo carried in the belly of passenger aircraft (Wensveen, 2007). Part
of the senior airline managers may be due to the passenger-centric focus of the passenger
airlines (Becker & Dill, 2007); however, some of the combination carriers make one third
to one-half of their gross revenues from belly cargo (Wensveen, 2007). The problem
with the shipment of cargo by passenger aircraft is that capacity is uncertain until near
departure time because capacity is dependent on the number of passengers and the
volume and weight of their baggage (Becker & Dill, 2007; Hellermann, 2006).
Additionally, since one of the advantages of transportation by air is speed, urgent or
perishable cargo dominates the market (Becker & Dill, 2007). This need for speed means
that often the demand for air-cargo carriage is generated on short notice (Becker & Dill,
2007). The delay in booking hinders the air-cargo industry from maximizing its revenue
management system. More details on revenue management will be discussed in the aircargo revenue management section later in this chapter.
Table 1 provides a ranking of the top 10 cargo airlines by freight tonne-kilometers
(FTK). Freight tonne-kilometers is an efficiency measure in the air-cargo industry and is
calculated as total freight tonnes carried times the total number of kilometers flown (e.g.,
one tonne of cargo carried one kilometer; Boeing, 2010). Table 1 lists two of the
integrator airlines (Federal Express and UPS), but only one all-cargo carrier, Cargolux, in
the top ten airlines by FTKs. The remaining operators are passenger airlines that supply
belly space and, counter to Wensveen’s (2007) assertion that airline management does
not consider freighter profitable, they all also operate dedicated freighter aircraft. The
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table also confirms that the all-cargo industry comprises many smaller all-cargo carriers
with no dominant players, since only one all-cargo airline, Cargolux, is in the top 10, and
none of the U.S. all-cargo airlines is present on the list (see Appendix A).
Table 1
Top 10 Scheduled Airlines Ranked by Freight Tonne-Kilometers Carried for year 2010
Rank

Airline

Millions of FTKs

Industry sector

1

Korean Air

8,225

Combination and freighters

2

Cathay Pacific Airways

7,722

Combination and freighters

3

Lufthansa

6,660

Combination and freighters

4

Singapore Airlines

6,455

Combination and freighters

5

Emirates

6,369

Combination and freighters

6

Federal Express

5,808

Integrator

7

China Airlines

4,903

Combination and freighter

8

Air France

4,672

Combination and freighter

9

Cargolux

4,652

All-cargo

10

UPS Airlines

4,652

Integrator

Note. Data obtained from “Top 50 Airlines,”AirCargoWorld.com, September 2010 and “World Air
Transport Statistics,” IATA 2010b.

According to Boeing (2010), in 2009 there were 1,755 freighter aircraft in
operation worldwide. Of these, 37% were standard-body aircraft with a carrying capacity
of less than 45 tonnes (e.g., DC-9, A320) while 36% of the fleet were medium wide-body
aircraft that carry between 40 and 80 tonnes (e.g., B777, A330, IL-76), and the remaining
27% were large wide-body aircraft that carry in excess of 80 tonnes (e.g., B747, MD-11,
AN-124) (Boeing, 2009, 2010). The freighter aircraft fleet is projected to grow to almost
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3,000 aircraft by 2029 with a shift to a larger percentage of wide-body aircraft according
to the Boeing report (2010). Table 2 lists the most common freighters grouped into size
categories used by cargo airlines.
Table 2
Freighter Fleet Grouped Into Size Categories
Standard-body
(<45 tonnes)
BAe 146
DC-9
B737
B727
TU-204
B-707

Medium wide-body
(40-80 tonnes)
B767
A300
A310
L-1011SF
DC-10
B787

DC-8
B757-200
A320
-

A330
A340-300SF
B777-A SF
IL-76 TD

Large
(>80 tonnes)
MD-11
B747
B777
A340-600SF
A350
A380 (cargo version not
in production)
IL-96T
AN-124
-

Note. Adapted from “World Air Cargo Forecast 2008-2009,” by Boeing, 2009. Copyright 2009 by Boeing.
Used with permission.

Of all of the freighter aircraft, the quintessential aircraft is the Boeing B747.
Developed as the world’s first jumbo jet, the Boeing B747 entered into commercial
service in 1970; today, the freighter version provides over half of the world’s total
freighter capacity (Boeing, n.d., 2010; Wensveen, 2007). The newest version of the
Boeing B747 freighter is the -8F model, which has a range of 4,390 nautical miles and
can carry 140 tonnes of cargo (Boeing, n.d.). The retail price in 2008 of a Boeing B747-8
freighter was just over $300 million (Boeing, n.d.). After several years of production
delays, Cargolux is slated to receive the first B747-8 freighter in late 2011 (Boeing, n.d.).
Company background. This section provides further background information
for the six airlines that were selected as the sample for this study for analysis using
grounded theory. In grounded theory, theoretical sampling provides direction for
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subsequent data collection in a process of constant comparative analysis. This study
started with initial purposeful sampling of 17 U.S. all-cargo airlines, and from the 17
airlines, six were selected based on the results of the K-Score model. Data from the six
selected all-cargo carriers were collected, analyzed, and compared using grounded theory
methodology. This section provides an overview of each of the six all-cargo carriers that
were selected.
ABX Air, Inc. Between 2005 and 2009, ABX Air, Inc. (ABX) provided
scheduled and ad hoc charter air-cargo transportation along with package handling,
warehousing, and line-haul trucking service to its main customer DHL Express (DHL)
(ABX Air, 2006). In 2005, ABX operated a network of 19 logistical hubs for DHL in the
United States. On a smaller scale, ABX offered aircraft, crew, maintenance, and
insurance (ACMI) services, also known as wet leasing, for which ABX provided the
aircraft, crew, maintenance, and insurance to a customer as well as selling aircraft parts,
providing maintenance and repair services, and flight-training services (ABX Air, 2006).
ABX was originally founded in 1980 as part of Airborne, Inc. and became an
independent publicly traded company in August of 2003 as part of the breakup of
Airborne and the subsequent merger between Airborne and DHL (ABX Air, 2006).
The ACMI and hub service agreement with DHL, their main customer in 2005,
provided for a cost-plus pricing structure with a mark-up of 1.75%. In 2005, ABX
operated a mixed fleet of 112 aircraft (Boeing 767, DC-8 and DC-9 aircraft) all
manufactured prior to 1990, and some over 35 years old (ABX Air, 2006). Older aircraft
have a higher operating cost due to limited parts inventories, higher fuel burn rates, and
higher maintenance cost. On December 31, 2007, ABX merged with Capital Cargo
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International Airlines and Air Transport International, and all three airlines became
subsidiaries to the newly formed holding company Air Transport Services Group, Inc.
(ATSG), a publicly traded holding company on the NASDAQ Stock Market (SEC,
2010). In 2008, DHL, ABX’s main customer began to restructure its operations in the
United States because of substantial financial losses and closed its U.S. operations in
2009 (SEC, 2010). ABX continued to operate international delivery services to the U.S.
for DHL and entered into a lease of 13 Boeing 767 aircraft to DHL through 2017. At the
end of 2009, ABX operated 62 aircraft (Boeing 767, Boeing 757, and DC-8s). This
represents about a 45% reduction in the number of aircraft over the 2005 fleet size. For
the five years included in this study, ABX Air had a negative K-score, indicating that the
company was in financial distress during the entire study timeframe.
Arrow Air, Inc. Arrow Air was originally established in 1947 in California, and
the company moved to Florida in 1964. Arrow Air is most famous for the December
1985 crash of Arrow Air Flight 1285 in Gander Newfoundland, killing 248 members of
the U.S. Army’s 101st Airborne Division, and 8 crewmembers. In January 2004, just
prior to the 2005-2009 sample window of this study, Arrow Air Inc, (dba Arrow Cargo)
filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection, but emerged 6 months later in June 2004 after
court approved restructuring (South Florida Sun–Sentinel, 2005). In 2004, Arrow
operated the industry’s largest fleet of DC-8 freighter aircraft, older aircraft with high
fuel burn rates and more costly to maintain, and had 520 employees (South Florida Sun–
Sentinel, 2005). By the next year, 2005, Arrow employed 750 people (South Florida
Sun–Sentinel, 2005). After the 2004 restructuring, Arrow began to acquire larger, more
fuel efficient DC-10 freighter aircraft and started to phase out the DC-8 fleet.
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In 2008, MatlinPatterson Global Advisers acquired an 85% stake in Arrow Air
and intended to increase the fleet of DC-10 freighter aircraft and finish the phase out of
DC-8s (“MatlinPatterson Global Opportunities Partners,” 2008). MatlinPatterson
specialized in distressed debt ownership of firms (Stempal, 2010). In 2008, Arrow
operated 10 cargo aircraft (six DC-10s and four DC-8s) and served more than 3,500
customers, mainly in the United States, Central and South America, and the Caribbean
(“MatlinPatterson Global Opportunities Partners,” 2008). By Midyear 2010; however,
Arrow again entered Chapter 11, and the company was liquidated after failing to find a
buyer, laying off its workforce of 540 employees (Stempal, 2010). Arrow Air emerged
from Chapter 11 the year before this study’s period (2005-2009) and reentered Chapter
11 the year after this study window. During the five years that this researcher examined
financial data, Arrow retained a negative K-score for the entire period, indicating ongoing
financial distress.
Atlas Air Inc. Atlas Air was founded in 1992 and was a wholly owned subsidiary
of Atlas Air Worldwide Holdings (AAWW), which also owns Polar Air Cargo. Atlas
mainly operates in the ACMI cargo aircraft leasing market. Atlas typically provides an
aircraft with crew, maintenance, and insurance and is paid a fixed hourly rate with other
operating expenses such as fuel, landing fees, and ground handling being paid for by the
customer; this type of arrangement is called a dry lease (Atlas Air, 2006). Atlas also
operated in the Air Mobility Command (AMC) charter market, flying cargo under
contract to the U.S. Military, although within AAWW, the majority of this business was
flown by Polar Air. In January 2004, Atlas, along with its holding company and other
subsidiaries, entered Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection, reorganized, and reemerged 6
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months later in July 2004 (Atlas Air, 2006). This bankruptcy coincided with the
bankruptcy and reemergence of Arrow Air. In 2005 Atlas was the sole service provider
of the Boeing 747-400 freighter aircraft, so it had no direct competition in this market;
however, Atlas also leased older, less fuel-efficient Boeing 747-200 freighters, which had
more market competition (Atlas Air, 2006). The Boeing 747-400 had the best operating
performance in the intercontinental airfreighter market at that time. As of 2005, Atlas
operated a common fleet of 15 Boeing 747-400 freighters, which increased to 22 B747400s by 2009 (Atlas Air, 2010). In 2009, the average age of Atlas’s B747-400 aircraft
was less than 20. Atlas emerged from Chapter 11 the year before this study’s window,
but retained a positive K-score value throughout the five years covered by this research.
Cargo 360, Inc and Southern Air Inc. Cargo 360 was established in 2006 and
was based in Seattle, Washington. Oak Hill Capital Partners owned a majority of Cargo
360 from the beginning and acquired Southern Air in 2008. Oak Hill merged Cargo 360
into Southern Air in 2008 and established operations in Norwalk, Conn, operating a fleet
of 13 Boeing 747-200s (Santiago, 2007). Cargo 360 provided ACMI services to the
Pacific Rim mainly under contract with Korean Air Cargo. Southern Air offered ACMI
and charter cargo services including AMC charter flights supporting the U.S. military.
Cargo 360 operated for two years (2006-2007) during the years of this study before
merging with Southern Air. For both of these years, Cargo 360 had a negative K-score
value, indicating financial distress, which could be expected for a startup company. From
2005 to 2007 at the time of the merger, Southern had a positive K-score, which indicates
no financial distress; however, from 2008 to the end of this study in 2009 (after the
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merger) Southern had a negative K-score, indicating financial distress possibly caused by
the merger of the weaker Cargo 360.
Gemini Air Cargo Airways. Gemini Air Cargo was founded in 1995 and
provided ACMI using DC-10 freighter aircraft and was based out of Dulles, Virginia.
Gemini also provided international and domestic scheduled service to international air
carriers, airfreight forwarders, and AMC. In 2006, Gemini operated seven DC-10 and
four MD-11 freighter aircraft, servicing customers that included DHL, Air Canada, and
FedEx (Boyd, 2006). As with many airlines, after the terrorist attacks on September 11,
2001, Gemini saw a downturn in business and went through an out of court financial
restructuring in 2003 as Gemini started to receive increased business from AMC cargo:
however, Gemini entered the formal Chapter 11 process in March 2006 after failing to
comply with several financial covenants (Boyd, 2006). Gemini emerged four months
later with fresh capital from Bayside Holdings (Boyd, 2006); however, this fresh capital
did not help, and Gemini entered Chapter 11 in 2008 and ceased operations. For both
years of data available during this study period (2005 and 2006), Gemini had a negative
K-score, indicating financial distress, which proved to be true because Gemini entered
Chapter 11 twice during the studies time period.
Kitty Hawk Air Cargo. Kitty Hawk Air Cargo was a cargo airline that was
originally founded in 1989 and was based in Grapevine Texas. Kitty Hawk Air Cargo
was a wholly-owned subsidiary of Kitty Hawk, Inc. Kitty Hawk Air Cargo mainly
provided airfreight services, ACMI, and ad-hoc charter to a variety of customers (SEC,
2006). As of 2005, Kitty Hawk Air Cargo operated seven Boeing 737 freighter aircraft
and 10 Boeing 727 freighters (SEC, 2006). Kitty Hawk Air Cargo serviced over 550
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freight forwarders and logistic company customers in 2005, with the top 25 customers
accounting for more than 65% of their scheduled freight revenue (SEC, 2006). Kitty
Hawk employed 618 full and part-time employees in 2005. Kitty Hawk Air Cargo, along
with its parent company Kitty Hawk, Inc. was under Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection
from 2000 to 2002 when it emerged after reorganization; however, the firm slipped back
into bankruptcy and liquidation in 2008. Kitty Hawk stated the reason for the failure was
significant losses due to high fuel prices and weakness in demand for airfreight services.
During the research window from 2005 to 2009, Kitty Hawk showed a positive K-score
for the years 2005, 2006, and 2007, which incorrectly indicated a firm not in financial
distress.
This section contained an outline of the air-cargo industry, the types of air
carriers, key firms in the industry, and type of aircraft typically used and included some
of the challenges faced by the air-cargo industry. Also included was background
information of the six airlines that made-up the sample in this study. The next section
will delve into the economics of air-cargo operations.
Industry Economics
“The aviation industry is capital intensive and highly leveraged” (Chung &
Szenberg, 1996, p. 135), and the need to buy and operate expensive aircraft requires
extensive financing (Boeing, n.d.). The airline industry’s debt load exceeds most
industry averages. In fact, the ratio of long-term debt to total capitalization has been
estimated at more than 50% (Boeing, n.d.; Chung & Szenberg, 1996; Hellermann, 2006;
Kroeze, 2005). Because of the high capitalization of the aviation industry, the financial
health of the industry is highly correlated with the global economy (Vasigh et al., 2008).
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As debt loads increase from the purchase of expensive aircraft and high operating
expenses, so does the likelihood of financial distress (Kroeze, 2005). Vasigh et al. (2008)
noted that this financial distress was not surprising, as the aviation industry is highly
related to economic growth; thus, the industry suffers when the economy stalls.
Hellermann (2006) supported Vasigh et al. by stating that economic fluctuation affects
air-cargo carriers in an amplified way. As the world’s economy expands, so does the
demand for the movement of air cargo. In 2009, fuel prices increased, putting additional
financial pressure on the aviation industry (Boeing, 2009).
The air-cargo industry, like the passenger airline industry, is reactive to national
and world economies (Chung & Szenberg, 1996). An expanding economy leads to
increased production, which results in an increase in demand for air cargo. Table 3
shows the U.S. real gross domestic product (GDP) for the Years 2003-2009 and the
growth of air-cargo traffic based on freight tonnes. World air-cargo demand tends to
drop off quickly as the world economy begins to stall, but also tends to be an early
indicator of economic recovery, as demand increases early in the economic upturn. This
trend is evident in Table 3 in that the growth in air-cargo traffic peaked in 2006, whereas
real GCP lags behind air-cargo traffic and starts to level in 2007 and decrease in 2009.
An economic downturn can quickly result in an overcapacity in the cargo airlines,
and an upturning economy can quickly leave the industry with too little capacity.
Obtaining a new aircraft requires a long lead-time, so airline companies attempt to time
the purchase of aircraft to coincide with a predicted future upturn in the economy
(Hellermann, 2006). If management gets it right, then the new aircraft arrive in time to
meet the increase in demand as the economy heats up, but getting the timing wrong
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means that management is left with an expensive asset that cannot be fully utilized
(Hellermann, 2006). For example, Cargolux was to receive their first new Boeing 747-8
freighter aircraft in 2009. At that time, there was overcapacity in the industry, not a good
time to be adding capacity; however, due to production delays, Cargolux is currently not
scheduled to receive their first B747-8F until the fall of 2011 (Boeing, n.d.). Because of
under capacity in the industry in 2010, Cargolux had to lease two older aircraft that were
more costly to operate aircraft to meet demand (Cargolux, 2010).
Table 3
U.S. Real Gross Domestic Product (GCP) From 2003-2009

Year
2003

Change from
preceding period in
real GDP (%)
2.5

Real GDP (%)
(Index 2005=100)
93.69

Growth in air-cargo
traffic (%) (based
on freight tonnes)
-6.67

2004

3.6

97.04

9.95

2005

3.1

100.00

2.26

2006

2.7

102.67

5.85

2007

1.9

104.67

5.03

2008

0.0

104.67

-3.11

2009

-2.6

101.92

-8.89

Note. Source for GDP, Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Department of Commerce. National Income
and Product Account (NIPA) historical tables. Accessed 19 Jan 2011; Source for growth in air traffic was
IATA Financial Forecast, December 2010.

One of the reasons why the aviation industry has financial difficulties and low
profit margins is that demand fluctuates constantly, but supply is relatively fixed. This is
true for both passenger and cargo airlines (Vasigh et al., 2008). This fluctuation in
demand makes it hard to optimize the use of available capacity (Vasigh et al., 2008).
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Yield or revenue management is the process the aviation industry uses in an attempt to
level out the demand fluctuations (Hellermann, 2006; Vasigh et al., 2008). The next
section of this chapter includes the fleet management procedures used by airlines when
deciding what type of aircraft to use, a potentially important nonstatistical aspect
influencing the accuracy of bankruptcy prediction.
Fleet Management
To achieve economies of scale, airlines prefer to operate a limited number of
different types of aircraft (Fleming & Tacker, 2008; Vasigh et al., 2008). For example,
Southwest Airlines only operates a common fleet of Boeing 737s, and Cargolux operates
Boeing 747s (Cargolux, 2010; Vasigh et al., 2008). Fleet management is the planning
process to determine the type and mix of aircraft to operate. Fleet planning is a
cornerstone of airline operational efficiency and is essential for the medium- and longterm planning process and the long-term financial survivability of an airline (Flouris,
2010). Aircraft are an expensive asset, and because of the high change over cost (retraining of flight crews, maintenance crews, ground equipment, spare parts inventories),
the introduction of a new fleet of aircraft takes times and is a strategic management
decision (Flouris, 2010). Once purchased, a typical aircraft type may be used for 10-20
years by an airline (Flouris, 2010). Operating a common fleet has the advantage of
increased operational flexibility, because it is easier to find replacement aircraft or flight
crew in the event of irregular operations (Vasigh et al., 2008). Once the fleet mix is
determined, strict air-cargo revenue management processes are needed.
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Air-Cargo Revenue Management
The all-cargo airline business is capital intensive because of the need to own and
maintain aircraft (Kroeze, 2005). The all-cargo airlines struggle for market share, operate
on low margins, need high cash flow to stay solvent, and are heavily tied to economic
cycles; thus, all-cargo airlines constantly live on the brink of bankruptcy (Boeing, 2009;
Hofer et al., 2009; Kroeze, 2005).
The air-cargo industry differs from the passenger industry in that cargo is
normally not booked round trip, so cargo flow is unpaired and often unbalanced. For
example, there may be more demand for cargo moving in one direction than the other
(Hellermann, 2006). This situation often requires cargo airlines to fly less-than-full
aircraft on some routes. For example, an airline may have to fly a less-than-full aircraft
to China and return with a full aircraft. Unlike passenger aircraft for which there is a
fixed capacity (i.e., seats), cargo is multidimensional (volume and weight), so the load
must be balanced and optimized by mixing cargo of different volumes and weights to
maximize the load. Optimization of cargo loads requires in-depth planning, but some
space can be sold twice (“e.g., to one customer with voluminous, light cargo and another
with heavy-weight, high-density cargo”; Hellermann, 2006, p. 7). All-cargo airlines also
differ from passenger airlines in routing possibilities. Cargo does not have to fly a direct
route; the only constraint is the required delivery time (Hellermann, 2006).
Revenue management planning in the air-cargo business is much more difficult
than in the passenger airline industry (Becker & Dill, 2007). Passenger airlines have a
vast amount of historical booking data they use to determine demand and pricing on
various routes, which the cargo airlines lack (Hellermann, 2006). Because of the
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differences between the supply and demand of the two airline industries, revenue
management for cargo airlines is more complex than for passenger only airlines (Becker
& Dill, 2007). The capacity supply issues include the following: (a) uncertainty of
capacity offer, (b) multidimensional capacity, (c) heterogeneous production platforms, (d)
large number of routing possibilities, and (e) restrictions, and multisegment flights
(Becker & Dill, 2007). Meanwhile, market demand issues include stowage loss, unequal
trade lanes, short booking periods, volatile business, continuous show-up rates, market
structure, and data shortcomings (Becker & Dill, 2007). For cargo shipments, the
capacity for cargo is unpredictable until close to the time of departure (Becker & Dill,
2007); that is, the weight or volume may fluctuate, taking up more or less room on the
aircraft, unlike passenger airlines in which a seat is a seat. Another issue is market
structure. Air-cargo airlines typically only provide capacity to a limited number of
customers, such as freight forwarders, who make the most of the bookings (Hellermann,
2006); therefore, the loss of one booking can have a large impact on the revenue for that
flight. Seasonal fluctuation can also affect air-cargo operations in the short term by
leading to under capacity in the high season, such as the months leading up to the winter
holidays, or overcapacity in the low season, such as after the holiday rush (Kroeze, 2005).
Thus far, this chapter has included the nature of bankruptcy in general and
provided some background on the air-cargo industry, the economics factors that can
affect the industry, and the use of revenue management within the industry. The next
section of this chapter contains the use of various models to predict financial distress in a
firm in general and specifically the use of these models in predicting financial distress in
the aviation industry.
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Predicting Financial Distress
Research on financial distress in a company has produced various models since
the 1960s (McKee, 2007), but there is no agreement on the best methodology (Hensher &
Jones, 2007; Ribbink et al., 2009; Ward, 2007). With the recent spate of highly
publicized corporate failures, the need for management, investors, and other stakeholders
to be able to predict impending financial distress has grown. As noted above, all-cargo
airlines operate on low margins and need high cash flow to stay solvent (Boeing, 2009;
Hofer et al., 2009; Kroeze, 2005). High fuel cost, high labor cost, and expensive fixed
assets contribute to low-operating margins for air-cargo airlines and make them prone to
bankruptcy (Boeing, 2009; Ribbink et al., 2009); however, the air-cargo industry is
critical to the world economy because it provides fast, secure trade over long distances
for shippers of high-value and perishable goods.
Financial distress is the circumstance in which the liquidation value of a firm’s
assets is less than the total face value of creditor claims (Chen, Weston, & Altman, 1995).
During financial distress periods, airlines may file for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection
to obtain reductions in labor, leasing, and debt costs (Hofer et al., 2009). This move, in
turn, may give the distressed firm a competitive edge. Because prior research had
suggested distressed airlines lower their fares as they approached bankruptcy, Hofer et al.
examined the extent to which an airline’s financial distress affects pricing behavior.
Hofer et al. used the Altman’s Z”-score model to determine which airlines were in
distress and then compared the level of financial distress to ticket prices. Hofer et al.
found financially distressed firms tend to reduce prices. Airlines heading into Chapter 11
bankruptcy protection tended to reduce fares by an average of 5.6% within 90-180 days
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prior to filing for bankruptcy protection (Borenstein & Rose, 1995); however, even with
reduced fares, firms that entered Chapter 11 tended to see a decline in market share on
existing routes (Borenstein & Rose, 1995).
Financial Models
Bankruptcy financial models are used to predict the future financial health of a
company. Many financial modeling techniques are available, but there is no agreement
within academia or the financial industry on which model is best (Hensher & Jones,
2007; Ribbink et al., 2009; Ward, 2007). In fact, certain models tend to work better than
others in certain industries, and most models need to be calibrated to specific industry
groups (Kroeze, 2005). One of the more common financial bankruptcy models discussed
in the literature is the Altman Z-score model developed by Altman in a 1967 dissertation
and published in the Journal of Finance in 1968. This seminal work has been altered
over the last 40 years by Altman (Altman & Hotchkiss, 2006) and others (Chung &
Szenberg, 1996; Kroeze, 2005; Ribbink et al., 2009; Scaggs & Crawford, 1986) and
tested on numerous companies.
Ward (2007) examined the construct validity of different financial models for
predicting financial distress. Ward scrutinized three response variables, compared the
stability of the results to determine their validity, and theorized that unstable response
variables would indicate that they were measuring different constructs. Also posited was
that previous studies had been dependent on the response variable used. A financially
distressed company is defined as a firm that has consecutive losses, possibly indicating a
cash flow problem, but not necessarily headed to bankruptcy (Altman & Hotchkiss,
2006). Ward (2007) observed that companies typically do not fall into a simple bankrupt
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or nonbankrupt status, but move through different degrees of financial distress that may
vary from day to day, and bankruptcy is a legal event, not an economic matter. Even
though bankruptcy may take on different degrees of distress, many of the current
financial models provide only a black or white (bankrupt or not) result. The results of
prior financial distress studies that used different measures of financial distress cannot be
compared because they had different constructs (Ward, 2007).
Not all financial models need to be complicated. For example, Liu (2009)
examined the link between an airline’s financial condition and its probability of entering
new markets. The model used for Liu’s research focused on financially distressed
airlines and not bankrupt firms, so only basic financial ratios were used instead of the
bankruptcy models proposed by Altman (1968). Liu noted that a firm can be financially
strong, but if faced with weak demand can quickly become economically distressed or
can have strong demand, but be financially weak due to poor management. Liu’s
research also included nonfinancial variables, such as large hub and slot-controlled
airports, which could be barriers for entry into new airport-pair markets. To limit
congestion, slot-controlled airports ration the number of landings and take-offs an airline
can do each day. Slot-controlled airports (i.e., in the United States, only Chicago O’Hare,
Reagan National, New York LaGuardia, and New York Kennedy) tend to affect only
passenger airlines; all-cargo airlines tend to stay away from these airports because of
congestion and cost (Liu, 2009). Liu found that legacy carriers are less likely to enter
new markets as the carriers leverage increases and postulated that a distressed airline acts
more conservatively in the end, but has an aggressive pricing strategy in the short run.
Liu’s simplified model predicted short-term financial distress in the aviation industry;
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however, an in-depth model is needed to predict bankruptcy accurately several years into
the future.
The use of statistical models has been questioned by some authors because of
their inability to take qualitative information into consideration (Fabozzi, Chen, Hu, &
Pan, 2010; Liu, 2009). In some cases, quantitative models may classify a company as in
financial distress, but the firm may never fail because of proactive action by management
or other attributes that quantitative models cannot detect (Fabozzi et al., 2010). The
results of most statistical techniques used in bankruptcy prediction modeling provide
analogous results (Ooghe et al., 2009). As there appears to be little difference in the
bankruptcy predictive abilities of most statistical failure models, it is important to explore
nonstatistical factors, such as company management and economic and industry
influences, which statistical methods cannot measure (Ooghe et al., 2009). Recent
research has concluded that stand-alone traditional statistical models are limited in their
bankruptcy prediction ability and nonstatistical factors should be investigated (Ooghe et
al., 2009; Youn & Gu, 2010). Wetter and Wennberg (2009) supported Ooghe et al.
(2009) and Youn and Gu's (2010) assertion that pure statistical methods have major
limitations while nonstatistical factors should be explored. The following section will
discuss the more widely used financial bankruptcy models and the advantages and
disadvantages of each.
Altman Z-score model. Throughout the literature, the Altman Z-score is touted
as one of the seminal works on bankruptcy prediction (Wetter & Wennberg, 2009). In
Altman’s (1967) dissertation work, he developed a bankruptcy prediction model for
manufacturing firms using multiple discriminant analysis (MDA). For predictive
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variables, the model used five independent financial ratios based on a company’s
liquidity, profitability, solvency, and capital turnover. The Altman Z-score model is of
the form Z = .012(X1) + .014(X2) + .033(X3) + .006(X4) + .999(X5), where X1 =
working capital/total assets, X2 = retained earnings/total assets, X3 = earnings before
interest and taxes/total assets, X4 = market value equity/book value of total debt, X5 =
sales/total assets, and Z = overall index. Altman tested the model on 66 manufacturing
firms and derived a discriminant function (or Z-Score) for each of the companies using
MDA (Altman, 1967). The dependent variable, the Z-score, was then used to classify
companies as either bankrupt or nonbankrupt with some falling into a gray area when the
model could not determine the bankruptcy potential of a firm (being too close to call or
what Altman called the zone of ignorance) (Altman, 1967). The model developed by
Altman correctly predicted corporate bankruptcies in 94% of the samples (66
manufacturing firms) 1 year in advance of failure (Altman, 1967). Altman found the
most serious deterioration in these ratios occurred 2 to 3 years before financial failure
(Altman, 1967). Additionally, the model was able to predict failure in 72% of the
samples 2 years in advance and 48% 3 years in advance (Altman, 1967).
Traditional financial ratios are input into the Z-score failure prediction model, and
then MDA is used to derive an overall credit score (Z-score). Firms with Z-scores above
3.0 are considered to be in the safe zone while firms with scores between 1.8 and 3.0 are
in the gray zone, and firms having a Z-score less than 1.8 are in financial danger (Altman,
1967). As of 1983, about 10% of U.S. manufacturing firms had a Z-score below 1.8,
though Altman (1983) indicated not all of those firms would end up in Chapter 11
proceedings. In fact, the stigma of official bankruptcy and the expected cost in declaring
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Chapter 11 motivates most firms to avoid court-regulated reorganization (Altman &
Hotchkiss, 2006). Altman provided background on the application of the Z-score to two
manufacturing firms, Manville Corporation and International Harvester (IH). Both firms
had downward trending scores between 1972 and 1980, and Altman projected that, at the
speed of the declining rate, both Manville and IH had little chance of survival because
firms with such low Z-scores rarely recover from such depths (Altman, 1983). Because
of financial troubles, IH was sold to J.I. Case in 1984, and Manville Corporation filed for
Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection in 1982. Kroeze (2005) stated that changing economic
circumstances could affect the accuracy of the Z-score coefficients; therefore, the
accuracy of the model will differ under various economic conditions. For these reasons,
bankruptcy models that do not take into account changing economic conditions need to
be regularly updated.
Furthermore, Scaggs and Crawford (1986) applied the Altman Z-score model to
the passenger airline industry and found the Altman model accurately forecast airline
failures one to five years in advance; however, for nonbankrupt passenger airlines, the
Altman Z-score model failed to provide an accurate prediction. Multiple discriminant
analysis is used in the Altman model to categorize a population into groups based on
quantitative features (Scaggs & Crawford, 1986). To predict airline failures accurately,
Scaggs and Crawford tested a revised Altman Z-score model in the form: Z = 0.012(X1)
+ 0.014(X2) + 0.033(X3) + 0.01524(X4) + 0.075 (X5), where X1 = liquidity (working
capital/total assets), X2 = profitability (retained earnings/total assets), X3 = leverage
(earnings before interest and taxes/total assets), X4 = solvency (market value of
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equity/book value of total debt), and X5 = interest expense (total operating
income/interest expense).
The variable X5is a revised ratio that replaced X5 = activity (sales/total assets) in
the Altman model. The new X5—interest expense ratio—was selected to reflect the high
debt positions many of the airlines carried during the 1970s and early 1980s. The
updated model better predicted airline bankruptcy by accurately predicting failure at least
three years in advance; thus, Scaggs and Crawford (1986) showed the Altman Z-score
model could be calibrated to improve bankruptcy prediction capability. Scaggs and
Crawford also indicated the Altman model does not include all of the factors that could
forecast bankruptcy in the airline industry; however, the model can be adjusted to include
the characteristics of a particular industry. This study (Scaggs & Crawford, 1986)
spanned the airline deregulation period with the population drawn from the periods prior
to and after deregulation. During this time, there was turmoil in the airline industry with
many new entries into the airline market, including a number of low-cost carriers. The
new entries forced some airlines to cut fares to stay competitive, putting pressure on
airline revenue, while at the same time many airlines carried a high debt position (Scaggs
& Crawford, 1986). Ribbink et al. (2009) found similar results.
Chung and Szenberg (1996) examined the effects of airline deregulation on the
U.S. airline industry by calculating the Altman Z”-score for eight major airlines between
1982 and 1996 (projections only for 1992-1996). While the use of the Altman Z”-score
is widely seen in the literature, this study was used to attempt to reduce the impact of the
gross domestic product (GDP) on the data by examining the relationship between the Zscore and the GDP. The airline industry is capital-intensive and highly leveraged, so the
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state of the economy directly affects this capital structure. A growing economy tends to
lead to increased demand for air travel, so the GDP should be taken into consideration to
remove the economic influence on the model. To detect any relation between GDP and
the Altman Z”-score, Chung and Szenberg (1996) used a linear regression technique.
The financial data were first scrutinized using the Altman Z”-score and classified into
one of three groups: healthy, failure, or gray zone. A linear regression was derived from
the Z”-score and GDP data and showed that for every one percentage point of growth, the
Z”-score increased by 0.18 with eight degrees of freedom and was significant at the 0.01
level. Additionally, the R2 value was 0.648, indicating almost 65% of the variation could
be explained by the variation in the growth of GDP. Chung and Szenberg found that the
airline industry is dividing into two market segments. The two market segments are the
low-cost short-haul carriers, and the long-range legacy carriers. In addition, the study
found that a sustained growing economy of 2.5% of GDP over three or more years would
bring the airline industry into financial profitability (Chung & Szenberg, 1996).
The Altman bankruptcy formula has gone through several changes since Altman
created it in the late 1960s. The latest version of the Altman bankruptcy formula and its
application were published in Altman and Hotchkiss (2006). The current Altman Z”score model is as follows: Z” = 6.56(X1) + 3.26(X2) + 6.72(X3) + 1.05(X4) + 3.25. In
the Z”-score model, X1 = working capital/total assets, X2 = retained earnings/total assets,
X3 = operating income/total assets, and X4 = book value of equity/total liabilities. In this
model, all Z”-scores below zero signify financially distressed conditions in a company.
In the updated Z”-score model, all of the coefficients for variables X1 to X4 have changed
from the original Z-score model (Altman & Hotchkiss, 2006). Altman and Hotchkiss
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stated that the Z”-score model is better than the original Z-score model for
nonmanufacturers. Altman and Hotchkiss also indicated that “models developed for
specific industries (e.g., retailers, telecoms, airlines) are an even better method for
assessing the distress potential of like-industry firms” (p. 249). The current version of the
Z”-score model has also been used to determine the financial health of non-U.S.
corporations with high accuracy and reliability (Altman & Hotchkiss, 2006).
Kroeze K-score model. More recently, Kroeze (2005) used the Altman Z”-score
model to test for bankruptcies in the passenger airlines business between 1998 and 2003.
The updated Z”-score model (renamed Kroeze K-score) used only three financial ratios
instead of the original five present in the Altman Z”-score model and modified the
coefficients of the dependent variables. Examining 16 passenger airlines between 1998
and 2003, six bankrupt and ten nonbankrupt firms, Kroeze found Altman’s Z”-score
model was 100% accurate at classifying bankrupt airlines, but correctly classified only
18% of the nonbankrupt passenger airlines (Kroeze, 2005). Kroeze then proposed a
modified Altman’s Z”-score model, called the K-score model, to improve the prediction
capability of the model for nonbankrupt passenger airlines.
In the Kroeze model, scores below zero indicate a bankrupt condition, whereas a
score above zero indicates that a firm is not in immediate danger of bankruptcy. Using
MDA, Kroeze determined that the X3 (productivity ratio) variable from the Altman Z”score model was negative for the dataset and so eliminated the variable when developing
the K-score model. Adjustments were also made to the coefficients to create a new
discriminant function equation (Kroeze, 2005). The K-score is of the form K = .268(X1)
+ .838(X2) + .111(X3) + έ, where X1 = working capital/total assets, X2 = retained
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earnings/total assets, X3 = book value of equity/total liabilities, έ = error term, and K =
overall index. The K-score proved to be better at predicting bankruptcies one year before
failure than the Altman Z”-score model. The K-score model correctly classified 69% of
nonbankrupt passenger airlines one year before failure. The Kroeze model is an
improvement over the Z”-model and is simpler because it uses only three variables.
Kroeze noted the K-score model might not be valid in light of the events of September
11, 2001. Nevertheless, Kroeze tested and provided ideas on improving Altman’s Z”score prediction model of financial failure as it applied to the passenger airline industry.
Numerous financial ratios used in examining a company’s financial health exist.
Kroeze used liquidity, profitability, and solvency ratios in the K-score model. Liquidity
is calculated as a firm's working capital divided by total assets (Kroeze, 2005). Liquidity
indicates a company’s ability to meet its current financial obligations (Kroeze, 2005).
Because airlines tend to operate on low margins, liquidity is a vital factor when
evaluating a company’s financial position (Kroeze, 2005). The profitability ratio is
calculated as retained earnings divided by total assets (Kroeze, 2005). To attract
investors and provide for the ability to obtain lower interest loans, management must
show that the firm is profitable. A solvency ratio is calculated by using the book value of
equity divided by total liabilities (Kroeze, 2005). The solvency ratio indicates how much
debt financing the firm has used and is an indicator of how much a firm can absorb in
operating losses (Kroeze, 2005). The higher the solvency ratio, the more likely a firm
can slip into financial distress (Kroeze, 2005).
Figure. Form of data for a function analysis
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Group 2
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Figure 2. Form of data for a discriminant function analysis. Note. Adapted from “A
Discriminant Analysis of Public Sector Financial Management Performance of the
Economies of Sub-Saharan Africa,” by N.C. Nwezeaku, 2010, in Interdisciplinary
Journal of Contemporary Research in Business, 1(11), 71-89. Used with permission.
Multiple discriminant analysis. Thus far in this literature review, the financial
models have all been based on multiple discriminant analysis (MDA), a statistical data
analysis that can be used to categorize an observation into one of several a priori
groupings (Kroeze, 2005; Nwezeaku, 2010). Kroeze (2005) noted that MDA is used to
form a linear model that classifies companies based on historical financial ratios.

46
Altman’s (1967) Z”-score model uses MDA to categorize firms as either bankrupt or
nonbankrupt as does the Kroeze K-score model (see Figure 2).
Figure 2 depicts the form of data for a discriminant function analysis. Chung and
Szenberg (1996) used MDA to examine the effects of deregulation on the U.S. airline
industry, but normalized the results by considering change in the GDP. So far, this
section of the chapter has discussed the Altman Z-score model and various incarnations
of the Altman model proposed by several authors using MDA. The following sections
include the use of neural network and mixed logit models in bankruptcy prediction.
Neural network models and genetic programming. Alternate models to the
Altman Z”-score model involve neural networks (NNs), mixed logit, and genetic
programming methodology. NN models simulate the thinking of the human brain and act
to provide qualitative relationships between variables by answering if-then questions
(Slim, 2007). Gritta et al. (2000) used an NN model to predict small air carrier
bankruptcies. Between 1982 and 2000, 134 U.S. air carriers filed for bankruptcy, and
some carriers were still susceptible to financial distress because of heavy debt loads
(Gritta et al., 2000). Gritta et al. believed current MDA and neural network models did
not accurately predict bankruptcy in small air carriers, so they explored a model that
could better predict such bankruptcies. Gritta et al. indicated the use of an NN would
provide a better result than MDA because an NN has the ability to indicate relations
among the data. In addition, an NN is better at spotting patterns in small data sets.
The NN model used in this study was found to predict bankruptcy accurately in
91% of the samples. An overall success rate of 88% was reported with only one Type II
error and three Type I errors out of a sample of 28 correctly identified samples. A Type I
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error occurs when an airlines is forecast to remain solvent, but the airline failed. A Type
II error is the reverse, and, in this case, occurs when insolvency was predicted, but did not
occur (Gritta, Adrangi, Davalos, & Bright, 2006). Other models similar to NNs, such as
fuzzy neural models and classical back-propagated neural networks, have been used to
forecast corporate bankruptcy (Slim, 2007). The Gritta et al. study determined the NN
has advantages over MDA because NNs can better tolerate noise and missing data and
have the ability to identify relations among the data. Others have found; however, that
when comparing NNs to discriminant analysis, the latter tends to perform slightly better
(McKee, 2007).
Another artificial intelligence data analysis method is genetic programming.
McKee examined the variables used in the Altman model to determine individual
significant of each variable. Genetic programming is based on the concept of natural
selection or survival of the fittest. McKee noted that genetic programming has the
advantage of not requiring any distributional assumptions to be made about the data
being analyzed. This study confirmed that some of the variables used in the Altman Z”score model were not statistically valid and noted that some of the variables could be
dropped and still maintain the same level of accuracy (McKee, 2007). Kroeze (2005)
also found that all of the original Altman Z”-score variables were not needed and dropped
two of the variables when developing the Kroeze K-Score model.
Mixed logit models. Jones and Hensher (2005) proposed using a mixed logit
methodology to predict financial distress in a firm. Jones and Hensher argued that a
mixed logit is better at predicting bankruptcy than MDA, binary logistic, or rudimentary
multinomial logit (MNL) models because of “their restrictive statistical assumptions and
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their failure to incorporate firm-specific observed and unobserved heterogeneity” (p. 21).
Fabozzi et al. (2010) supported Jones and Hensher by stating that mixed logit or logit
regression analysis could overcome the flaws of multiple discriminant analysis related to
some of the assumptions needed to run the model.
The mixed logit model is based on discrete choice theory, which attempts to
understand the behavioral responses of customers to the actions of a business,
government, or market. The results obtained from a mixed logit model are used to
categorize firms into one of three states: solvent firms, insolvent firms, and firms that
have filed for bankruptcy. For this study, a sample of firms representing about 3,000 firm
years was used to test the mixed logit model. The data were also analyzed using MNL.
Jones and Hensher found the mixed logit provided an overall goodness of fit and had
95% accuracy for up to three reporting periods prior to failure and 78% accuracy at
predicting failure five reporting periods out. While the mixed logit model proved to be
better than MNL at predicting insolvency and failure, the MNL proved to be better at
predicting success of firms. The mixed logit model was not tested against MDA, but
Jones and Hensher (2007) noted that MDA is a popular method used extensively in the
literature.
Furthermore, another study by Hensher and Jones (2007) used a mixed logit
model to explore its ability to predict bankruptcy across a broad number of industries.
The purpose of the study was to consider the predictive performance of various mixed
logit models using different distribution assumptions. The sample for the study included
5,209 firm years, which included 4,980 firm years for firms not yet failed, 119 for
insolvent firms, and 110 for firms that had filed for bankruptcy protection or liquidation.

49
Of the five mixed logit models studied, the unconditional triangular distribution offered
the best predictive performance. Hensher and Jones (2007) concluded the multinomial
mixed logit models seemed to be sensitive to the type of sampling methodology used.
Unlike many authors who asserted bankruptcy models must be firm specific and focused
for each industry type, Hensher and Jones (2007) noted that because of the inherent
difficulties in precisely predicting corporate failures at the firm type level, there is no
need to focus on one particular firm type.
Comparison of Models
The use of MDA or NN for predicting financial distress in firms is most prevalent
in the literature. Altman’s MDA Z”-score model has been shown to predict bankruptcy
accurately in a sample of manufacturing firms 94% of the time (Altman, 1968);
moreover, Scaggs and Crawford (1986) found the Altman Z-score, with alterations, could
be used to forecast passenger airline failures accurately 1 to 5 years in advance. In 1996,
Chung and Szenberg furthered the work of Scaggs and Crawford by using the Altman Zscore model to examine eight major passenger airlines between 1982 and 1996. In
addition, Chung and Szenberg used GDP data in an attempt to remove economic
influences on the model.
In the most recent passenger airline study using the Altman Z”-score, Kroeze
(2005) extended the work of Scaggs and Crawford and proposed an altered Altman’s Z”Score. This altered model was found to improve the prediction capability of the model
for use in predicting passenger airline bankruptcies. Ribbink et al. (2009) also used the
Altman Z”-score model to determine financially distressed airlines and customer
satisfaction and made no alterations to the model. Airlines have increasingly started to
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lease more aircraft, which removes these assets from the balance sheet and shifts them to
short-term debt (Gritta & Lippman, 2010). Because of this shifting around between
assets and short-term debt, the Altman Z”-score and variations thereof are becoming less
reliable (Gritta & Lippman, 2010). For smaller sample sizes, Gritta et al. (2000)
suggested using an NN while predicting bankruptcy in smaller passenger air carriers 91%
of the time. Both the MDA and NN models have been shown to predict bankruptcy
accurately in various industries, but they must be focused for each particular industry.
While the NN model may have advantages over MDA, such as better tolerance for noise
and missing data as well as the ability to identify relations among the data, the data
processing methodology is complicated and not realistic for use by an novice researcher.
Table 4 provides a sample list of published bankruptcy prediction studies
conducted on the aviation industry over the last 30 years. The oldest study found was
conducted in 1986, less than 10 years after U.S. airline deregulation. Prior to 1977 (1978
for the passenger airline industry), U.S. air-cargo airlines where heavily regulated by the
Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) (Chung & Szenberg, 1996; Kroeze, 2005; Scaggs &
Crawford, 1986). Under regulation, the CAB controlled prices and limited the number of
airlines that could operate on a particular route, essentially eliminating competition and
therefore limiting the number of bankruptcies seen in the industry
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Table 4
Summary of Bankruptcy Prediction Studies in the Aviation Industry
Title

Number of
airlines used

Ribbink, Hofer and
Dresner (2009)

Airline financial distress
and customer satisfaction

21 passenger
airlines

Gritta, Adrangi,
Adams, and
Tatyanina (2008)

An update on airline
financial condition and
insolvency prospects
using the Altman Z” score
model

15 passenger
MDA
airlines between
1997-2006

Davalos, Gritta, and
Adrangi (2007)

Deriving rules for
forecasting air carrier
financial stress and
insolvency: A genetic
algorithm approach

19 passenger
airlines

Neural Network
with a genetic
algorithm

Kroeze (2005)

Predicting airline
corporate bankruptcies
using a modified Altman
Z-score model

11 passenger
airlines

MDA

Gritta, Wang,
Davalos and Chow
(2000)

Forecasting small air
32 passenger
carrier bankruptcies using airlines
a neural network approach

Neural Network

Chung and Szenberg
(1996)

The effects of
deregulation on the U.S.
airline industry

8 passenger
airlines

MDA normalizing
for GDP

Scaggs and
Crawford (1986)

Altman’s corporate
bankruptcy model
revisited: Can airline
bankruptcy be predicted

12 passenger
airlines

MDA

Researcher(s) (Year)

Methodology
MDA tied to ontime performance,
mishandled
baggage and
ticket sales

In the 15 years after deregulation, 80 new airlines were established (including
passenger, cargo, and charter carriers) with over half of the airlines going into bankruptcy
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protection during that period (Chung & Szenberg, 1996; Scaggs & Crawford, 1986).
Finally, the Altman Z”-score model has been shown to predict bankruptcy accurately in a
number of different industries (Altman, 1968, 1983; Chung & Szenberg, 1996; Hofer et
al., 2009; Kroeze, 2005; Ribbink et al., 2009; Scaggs & Crawford, 1986); however, the
model must be calibrated to each particular industry group. The most recent study that
calibrated the Altman Z”-score model was conducted by Kroeze in 2005. The Kroeze
model simplified the Altman model while improving the model's prediction capability
specifically for the airline industry.
No matter which statistical method is used to predict bankruptcy, all of these
methods have limitations that pure statistical methods cannot take into account (Fabozzi
et al., 2010; Ooghe et al., 2009; Wetter & Wennberg, 2009; Youn & Gu, 2010). Past
research on airline bankruptcy prediction models have not enhanced the understanding of
bankruptcy prediction, but instead just improved the statistical methodology
(Gudmundsson, 2002). Wetter and Wennberg (2009) outlined limitations that statistical
methods cannot account for, such as the following:
1. They use a dichotomous dependent variable, though business failure is not a
well-defined dichotomy.
2. The sampling method has some problems as there is a risk of using nonrandom
samples and, thereby, oversampling the failing firms.
3. Classical models can be criticized because of problems relating to
nonstationary and data instability; in classical models, it is assumed that the
relationships among the variables are stationary over time.
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4. The use of accounting information can be questioned, especially with regard to
small or new firms, as there are doubts that these statements give a fair view of
the financial situation in the firm.
5. The selection of independent variables is problematic as there is a general lack
of theory regarding independent variable selection in accounting, and a purely
empirical selection of variables may lead to over-fitting and, thereby, an unstable
model with little general applicability. (p. 30)
Fabozzi et al. (2010) stated that financial distress could be influenced by economic
factors such as the deterioration of an industry, financial factors such as high debt loads,
corporate fraud, mismanagement, and disasters such as natural catastrophes or terrorism.
Nonstatistical Factors
Some of the nonstatistical factors that may affect a bankruptcy model include
management, cultural factors, and the type of aircraft and route structure the airline uses.
First, management and airline leadership may be significant factors in the success or
failure of an airline, though to what extent is unknown (McCabe, 1998). Human capital
theory states that an investment in education and new knowledge will provide for better
managers and owners (Wetter & Wennberg, 2009), indicating that the more educated an
airline management is, the more likely the airline will prosper. Sun and Li (2007) used a
factor of management and control when exploring early warning signed of financial
distress, as did Kim and Han (2003). Therefore, human capital theory may provide some
insight into a firms failure potential.
Culture can also play a role in the financial health of a company. Giapponi and
Scheraga (2007) used Hofstede’s five dimensions of culture to examine the airline
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industry, as did Roberts, Walton, and Muldoon (2011). Giapponi and Scheraga noted
that organizations in an individualistic culture tend to be individualistic in nature,
whereas organizations in a collectivist culture tend to bond together. Cultures with high
power distance tend to have problems with the delegations of authority and; therefore,
reduced transparency (Giapponi & Scheraga, 2007). In cultures that are considered
feminine, discussion is favored over aggression and cooperation is favored over
competition, (Giapponi & Scheraga, 2007), whereas in masculine cultures, fierce
competition and basic mistrust is common. Hofstede’s work related values for the United
States as low power distance and uncertainty avoidance with high masculinity and high
individualism (Giapponi & Scheraga, 2008). Roberts et al. (2011) noted that the speed of
innovation acceptance is also influenced by culture. Cultures with higher uncertainty
avoidance, masculinity, and power distance dimensions tend to have slower innovation
acceptance rates (Roberts et al., 2011). Because of these reasons, company management
must adopt its management style to the type of workforce employed to maximize
revenues (Roberts et al., 2011).
Another factor that may affect the financial health of an airline is the type of
aircraft and routes flown. The advantages of obtaining the proper fleet mix were
discussed above, but an additional factor of efficiency for an airline is the average fleet
age (Gudmundsson, 2002). Older aircraft cost more to maintain and typically have
higher fuel consumption, making them more expensive to operate, which may be a trait
of a poorer performing airline (Gudmundsson, 2002). The routes and frequency of an
airline’s services may also affect the financial health of an airline. Economies of density
from a consolidation of routes in the passenger market come from the hub-and-spoke
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system in which airlines consolidate operations at a single airport, such as Delta Airlines'
Atlanta hub (Gudmundsson, 2004; Vasigh et al., 2008). All-cargo airlines also often
operate through consolidated terminals where cargo can be trans-loaded onto other
aircraft and benefit from economies of density. Airline alliances are also used by both
passenger and cargo airlines and so benefit from economies of scope by expanding
locations serviced and optimization of their route structure (Vasigh et al., 2008).
Subject matter experts (SMEs) have been used in financial distress prediction
studies to improve prediction accuracy (Kim & Han, 2003; Sun & Li, 2007). Sun and Li,
(2007) stated that to improve financial distress prediction methods, SMEs and other
nonfinancial data is needed. Quantitative bankruptcy prediction models use past data,
whereas the use of SMEs can provide near term insight into companies (Kim & Li,
2007).
The last section includes the grounded theory research design for this study.
While this study used grounded theory design based on the idea that theory is derived
directly from the data as it emerges with no preconceived notions (Mello & Flint, 2009),
an understanding of how the aviation industry and the current bankruptcy prediction
models work is essential to the research.
Grounded Theory Design
The literature review has focused on cargo airlines, bankruptcy models, and the
factors that may affect a bankruptcy model's prediction capability; therefore, the
background knowledge provided in this literature review provides a basis for the conduct
of this study's use of ground theory design. Grounded theory was originally developed
by Glaser and Strauss (1967) in Discovery of Grounded Theory and expanded separately
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by Corbin and Strauss (1990), Charmaz (2006), and Allen (2010). Grounded theory is
used to construct theory directly from field data such as interviews, observations, and
document analysis (Mello & Flint, 2009), not just test existing theory (Birks & Mills,
2011).
Grounded theory is a systematic approach to research that assists the researcher to
develop theoretical abstraction from field data through a course of constant comparative
analysis (Mello & Flint, 2009). Data are collected and coded into emergent categories,
refined, and used to capture relevant topics of the phenomena (Allen, 2010; Corbin &
Strauss, 1990; Mello & Flint, 2009). These topics are then used to construct a verifiable
theory, either quantitatively or qualitatively, that should be easily understandable for
academics, students, and practitioners (Mello & Flint, 2009). The aim of grounded
theory is to move the analytical process beyond simple description to exploration (Birks
& Mills, 2011).
Grounded theory is based on the idea that theory is built directly from the data,
and analysis begins as soon as data are collected (Luckerhoff & Guillemette, 2011). The
use of emergence research requires a flexible and “rudimentary research design”
(Luckerhoff & Guillemette, 2011, p. 402), because the researcher must avoid
preconceived notions of where the data may lead (Corbin & Strauss, 1990). Charmaz
(1995) summarized the research methods and design problems best by stating the
following:
The grounded theorist builds the research as it ensues rather than having it
completely planned before beginning the data collection. Similarly, you shape
and alter the data collection to pursue the most interesting and relevant material.
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This approach differs sharply from the traditional research design with its
structured interments that are used in the same ways with each research subject.
(pp. 47-48)
It is a basic tenet of grounded theory design not to have a fully developed research
plan before starting, since it is unknown at the start of a study as to which data or analysis
instrument is best to use (Luckerhoff & Guillemette, 2011). It is; however, important to
plan the initial steps in the research and for the researcher to have a firm understanding of
the process to ensure a successful and defendable research project. Grounded theory was
first developed by Glaser and Strauss in 1967 and published in The Discovery of
Grounded Theory. Glaser and Strauss’s work was later refined by Corbin and Strauss in
1990 (Luckerhoff & Guillemette, 2011). Corbin ad Strauss (1990) outlined the canons
and procedures for grounded theory. Current writers on grounded theory such as
Charmaz (2006) and Birks and Mills (2011) generally accept these procedures as the best
process to conduct a grounded study. The cannons outlined by Corbin and Strauss (1990)
are:
1. Data collection and analysis are interrelated processes.
2. Concepts are the basic unit of analysis.
3. Categories must be developed and related.
4. Sampling in grounded theory proceeds on theoretical grounds.
5. Analysis makes use of constant comparisons.
6. Patterns and variations must be accounted for.
7. Process must be built into the theory.
8. Writing theoretical memos is an integral part of doing grounded theory.
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9. Hypotheses about relationships among categories should be developed and
verified.
10. The grounded theorist need not work alone.
11. Broader structural conditions must be analyzed, however microscopic the
research.
Summary
Several authors (Chung & Szenberg 1996; Kroeze, 2005; Ribbink et al., 2009;
Scaggs & Crawford, 1986) have used the Altman Z-score or the newer Z”-score to
predict financial distress in the passenger airlines industry. Kroeze tested the Altman Z”score model on the passenger airline industry and developed an updated model called the
Kroeze K-score; however, the literature does not indicate whether the Kroeze model has
been tested on the all-cargo airline industry. Other authors have argued that nonstatistical
variables should be considered in financial models (Fabozzi et al., 2010; Gudmundsson,
2002; Ooghe et al., 2009; Wetter & Wennberg, 2009; Youn & Gu, 2010). Significant
operational and economic differences exist between passenger and all-cargo airlines that
may affect the financial stability of the two industries differently (e.g., demand, traffic
patterns), and these differences along with other qualitative factors are explored in this
study.
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Chapter 3: Research Method
Introduction
The purpose of this study was to explore the nonstatistical factors influencing the
accuracy of the Kroeze K-score bankruptcy prediction model for the all-cargo airline
industry, using a grounded theory design. The first step in this study was to determine
the effectiveness of the Kroeze K-score model in predicting bankruptcy by comparing the
model’s results to actual U.S. all-cargo airline bankruptcies between the Years 2005 and
2009. Once the prediction success rate was established, grounded theory was used to
identify some of the nonstatistical influences that cause inaccurate predictions in the
statistical model.
Recent research has indicated that stand-alone traditional statistical models are
limited in their bankruptcy prediction ability, and nonstatistical factors should be
explored to improve this (Ooghe et al., 2009; Wetter & Wennberg, 2009; Youn & Gu,
2010). For example, by incorporating management decisions regarding airline routes into
the prediction model, the accuracy of the model may be increased. The model could then
be used to avoid financial distress, in part by reconsidering routes. Such connections can
be explored as the researcher discovers the data; thus, a grounded theory method was
determined to be the best approach for this research. The project used financial data from
U.S. all-cargo airlines from 2004 to 2009, applied a published financial bankruptcy
model (Kroeze K-score), and compared the predicted results with the actual events.
The results of the K-score model provided a starting point for the grounded theory
design to explore the external influences that may affect the prediction model. Grounded
theory is one of discovery in which concepts are uncovered by systematically examining
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a multitude of data from many sources (Corbin & Strauss, 1990; Mello & Flint, 2009).
For this study, data were obtained from numerous sources, including, but not limited to,
scholarly articles, magazines, newspapers, technical papers, books, government
publications, company and industry literature, and company and professional websites.
The data were coded and grouped into categories to expose concepts that describe the
factors that influence the K-score model's prediction inaccuracies. The research question
for this study was as follows:
RQ: What nonstatistical factors influence the K-score bankruptcy prediction
models in the all-cargo airline industry?
This chapter includes an overview of the research method and design for this
grounded theory study. The chapter includes a discussion of the population, data
collection methodology, and analysis. The chapter then contains the assumptions and
limitations of the study and the process to ensure ethical research standards are met.
Research Methods and Design
Grounded theory is based on the idea that theory is built directly from the data
and emergence research requires a flexible design. It is a basic tenet of grounded theory
design not to have a fully developed research plan before starting; however, it is
important to plan the initial steps in the research, and for the researcher to have a firm
understanding of the process to ensure a successful and defendable research project. The
rest of this chapter includes the steps used to conduct this grounded theory study.
This study was used to explore nonstatistical factors that affect a quantitative
model’s prediction ability. The prediction ability of current quantitative bankruptcy
prediction models has been honed to a point where little improvement can be made
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(Gudmundsson, 2002), yet more accurate models are needed. A better understanding of
the nonstatistical (i.e., qualitative factors) variables is needed to advance bankruptcy
protection (Ooghe et al., 2009; Youn & Gu, 2010). Some of the nonstatistical data
originated from human interactions such as the management practices and other
processes germane to a real-life organization. These human interaction factors are best
explored using qualitative methods as quantitative data would be missing, hard to obtain,
or would not provide the data needed (Mello & Flint, 2009). Within the realm of
qualitative methods, grounded theory can be used to gain insights into phenomena and to
discover and understand the meanings and concepts surrounding the subject (Charmaz,
2006; Mello & Flint, 2009). Further, grounded theory is used to construct theory directly
from field data (Mello & Flint, 2009). Grounded theory, while rooted in nursing
research, has been used in other disciplines to open up new avenues of research (Mello &
Flint, 2009). The literature review revealed one grounded theory airline bankruptcy
study, conducted by McCabe in 1998. The need to understand the social system within
the organization, the ease of obtaining data, and the advantage of constant comparative
analysis has led to the conclusion that grounded theory will be the best method to conduct
this research. Using grounded theory for a study of this type is to some extent uncharted
territory; however, the need to explore the data, untainted, by connections and
relationships suggested by previous approaches is paramount and allowed for exploration
of the data in unconventional ways.
The process as outlined by Corbin and Strauss (1990) was used as the road map
for the conduct of this research. Simplified, the three major phases of grounded theory
research used in this study are as follows: (a) the discovery of categories and properties,
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(b) the discovery of the relationship between the categories and properties, and (c) the
discovery of theory as it emerges from the refinement of categories and properties (Birks
& Mills, 2011; Charmaz, 2006; Corbin & Strauss, 1990; Mello & Flint, 2009; McCabe,
1998).
The first phase of the grounded theory research was the discovery of categories
and properties that are likely to affect the bankruptcy prediction ability of the K-score.
The data were coded and grouped into categories with similar properties. Categories are
abstract concepts into which other concepts can be grouped; this grouping includes
specific characteristics or attributes of a category, which allows a category to be defined,
and given meaning (Mello & Flint, 2009).
The next phase of the research was the detection of the association and patterns
between the categories and properties related to nonstatistical bankruptcy factors. This
phase continued until theoretical saturation occurred. Saturation occurs when no new
information is emerging from the data (Corbin & Strauss, 1990; Mello & Flint, 2009).
Birks and Mills (2011) discussed the coding process as first fracturing the data then
reconnecting “the data in ways that are conceptually much more abstract than would be
produced by a thematic analysis” (p. 12).
The final phase of the research was the refinement of categories and properties to
reveal the theory. Throughout all three phases of the research, constant comparative
analysis of the data was ongoing, so as new categories are discovered, they were
incorporated into the dataset and refined. The constant comparison is directed toward
similarities and differences in order to develop concepts that helped interpret and explain
behavior (Mello & Flint, 2009). Through this three-phase process, theory was
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constructed from the categories and their properties to result in a theory that provides
categories and verifiable hypotheses (Mello & Flint, 2009). The next section of this
chapter will discuss the population to be examined.
Participants
Grounded theory sampling progresses on theoretical grounds in which there are
no “specific groups of individuals, units of time, and so on, but in terms of concepts, their
properties, dimensions, and variations” (Corbin &Strauss, 1990, p. 8); therefore, in
grounded theory design, there is no set sample size needed. Instead, the size may be as
few as one, or many may be needed to reach saturation (Corbin & Strauss, 1990;
Luckerhoff & Guillemette, 2011; Mello & Flint, 2009; Mello & Hunt, 2009). While
grounded theory does not require a minimum sample size, the initial population for this
study was all of the all-cargo airlines in operation in the United States between 2005 and
2009 with operating revenues of $20 million. The reason for this is that these companies
must report financial data to the DOT quarterly in accordance with 14 Code of Federal
Regulations (CFR) 241.
A search of such airlines was performed through the TranStats database and
revealed there were17 all-cargo airlines in operation during the years 2005 to 2009 (see
Appendix A). The TranStats database is maintained by the U.S. Department of
Transportation (DOT), U.S. Bureau of Transportation Statistics, Research and Innovative
Technology Administration (RITA); therefore, the starting sample of 17 all-cargo airlines
and the population were the same. During the research process, six of the 17 all-cargo
airlines were selected for detailed analysis.
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Data Collection Method
The initial financial data for this study were obtained by data mining the U.S.
Department of Transportation (DOT), U.S. Bureau of Transportation Statistics, and
Research and Innovative Technology Administration (RITA) database (also known as
TranStats). The TranStats financial data are stored in the Air Carrier Financial Reports
(Form 41 Financial Data) database. All U.S. air carriers with annual operating revenues
of $20 million or more must report financial data to the DOT quarterly in accordance
with 14 Code of Federal Regulation (CFR) 241. Their data are made available for
research by the DOT as part of the TranStats database. Failure to report financial
information is an indication of cessation of operations. In these instances, bankruptcy
was confirmed using a literature search. Gathering financial data using a survey is not a
practical method to collect the detailed financial data necessary for this study, and
because the financial data are publicly available, the survey method is unnecessary.
Additionally, response rate to a survey from senior personnel who would have access to
the required data from within the all-cargo industry was expected to be low.
An electronic search of the TranStats database was conducted to extract the data
for input into the K-score model. The data extracted included working capital, total
assets, retained earnings, book value of equity, current liabilities, and total liabilities.
Using the financial information, the required financial ratios were calculated for input
into the Kroeze K-score model. Financial data were obtained for the 5-year period from
2005 to 2009 for all U.S. all-cargo airlines with operating revenues of $20 million or
more.
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The results of the K-score model provided a starting point for the grounded theory
design to explore the influences on the prediction model. An initial sample of six allcargo airlines was chosen to provide a cross-section of airlines where the model correctly
and incorrectly predicted bankruptcy. Documentary data about these airlines and the
industry as a whole were collected from scholarly articles, magazines, newspapers,
technical papers, books, government publications, company and industry literature, and
company and professional websites. Both qualitative and quantitative data were used in
this study, and data were collected from multiple sources. The collection of rich and
substantial data, from multiple sources, gave the study more quality and credibility
(Charmaz, 2006).
The literature, while downplayed by some grounded theorists, is an important
starting point for the study. Review of published scholarly literature provided general
knowledge of the subject and helped define the terms and processes used in other
researchers work. Scholarly research is a source of data for the study and provides a
context for this research in the field. Another source of data for this study entailed
personal communication with SMEs. As with other sources of data, open-ended
interviews with SMEs were used to provide data for this study. Transcripts from
interviews were coded just as other documentary data. Coding of data was used to
summarize and sort the data into general categories. According to Corbin and Strauss
(1990), in grounded theory protocol, as data were collected, ongoing analysis was
conducted on the data to uncover concepts and categorize the data into phenomena that
may represent patterns. The direction of the research and further data collection events
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were determined as data emerged. Data collection continued until no new patterns in the
data emerged and relationships among the categories were established.
Measurement/Assessments
A grounded theory design was used in this research on bankruptcy prediction with
all-cargo airlines. The research was used to explore the factors that affect the bankruptcy
prediction ability of the Kroeze K-score model in the all-cargo airline industry. For the
study, a Kroeze K-score model was applied to 17 U.S. all-cargo airlines to determined
which companies the model worked and in which it did not by comparing the prediction
to actual bankruptcies. For this study, the raw data for use in the Kroeber K-score model
were assumed reliable and valid, since the data were obtained from a government
database. This study did not collect primary data by means of a survey instrument, but
used only secondary data from the TranStats database and interview data from SMEs.
Airline companies with operating revenues of $20 million or more are required to report
certified financial data quarterly to the U.S. government for inclusion in the TranStats
database.
The outcome of the Kroeze model was analyzed and six all-cargo airlines were
chosen as the sample to explore the nonstatistical variables affecting the accuracy of the
Kroeze model using grounded theory. Multiple sources of data were compared and
grouped throughout the research until saturation of the data was observed. After concepts
emerged from the data, unstructured interviews with SMEs were conducted to gain
insight into bankruptcies and how the emergent concepts fit into existing theories.
The continual comparison and grouping process used in grounded theory guards
against bias and achieves greater precision and consistency (Corbin & Strauss, 1990).
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Additionally, triangulation of different data sources was used to add validity to the study
(Guion, Diehl, & McDonald, 2011). To provide external validity and transferability to
the study, a detailed description of the information was provided to present an accurate
description of the methods used. Grounded theory requires the researcher to be open to
all ideas and have no preconceived theories (Corbin & Strauss, 1990; Luckerhoff &
Guillemette, 2011). This openness to ideas helps to avoid bias in the research
(Luckerhoff & Guillemette, 2011). Strict grounded theorists reject any review of
literature related to the research prior to starting data collection to avoid the temptation of
the researcher to use a priori concepts during data analysis (Luckerhoff & Guillemette,
2011); however, in reality all professional researchers have some understanding of their
disciplines, and therefore, some level of a priori concepts (Luckerhoff & Guillemette,
2011).
Data Analyses
The first step in the process was to run the Kroeze K-score model on the 17 U.S.
all-cargo airlines in operation between the 2005 and 2009. The predicted results were
compared to the actual bankruptcies of the firms during this period, but no attempts to
alter the model were made. In the second phase of the research, cases in which the model
failed to predict actual events and cases in which the model succeeded in predicting
actual events accurately were explored using grounded theory. The data used in
grounded theory research come from a range of sources, such as newspapers, books,
government documents, and videos, indeed, any data that can provide any insight into the
research question (Corbin & Strauss, 1990).
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The underlying theme in grounded theory is the search for concepts and the
ongoing analysis of data, and as new data is uncovered, the direction of the research must
change to account for the data (Birks & Mills, 2011; Charmaz, 2006; Corbin & Strauss,
1990). Extensive use of coding was used to compare events and interactions for
similarities and differences (Corbin & Strauss, 1990). Initial coding was used to fracture
the data and once concepts emerged, categories of related ideas were organized and
grouped together for further analysis (Birks & Mills, 2011; Charmaz, 2006; Corbin &
Strauss, 1990).
Coding is the process of naming segments of data that summarizes and
categorizes each piece of data. Codes are a synopsis of the essence of a segment of text
and show action. During initial coding, segments of data to be coded were groups of
words, a sentence, paragraph, or a section of text. Initial coding of data was provisional
and provided an extensive list of codes. As themes developed, codes were grouped into
similar ideas and used to summarize and sort the data into general categories. Focused
coding, which identified and grouped the most significant data into conceptual categories,
followed. Finally, the third round of coding, or theoretical coding, produced theoretical
codes that suggest possible associations between categories and show links in the data.
Theoretical coding reassembles the data that was fractured during initial coding to reveal
new ways to view the data and expose the story the data is telling.
Throughout the coding process, memoing and sorting of the data identified
incomplete categories and holes in the analysis that were further explored to assist in the
theoretical integration of the categories. Memos are free flowing analytical notes that
helped to refine, compare, and understand the data. Once the initial round of theoretical
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coding was completed and themes started to emerge, theoretical sampling was conducted
to expand and refine the categories of the emerging theory. Unlike traditional
quantitative research design, theoretical sampling in grounded theory research is used to
obtain data to expand the categories that were identified during the theoretical coding
process. The sampling is not meant to represent a population, but to focus on the
theoretical and conceptual development of the emerging theory. This process continued
until saturation of the data occurs and the phenomena explained.
The atlas.ti qualitative data analysis software package was used to record and
conduct data analysis. The atlas.ti software allowed for the collection of text, audio,
video, and image data. As data were input into the software, they were labeled as codes
that were later grouped into categories. The software allowed for memo writing,
whereby ongoing comparison between data was annotated and used to construct analytic
notes. The software allowed for the data to be searched, filtered, and grouped into codes
and categories in various ways to support theoretical integration of the categories.
Additionally, the atlas.ti software provided high-level quantification of the data through
tracking the frequency of codes and words in the dataset, database searching, and filters
to determine links between the data. All data were input into the atlas.ti software and
coded until categories emerge that were then used to determine patterns in the data that
were related back to the failed financial model. Data were collected and analyzed until
no new patterns in the data emerged and the relationships among the categories were well
established.
After the data were collected and analyzed two SMEs were interviewed using
open-ended questions relating to bankruptcy prediction. The interviews where held by
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phone, and the sessions taped and later transcribed. The two SMEs were Dr. Robert
Tompkins, professor of finance at the Frankfurt School of Finance and Management and
Dr. Richard Gritta, professor of finance at the University of Portland.
Methodological Assumptions, Limitations, and Delimitations
Validation of grounded theory has been the center of considerable debate
(Luckerhoff & Guillemette, 2011; McCabe, 1998; Mello & Flint, 2009) because some do
not view grounded theory as a valid research method due to the circularity of the research
method, the lack of references to normal theoretical frameworks, and theoretical
sampling (Luckerhoff & Guillemette, 2011). Grounded theory research is sometimes
viewed as nonscientific, or is criticized for a lack of planning when compared to
traditional scientific methods (Luckerhoff & Guillemette, 2011). The initial sampling
plan outlined in this document provided a starting point, but could not and did not
determine the direction the research took; however, a carefully designed and executed
study using a systematic approach can provide verifiable results (Mello & Flint, 2009).
In addition, the continual comparison and grouping process used in grounded theory
guarded against bias and helped achieve greater precision and consistency (Corbin &
Strauss, 1990).
Qualitative research is meant to provide an understanding of a particular social
situation or interaction and is largely a process of comparing, contrasting, replicating,
cataloguing, and classifying the subject (Creswell, 2009). Grounded theory is based
largely on the judgment of the researcher to contrast, compare, catalog, and classify the
data in the study, and; therefore, may have inherent bias (Luckerhoff & Guillemette,
2011). There is risk of researcher bias, but this was minimized by the researcher keeping
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an open mind and holding no preconceptions on the subject; however, there is more
danger in bias from the actors involved than from the researcher (Luckerhoff &
Guillemette, 2011).
Creswell (2009) stated that researcher bias could also be reduced through open
discussion of the researcher's background. This bias cannot be completely removed since
the researcher inherently has preconceived unselfconscious theories about the subject.
Additionally, and in keeping with grounded theory design, to avoid a priori concepts,
little literature review was conducted on the nonstatistical factors that may affect
bankruptcy prediction models. The literature was not reviewed in depth for the following
reasons: (a) to avoid a priori concepts and (b) the literature is largely lacking in studies
on the use of nonstatistical qualitative information in bankruptcy prediction. An extensive
literature review was conducted on statistical bankruptcy prediction methods and the use
of grounded theory.
Internal validity was maintained through the triangulation of data in which data
from multiple sources was used for cross-verification (Guion et al., 2011). Crossverification is inherent in the research process of grounded theory with the expectation
that data will appear in several forms before being considered in the theory. The use of
data triangulation increased the confidence in the research data through verification from
several sources including, SMEs (Guion et al., 2011). Additionally, detailed descriptions
of the data were provided to give a thorough perspective of the data, adding validity to
the research (Guion et al., 2011). External validity threats arise when incorrect
inferences from the data is drawn and generalizations cannot be made to other persons,
settings, and times (Guion et al., 2011). External validity threats were minimized using
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the circularity that is inherent in grounded theory. Ideas that emerge from one set of data
were checked and re-circulated through other settings and different time frames to check
for consistency of results (Luckerhoff & Guillemette, 2011). While steps were taken to
reduce external validity threats, results of this study can only be applied to the sample in
the study and cannot be generalized across all of the all-cargo carriers.
The initial financial data for this research were obtained from the TranStats
database. Reporting financial information to this database is mandatory under U.S.
federal law for airlines in the dataset; therefore, it is assumed that the data were properly
reported. Financial data were collected from the TransStats database for all-cargo
airlines for the Years 2005 to 2009. Qualitative data were obtained from numerous
sources, including, scholarly articles, magazines, newspapers, technical papers, books,
government publications, company and industry literature, and company and professional
websites. A list of all of the sources used to obtain data is in Appendix B. All data were
obtained from known professional sources, and since this information is in the public
domain, it is assumed to be correct; however, the data were crossed-checked using
triangulation methods to confirm validity.
Ethical Assurances
All ethical guidelines were stringently followed in the implementation of this study.
Ethical rules and guidelines ensure that research is conducted to minimize risk to humans
and that the potential benefits are balanced with the risk (Creswell, 2009). The proposed
research obtained the required publicly available financial data by the process of data
mining of the TranStats database. For the qualitative analysis, published materials,
annual report, company websites, and other open sources of information were examined.
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Names and backgrounds of some management personnel (e.g., education level, work
experience, and management styles) used in this study were collected from previously
published secondary sources (e.g., the Internet, company websites). Although some
names and identifying features were found in the literature, none was used in the writing
of this study.
Personal communication with SMEs was conducted as part of this study to provide
background information on the subject. Personal communications with SMEs were in the
form of open-ended interview questions, and interviews were conducted synchronously
via personal interviews. The role of the SMEs was to provide information on the subject.
Interview questions were not focused on them personally. Personal communications with
SMEs are properly cited in this study and release forms were collected. Northcentral
University's Institutional Review Board (IRB) approval was obtained prior to any data
collection; however, because the data for this research were obtained from secondary,
previously published sources, the research falls into the exempt research categories as
outlined in 45 Code of Federal Regulations 46.101b, since this research did not expose
humans to psychological, social, or physical risks.
Summary
A grounded theory method was used for this research. The research was used to
examine the Kroeze K-score model, which uses various financial ratios to calculate a Kscore. The K-score was then used to classify companies as being either bankrupt or
nonbankrupt. Finally, external factors that influence the model were examined using
grounded theory.
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Using grounded theory, the research was used to explore nonstatistical factors that
affected the Kroeze K-score model. The data for the proposed research were obtained
from publicly available sources, such as published research, company annual reports,
airline industry publications, and government publications and databases. The testing of
the Kroeze K-score model on the all-cargo industry and determining the qualitative
factors that affect the model provide new insight into the financial stability of the allcargo airlines. This research also adds to the body of knowledge on the use of predictive
modeling and qualitative, nonstatistical factors that may influence bankruptcy predictive
modeling.
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Chapter 4: Findings
Introduction
The goal of this qualitative study is to explain the nonstatistical factors that
influence the Kroeze K-score qualitative bankruptcy prediction model. Through the
analysis of 34 publicly available documents (i.e., scholarly articles, magazines,
newspapers, government records, and company literature), 35 unique codes emerged
during the coding process. After intermediate coding, six categories emerged that form
the basis of the emergent theory. Two subject matter expert interviews were also
conducted to provide data for the study, along with a re-review of the literature for
additional data as theoretical sampling directed and for comparison of previously
published with the findings of this study.
In the results section, a summary of the prediction accuracy of the Kroeze K-score
model is provided followed by the open-coding and intermediate-coding process and
results. Finally, in the Evaluation of Findings section, the results are analyzed in
relationship to the emergent theory, and the results of this research within the context of
the existing literature on financial distress and bankruptcy prediction are discussed.
Results
The results section begins with an analysis of the prediction accuracy of the
Kroeze K-score model for 17 U.S. all-cargo airlines. Subsequently, the categories that
emerged during the open-coding and intermediate-coding phases of this research are
discussed in relation to the research question. The data analysis and findings to support
the research question (What nonstatistical factors influence the case for bankruptcy
prediction model in the all-cargo airline industry?) will be addressed in the following
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sections. Because of the nature of qualitative research, the results section includes
illustrations and observations with interpretive components.
Prediction Accuracy
The sample of all-cargo airlines (N = 17) included two firms that went bankrupt
during the study timeframe, 14 all-cargo airlines that did not, and one cargo airline
(Cargo 360) that merged with Southern Air, Inc. Bankrupt airlines were coded as 1, and
nonbankrupt airlines where coded as 2. The 76 discreet cases (one case per airline per
year in operation), were used to calculate a K-score for each year for each airline in the
sample. For example, ABX’s K-scores were -0.54 in 2005, -0.44 in 2006, -0.26 in 2007,
-0.12 in 2008, and -0.09 in 2009. The all-cargo airlines were then classified as bankrupt
or nonbankrupt according to the K-score model, using the appropriate cutoff value of
zero as suggested by Kroeze (2005). Table 5 indicates the airlines, financial statement
dates, years data were available for the sample, and if the airline declared bankruptcy
during the study.
Table 6 indicates a summary of the K-score for the 17 U.S. air-cargo airlines in
operation from 2005 to 2009. A negative K-score indicates a company that is in financial
distress and in potential risk of bankruptcy, whereas a positive K-score indicates a
company that is not in financial distress. The raw financial data obtained from the RITA
schedule B1 forms and used in the calculations of the K-scores can be found in Appendix
C. The negative K-scores are marked by asterisk (*).
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Table 5
List of All-Cargo Airlines, Financial Statement Dates, Years Active During the Study and
Bankruptcy Declaration

Airline

Financial statement

Number of

dates

years

Bankrupt?

ABX Air, Inc.

2005 to 2009

5

No

Aloha Air Cargo

2005 to 2009

5

No

Amerijet International

2005 to 2009

5

No

Arrow Air Inc.

2005 to 2009

5

No

Astar USA, LLC

2005 to 2009

5

No

Atlas Air Inc.

2005 to 2009

5

No

Capital Cargo International

2005 to 2009

5

No

Cargo 360, Inc.

2006 to 2007

2

No

Centurion Cargo Inc.

2006 to 2009

4

No

Evergreen Int'l Inc.

2005 to 2009

5

No

Gemini Air Cargo Airways

2005 to 2006

2

Yes

Kalitta Air LLC

2005 to 2009

5

No

Kitty Hawk Air Cargo

2005 to 2007

3

Yes

Lynden Air Cargo Airlines

2005 to 2009

5

No

Northern Air Cargo Inc.

2005 to 2009

5

No

Polar Air Cargo Airways

2005 to 2009

5

No

Southern Air Inc.

2005 to 2009

5

No
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Table 6
K-Scores for Air-Cargo Airlines Between 2005 and 2009
Company

2009

2008

2007

2006

2005

Abx Air, Inc.

-0.09*

-0.12*

-0.26*

-0.44*

-0.54*

Aloha Air Cargo

0.59

-0.69*

-0.49*

-0.86*

-1.14*

Amerijet International

0.07

0.06

0.15

0.06

0.09

Arrow Air Inc.

-0.68*

-0.50*

-0.18*

-0.13*

-0.05*

Astar USA, LLC

-0.55*

-0.33*

-0.28*

-0.39*

-0.32*

Atlas Air Inc.

0.29

0.28

0.30

0.15

0.05

Capital Cargo International

0.24

0.67

-0.49*

-1.82*

-0.58*

Merged

-0.02*

-0.41*

New

-0.61*

-0.07*

-0.62*

-1.71*

New

0.29

0.33

0.31

0.31

0.26

Bankrupt

––

-1.34*

-2.65*

0.87

1.47

1.27

1.32

Bankrupt

0.50

0.45

0.65

Cargo 360, Inc.
Centurion Cargo Inc.
Evergreen Int'l Inc.
Gemini Air Cargo Airways
Kalitta Air LLC

0.75

Kitty Hawk Air Cargo
Lynden Air Cargo Airlines

1.13

0.79

1.07

0.91

0.73

Northern Air Cargo Inc.

0.34

0.21

0.27

0.39

0.24

Polar Air Cargo Airways

-0.26*

0.00*

0.10

0.42

0.50

Southern Air Inc.

-0.58*

-0.04*

0.27

0.48

0.46

Note. * =K-scores = < 0.0. Company considered not in financial distress if K-score is > 0.0, and in
financial distress if K-score is = < 0.0. Source of data RITA Schedule B1 data.
Note. –– = no data.
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Testing the Original Kroeze K-Score Model
The original K-score bankruptcy prediction model developed by Kroeze was
based on the Altman Z-score and used multiple discriminate function analysis (MDA).
Within the sample for this study, the K-score model correctly classified one of the two
bankrupt firms (50.0% correctly classified) as bankrupt and seven of the nonbankrupt
firms correctly (46.7% correctly classified). The K-score model did not perform as well
on this sample as in the Kroeze (2005) study in which the K-score model correctly
classified 69% of nonbankrupt passenger airlines 1 year before failure. Table 7 indicates
the prediction accuracy matrix for the Kroeze K-score model.
Table 7
Kroeze K-Score Model: Prediction Accuracy Matrix
Predicted group membership
Group
Original

Count
%

Bankrupt
Nonbankrupt
Bankrupt
Nonbankrupt

Bankrupt

Nonbankrupt

1
8
50.0
53.3

1
7
50.0
46.7

Total
2
15
100.0
100.0

An initial sample of six all-cargo airlines was drawn from airlines for which the
K-score model correctly and incorrectly predicted bankruptcy. The six airlines were
ABX Air, Inc, Arrow Air Inc., Atlas Air Inc., Cargo 360, Inc., Gemini Air Cargo
Airways, and Kitty Hawk Air Cargo. ABX Air and Arrow Air Inc. are both cargo
airlines for which the K-score model predicted bankruptcy, but the airlines continued
operations. Atlas Air was correctly predicted and remained solvent throughout the
sample window. In the sample, two airlines entered Chapter 11 bankruptcy during this
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period and both were examined using grounded theory. One of the two, Gemini Air
Cargo, was correctly predicted by the K-score to enter bankruptcy; however, Kitty Hawk
Air Cargo entered bankruptcy in 2008, an event that the K-score model did not predict.
The other firm that went out of operation during this study period was Cargo 360;
however, Cargo 360 did not enter bankruptcy, but instead, merged with Southern Air.
After the merger, Southern Air went from a positive K-score to a negative score. Table 8
indicates the 17 all-cargo firms in operation between 2005 and 2009 in a prediction
accuracy matrix, and the six all-cargo airlines chosen as the initial sample for this study
are marked with an asterisk.
Table 8
Kroeze K-Score Model: Prediction Accuracy Matrix With Airline Names
Predicted group membership
Group
Original Bankrupt
NonBankrupt

Bankrupt

Nonbankrupt

Gemini Air Cargo*
ABX Air*
Aloha Air Cargo
Arrow Air*
Astar USA
Captal Cargo
Centurion Cargo
Polar Air Cargo
Southern Air

Kitty Hawk*
Amerijet Int’l
Atlas Air*
Cargo 360*
Evergreen Int'l
Kalitta Air
Lynden Air Cargo
Northern Air

Total
2
16

Note: Airlines marked with an asterisk were the initial sample of airlines for this study.

Table 9 indicates the K-scores for the all-cargo airlines that were part of the initial
sample. Negative K-scores, which indicate financial distress, are marked with an
asterisk. This sample of airlines was chosen to give a mix of cases for which the model
correctly and incorrectly predicted bankruptcy. The next part of this chapter provides an
overview of the six all-cargo carriers selected for this study.
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Table 9
K-Scores for Air Cargo Airlines Between 2005 and 2009 for Sample Airlines
Company

2009

2008

2007

2006

2005

ABX Air

-0.09*

-0.12*

-0.26*

-0.44*

-0.54*

Arrow Air

-0.68*

-0.50*

-0.18*

-0.13*

-0.05*

Atlas Air

0.29

0.28

0.30

0.15

0.05

Merged

-0.02*

-0.41*

New

Bankrupt

-1.34*

-2.65*

0.50

0.45

0.65

Cargo 360
Gemini Air Cargo Airways
Kitty Hawk Air Cargo

Bankrupt

Note: K-Scores = < 0.0 are marked with an asterisk (*). Company considered not in financial distress
if K-Score is > 0.0, and in financial distress if K-Score is = < 0.0. Source of data RITA Schedule B1
data.

Open-Coding Results
Once the six all-cargo airlines were selected for further examination, data were
collected on the operation of these airlines. During the open-coding phase a total of 34
documents were reviewed which included company annual reports, SEC 10K annual and
quarterly reports, reports from professional journals such as Air Transport Intelligence
and Traffic World, news reports, and company press releases from the period 2005 to
2009. A list of all of the sources used for data is in Appendix B. The first phase of data
collection included the uploading into Atlas.ti software and review of documents related
to the six all-cargo airlines in the sample. The Atlas.ti software is a commercially
available database program that was used to organize, code, memo, and visualize the data
and is specifically programmed to assist in qualitative data collection research. The
software also includes a search, filter, and query tool, which allows a researcher to
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interrogate the data in many ways. Documents were collected and reviewed, and codes
were developed as they emerged from the text.
Coding was conducted on a sentence-by-sentence or theme-by-theme basis in
which a code or group of codes were assigned to each sentence or group of sentences
with the same theme. The codes that were assigned to the text was intended to identify
the process being discussed, and was not limited by any particular theme or idea. As
codes emerged, more documents were collected and coded until saturation in the data was
observed. Saturation occurs when no new data is emerging from the documents. A total
of 34 documents was examined before saturation was observed. After the initial coding
round, there were 35 unique codes that emerged from the data (see Table 10). These
codes are based on segments of the text and can be viewed as general concepts that
summarize the text. Definitions for the codes can be found in Appendix D.
Table 10
The 35 Codes Developed During Initial Coding
Accidents
Antitrust
Bankruptcy
Capacity
Cash flow
Competition
Competitive Advantage
Cost
Credit_markets
Customers
Earnings
Economics

Environmental
Fleet mix
Flight_frequency
Fuel_efficiency
Geographic location
Labor_Issues
Maintenance
Management
Market
Merger
Operations
Ownership

Price
Regulation
Reliability
Revenue
Risk
Routes
Security
Service
Size
Tax
Utilization

Since codes were established as they emerged, the entire set of 34 documents was
re-reviewed a second time to ensure that all text was properly coded. In total, 2,593
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segments of text were categorized into 35 unique codes. The code frequencies are shown
in Table 11. These codes represent themes or ideas that emerged from the data; however
not all of these codes may not be significant. During the intermediate-coding process,
these codes were grouped to form several categories. Throughout the process, memos
were kept that were used to develop the ideas on what the data were indicating and were
later used to assist in theory development.
Table 11
Code Frequencies (N =2593)
Codes
Accidents
Antitrust
Bankruptcy
Capacity
Cash flow
Competition
Competitive Advantage
Cost
Credit_markets
Customers
Earnings
Economics
Environment
Fleet mix
Flight_frequency
Fuel_efficiency
Geographic location
Labor_Issues
Maintenance
Management

Code frequency
43
5
92
103
59
24
27
238
166
393
129
85
90
124
12
30
19
43
123
59

(continued)
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Table 11
Code Frequency (continued)
Code

Code frequency

Market
Merger
Operations
Ownership
Price
Regulation
Reliability
Revenue
Risk
Routes
Security
Service
Size
Tax
Utilization
Total N (coded sections)

8
21
35
37
9
277
42
42
77
60
100
2
15
1
3
2593

Table 12 indicates the percentage each code rated for that airline at the end of the
open-coding process. These percentages are based on the number of times the code was
linked to a segment of text and may indicate the importance of the code to the company
(reference, year). The percentages vary between the different airlines; however, the
highest percentages, those above 10%, were connected to the codes bankruptcy, cost,
customers, earnings, fleet mix, management, merger, ownership, and regulation. Of the
codes with percentages above 10%, five (bankruptcy, cost, earnings, merger, and
ownership) are associated with the financial factors category that will be discussed later
in this chapter. The list is presented in alphabetical order and is not based on actual
rankings because these differ between airlines.

85
Table 12
Percentage for Each Code Broken out by Airline
Airline
Code
Accidents
Antitrust
Bankruptcy
Capacity
Cash flow
Competition
Competitive advantage
Cost
Credit_markets
Customers
Earnings
Economics
Environment
Fleet mix
Flight frequency
Fuel_efficiency
Geographic location
Labor_Issues
Maintenance
Management
Market
Merger
Operations
Ownership
Price
Regulation
Reliability
Revenue
Risk
Routes
Security
Service
Size
Tax
Utilization

Cargo
360
0
0
1
0
0
0
2
1
0
9
0
0
0
16
0
0
5
0
6
14
0
11
6
7
0
11
0
2
0
2
0
0
6
0
0

ABX
Air
0
0
0
1
4
1
0
13
6
8
13
3
4
4
0
1
1
2
11
2
0
1
2
1
0
10
2
3
2
2
2
0
1
0
0

Atlas
Air
1
1
4
8
2
1
3
10
7
17
3
4
1
6
0
2
0
2
1
2
1
0
1
1
1
7
1
1
5
3
4
0
0
0
0

Kitty
Hawk
4
0
2
3
2
1
0
8
7
21
2
3
6
2
1
1
0
1
5
1
0
0
0
0
0
17
2
1
3
2
6
0
0
0
0

Arrow
Air
0
0
20
4
4
0
2
2
4
4
0
4
0
18
0
4
6
4
0
8
0
0
0
8
0
0
0
0
0
6
0
0
2
0
2

Gemini
0
0
30
5
0
0
0
0
9
7
0
3
0
9
0
1
1
6
1
7
0
1
2
13
0
0
0
2
0
1
0
0
1
0
0
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Throughout the open-coding process, that is the initial data collecting and coding
generated from the documents, codes were developed to fracture the data. Fractionation
of the data during the open-coding process allows codes to be re-assembled into
meaningful categories during the intermediate-coding phase of this research (Birks &
Mills, 2011; Corbin & Strauss, 1990). Ongoing review of these codes was conducted in a
process of constant comparative analysis in an attempt to start to link the codes and
concepts and was followed by additional theoretical sampling. After theoretical
saturation was observed in the data; that is, there were no new codes being identified, the
next step in the process was intermediate coding. Intermediate coding is the process by
which the data was regrouped to form intermediate codes.
Intermediate Coding
After the initial codes were developed and theoretical saturation occurred, the
research moved into the intermediate-coding phase in which codes were compared to
identify relationships that may exist in the data (Birks & Mills, 2011; Corbin & Strauss,
1990). The initial 35 codes were synthesized into six categories. The name of some of
these categories came directly from code names (e.g., operations, competitive advantage)
while the names of other categories were generated after grouping a set of codes together
(e.g., financial factors, external factors). The six categories that emerged during the
research were management, risk, operations, competitive advantage, financial factors, and
external factors. Figure 3 graphically shows the six categories and the linkage of the
code groups to these categories.
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Figure 3. Graphic representation of codes and their linkage.
Part of grounded theory methodology is to ensure validity through a rich
discussion of the data that emerges throughout the research (Birks & Mills, 2011). The
data for this research is based on segments of text found in the documents that were
reviewed. Throughout the remainder of this chapter, many quotations will be provided
from the 34 documents reviewed to support the theory development. Table E1 in
Appendix E provides a list of the six categories and examples of quotations and their link
to individual codes. The detailed quotes that support each of the six categories are
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intended not only to provide examples of coded text, but also to provide a detailed
description of the data so that a through perception of the data is presented, thus adding
validity to the research (Birks & Mills, 2011). Further discussion of these codes and
links are discussed found in Table E1 (see Appendix E).
The six qualitative categories that emerged from the intermediate-coding process
that may influence bankruptcy prediction models are management, operations, financial
factors, competitive advantage, risk, and external factors. While these are broad
categories, they are all linked to specific codes or ideas found in the data and form the
basis of the emergent theory. The following is a description of each of the six categories
and their component codes.
Management
The main overarching code that emerged was management that was linked to
categories such as operations, financial factors, competitive advantage, and risk. The
management category is not linked to any codes directly, but is linked to four other
categories because management directly influences all of the categories except possibly
for the external factors of economics and regulations. As depicted in Figure 3,
management is at the center of any organization and can be viewed as the hub around
which all the other categories and codes revolve. Management has both a strategic and
operational function.
Dr. Richard Gritta discussed management at length during the subject matter
expert interview held on October 28, 2011. Dr. Gritta stated that management has
oversight of both operating strategies and financial strategies.
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If it's operating strategies, one of the keys would be; do you have efficient routes,
and are you flying aircraft that are matched to your route. Are you minimizing
your fuel bill by having your pilots fly more intelligently, and are you managing
your labor issues properly. Because that is part of your operating strategy. The
financial strategy part of management is how much debt that you have on the
balance sheet, and how much disguised debt that you have in the form of leases,
because obviously the more debt you have, the higher the probability of a
financial problem. That's the magic of the US system like with Southwest and
Alaska as compared to the rest of the airlines, is they have low levels of debt.
(Richard Gritta, personal communication, October 28, 2011)
One of the categories directly linked to management is operations that encompass the
day-to-day management of the firm.
Operations
Operations, linked to management, included codes such as security, service, flight
frequency, maintenance, geographic location, labor issues, capacity, and fuel efficiency.
Security, while a part of operations, is also considered part of regulation, which is an
external factor that will be discussed in the external factors section. Likewise,
maintenance is also a part of competitive advantage and will be discussed in the
competitive advantage section.
The cost of fuel typically makes up about one third of the operating expenses for
an airline (Atlas Air, 2006). Arrow Air noted that “rising jet fuel prices outpaced its
ability to boost prices for customers. This resulted in significant recurring operating
losses and a large operating deficit” (Stempal, 2010, para. 5). Rising fuel prices had a
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significant impact on Arrow Air since it “operated one of the industry's largest fleet of
DC-8 freighters, older planes that guzzle fuel and are costly to maintain” (South Florida
Sun–Sentinel, 2005, para. 5). Because fuel is such a large portion of the operating
expenses, the text associated with the code fuel is found throughout all of the documents
reviewed with many of the airlines discussing the future plans for more fuel-efficient
aircraft. For example, Atlas Air and their 2009 annual report stated the following:
The relative operating cost efficiency of our current 747-400F aircraft and future
747-8F aircraft, including their superior fuel efficiency, capacity and loading
capabilities, create a compelling value proposition for our customers and position
us well to manage market conditions and for future growth. (Atlas Air, 2010, p.
28)
ABX Air stated that “the primary competitive factors in our industry are price,
geographic coverage, flight frequency, reliability and capacity” (Atlas Air, 2006, p. 6).
Kitty Hawk Air Cargo echoed these factors by stating that “the ability to compete
effectively depends on price, frequency of service, cargo capacity, ability to track freight,
extent of geographic coverage and reliability” (SEC, 2007b, p. 25). Of these competitive
factors, three (i.e., capacity, flight frequency, and geographic coverage) are directly
related to the category of operations; however, the others are also affected by the
operations department in an airline.
Capacity can be viewed as the total lift capacity of the airline or the individual
capacity of each of their aircraft. Atlas Air Cargo and Cargo 360 operated Boeing 747
freighters, which have the largest lift capacity compared to the smaller aircraft operated
by the other four airlines, which were MD-11s, Boeing 737s, Boeing 767s, DC-8s, DC-
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9s, and DC-10s. No matter how much lift capacity and airline may have, the most
important aspect is the total utilization of that aircraft. Total utilization of an aircraft
refers to the maximization of both volume and weight of cargo for every leg of the flight;
however, fluctuating demand makes it difficult to optimize the use of available capacity
(Walton, 2011).
Reliability can be viewed as the dependability of the aircraft or the optimization
of flight operations to ensure reliable delivery. Kitty Hawk Air Cargo was so concerned
with aircraft reliability that “to enhance the reliability of our service, it is generally our
policy to have available at least one operational spare aircraft” (SEC, 2007c, p. 9). In the
documents reviewed for this research, Kitty Hawk Air Cargo was the only airline that
made a point of noting that they keep a spare aircraft in waiting. It can be hypothesized
that the underutilization of this aircraft may have negatively affected Kitty Hawk's
revenues and could possibly be connected to its bankruptcy filing.
The documents did not provide much detail on any of the airlines' flight
frequencies. In general, all the airlines have a global reach and serve the major cargo
airports of the world. During the timeframe of the study, ABX Air was the only
exception to this in that it supported mostly U.S. domestic DHL cargo.
Financial Factors
Also linked to management was the category of financial factors, which was made
up of the codes bankruptcy, market, credit markets, merger, earnings, ownership,
revenue, costs, and cash flow. The code bankruptcy falls under the category of financial
factors and is germane to the study. The data related to bankruptcy were mostly found in
the documents for Gemini Air Cargo and Kitty Hawk Air Cargo, the two airlines in this
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sample that went bankrupt. References to bankruptcy were also found in the documents
related to Arrow Air. Arrow Air exited Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection in June 2004
just before the sample window of this study started and then reentered Chapter 11
bankruptcy again in 2010 just after the sample window closed. Arrow Air carried a
negative case score throughout the entire sample window 2005-2009, so never seemed to
be financially healthy even after exiting Chapter 11 in 2004. Access to credit markets
was also a recurrent theme throughout the documents, especially from the financially
weaker firms such as Kitty Hawk Air Cargo; however, even financially sound firms such
as ABX Air worried that “tight credit markets could impact [a] company's future access
to liquidity” (ABX Air, 2010, p. 10). In the 2009 annual report for ABX Air, officials
stated that “Given the current tight credit markets, the interest rates and other costs of a
renegotiated or new facility, if one can be obtained, would be more expensive and may
require more rapid amortization of principal than under the terms of the current credit
agreement” (ABX Air, 2010, pp. 10-11).
During this sample, only one merger took place: Cargo 360 merged into Southern
Air. Cargo 360 had shown two years of negative K-score values before merging with
Southern Air. Up until the time of the merger, Southern Air had had a positive K-score,
but at the merger, showed negative case score values for the years 2008 and 2009. While
mergers may be viewed as positive within the aviation industry due to a reduction in
capacity and the removal of a competitor (R. Gritta, personal communication, October
28, 2011), the Cargo 360 and Southern Air merger may have put Southern Air in
financial peril. In the company's 2005 annual report, Atlas Air officials stated that
“ACMI [Aircraft, Crew, Maintenance and Insurance] maximizes yield and traffic demand
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risk in the air-cargo business and provides a more predictable annual revenue and cost
base” (Atlas Air, 2006, p. 3), which indicates that air carriers that operate only ACMI
may have a more stable balance sheet. Revenue is directly tied to financial factors and is
a important part of the financial management of the company.
For the firms in the sample, ABX in Kitty Hawk Air Cargo had a limited number
of customers from which they received most of their revenues. ABX had almost all of its
revenue tied to one customer, DHL, and officials recognized this dangerous position in
their 2005 annual report where they stated, “We rely on a single customer for
substantially all of our revenue and operating cash flows” (ABX Air, 2006, p. 10). The
main competitors to DHL in the U.S. market were the established Federal Express
Corporation (Fedx) and United Parcel Service (UPS), which had “significant resources,
market penetration and brand recognition” (ABX Air, 2006, p. 10). Due to this
competition and ABX’s perilous position of only having a single substantial customer,
DHL was able to place pressure on ABX to reduce costs and improve productivity. This
pressure from DHL limited ABX's revenues and may have been the reason that the Kscore model predicted ABX to go bankrupt throughout this sample. So while DHL, as
the sole customer, could pressure ABX to reduce cost and; therefore, reduce revenues,
officials of DHL could not afford for ABX to go bankrupt. Kitty Hawk Air Cargo also
operated with a small client base, and officials of the company recognized the fact that
they derived “a significant portion of [their] revenues from a limited number of
customers, and the loss of their business or payment defaults by one or more of them
could have a material adverse effect on results of operations” (SEC, 2006, p. 14). The
statement by Kitty Hawk Air Cargo seems to be a recurring comment and adds credence
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to the idea that air-cargo airlines operate on tight margin, so much so, at least in this case,
that even one nonpaying customer can jeopardize the entire company.
Cost was another concept that was prolific throughout the data. The costs code
was associated with the idea operating cost and referred mostly to the cost of fuel, which
is the largest portion of an airline's operating costs. For example Arrow Air operated DC
8-freighters that company officials stated “guzzle fuel and are costly to maintain” (South
Florida Sun–Sentinel, 2005, para. 1), before switching to newer, more fuel-efficient DC10s. Further officials of Arrow Air noted that “rising jet fuel prices outpaced its ability to
boost prices for customers. This resulted in significant recurring operating losses and a
large operating deficit” (Stempal, 2010, para. 6). The cost of jet fuel could also be
considered an external factor.
Cash flow is the last code associated financial factors and is probably the most
important, since a lack of cash flow is what ultimately drives companies into bankruptcy.
Dr. Tompkins (personal communication, October 15, 2011) noted that cash flow is the
most important element because “that's really what causes a company to go bankrupt.”
Cash flow is a qualitative indicator that is used in many of the published financial distress
models, so it is no surprise that it appears in the data. The next category to be explored is
risk.
Risk
The category of risk with the code of accidents also was linked to the
management category. Risk is a factor that management must deal with on a daily basis.
Whether the risk to a firm is from accidents, related to business decisions, external
factors, or related to government regulation, management must put in place processes to
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reduce the overall risk to the company. Anecdotally, aviation is viewed as inherently
risky due to the extensive press coverage anytime there is an aviation accident, and while
aircraft accidents occur, they are a rare event.
Although there was an indication of risk throughout the literature review, Kitty
Hawk Air Cargo appeared to be more prominent in the discussion of risk and the articles
reviewed than any other. In their annual report, officials of Kitty Hawk Air Cargo
outlined in detail the various risks the airline faces. An indication that Kitty Hawk Air
Cargo was in financial distress before going bankrupt in 2008 was a discussion in its
2006 SEC 10K annual report in which Kitty Hawk Air Cargo officials stated that an
“aircraft or truck accidents and the resulting repercussions could have a material adverse
effect on our business” (SEC, 2007a, p. 21). Although the loss of an aircraft for a small
air-cargo company could be devastating, rarely do airlines go out of business because of
the loss of an aircraft (R. Gritta, personal communication, October 28, 2011); however an
indication of financial difficulty can be found in the statement by Kitty Hawk Air Cargo
officials indicating that even the loss of a truck “could have a material adverse effect on
[their] business” (SEC, 2007a, p. 21).
The rising cost of jet fuel was also seen as a risk factor for the all-cargo
companies in the sample, which in some cases exceeded 30% of total operating expenses
(Atlas Air, 2006). Even for the companies that have ACMI contracts, which require the
customer to pay for aviation fuel, an increase in fuel costs is seen as a risk due to the fact
that higher fuel payment may limit the viability of the ACMI business because of the
inability of the customers to cover the cost of the increased aviation fuel (Atlas Air,
2006).
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Security, which is one of the codes that is part of operations, can also be
considered under the category of risk. The aviation industry is subject to extensive
governmental regulations, and failure to comply with these regulations may have an
adverse effect on the business (Atlas Air, 2006). After the terrorist attacks on September
11, 2001, the U.S. government adopted new rules and regulations to increase the security
requirements in the aviation industry. In a 2005 annual report, officials of Atlas Air
stated that “These new regulations and others that potentially might be adopted could
have an adverse impact on our ability to efficiently process cargo or could increase our
costs” (Atlas Air, 2006, p. 12).
Access to credit markets could also be considered a risk factor for the all-cargo
industry. Atlas air officials stated that “We are highly leveraged and our substantial debt
and other obligations could limit our financial resources and ability to compete and may
make us more vulnerable to adverse economic events” (Atlas Air, 2006, p. 13). The
officials of Atlas Air continued by stating that restricted access to credit markets would
require “us to dedicate a substantial portion of our cash flow from operations for interest,
principal and lease payments and reducing our ability to use our cash flow to fund
working capital and other general corporate requirements” (Atlas Air, 2006, p. 13). If a
company's cash flow is restricted it may be forced to restructure or refinance its debt, sell
assets, delay capital expenditures, obtain additional financing, limit future business plans
(Atlas Air, 2006), or ultimately file for bankruptcy protection.
Competitive Advantage
The category of competitive advantage was supported by codes such as price,
reliability, fleet mix, routes, competition, size, customers, and utilization. Most business
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textbooks will have a large section on competitive advantage. Typically, after defining
competitive advantage the author of these texts will go into a detailed discussion of how
to determine a firm's strengths and weaknesses and how to minimize the weaknesses and
take advantage of the firm's strengths to be more competitive in the marketplace. The
codes related to competitive advantage were found in every document reviewed.
Officials of Atlas Air were probably more expansive in their discussion of
competitive advantage than any of the other airlines in the sample. Atlas Air clearly
holds a competitive advantage in the ACMI wide-body aircraft marketplace, since the
company was the only ACMI provider of the Boeing 747–400 freighters during the
timeframe of the study (Atlas Air, 2010). Not only does Atlas Air have a competitive
advantage because the company is the only provider of Boeing 748-400 aircraft, but “By
managing the largest fleet of 747 freighter aircraft, [they] achieve significant economies
of scale in areas such as aircraft maintenance, crew training, crew efficiency, inventory
management, and purchasing” (Atlas Air, 2010, p. 29). Additionally, officials of Atlas
stated, “The most important elements for competition in the air-cargo business are the
range, payload and cubic capacities of the aircraft and the price, flexibility, quality and
reliability of the cargo transportation services provided” (Atlas Air, 2006, p. 13).
Reliability is one of the codes that support competitive advantage. Reliability
within the cargo industry refers to on time delivery and no damage to the cargo. Officials
of both ABX and Atlas Air in their annual reports stated that reliability is one of the key
elements to their business model. ABX officials state that all of their aircraft have
Category II or III landing equipment on all their aircraft, which gives them the ability to
land in limited visibility weather conditions, increasing their reliability (ABX Air, 2006).
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The number and type of customers can provide a competitive advantage to the
company. ABX Air primarily sole sourced all of its cargo space to DHL, giving DHL
more pricing power, whereas Atlas Air operated long-term ACMI contracts for five
years, giving the company a more predictable cash flow (Atlas Air, 2006). Officials of
Kitty Hawk Air Cargo in their 2005 annual report stated that the company had “over 550
active freight forwarders and logistics company customers…however [the company's] top
25 customers accounted for more than 65.0% of [its] schedule freight revenue” (SEC,
2006, p. 6). Kitty Hawk Air Cargo officials met regularly with their top customers “as
part of [their] strategic planning activities for [their] schedule freight network” (SEC,
2006, p. 6). While Kitty Hawk Air Cargo had a much larger clientele base than ABX it
did not save the company from bankruptcy in 2007.
Fleet mix is an important aspect of competitive advantage and plays a key role in
the operation of an airline. Fleet mix refers to the type of aircraft that the company flies
and the age of those aircraft. By operating a single aircraft type, an airline can achieve
economies of scale and the strategy provides “increased operational flexibility, because it
is easier to find a replacement aircraft for flight crew in the event of your regular
operations” (Walton, 2011, p. 55). In addition to the operational flexibility, airlines that
fly a single aircraft type have lower crew training, maintenance, parts, and equipment
costs. Table 13 summarizes the type of aircraft fleet the airlines operated versus their
actual and bankruptcy prediction membership as predicted by the K-Score. Of the six
airlines in the sample, four flew mixed fleets and two operated with a single aircraft type
fleet. The two airlines that operated a single type aircraft fleet, Atlas Air and Cargo 360,
were the only two airlines that the K-score model correctly identified as nonbankrupt
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airlines during the timeframe of the study. Airlines for which the K–score incorrectly
predicted bankruptcy, that is, Kitty Hawk Air Cargo, ABX Air, and Arrow Air, all
operated a mixed fleet. Gemini Air Cargo, the only airline for which the model correctly
predicted bankruptcy, operated a mixed fleet.
Table 13
Type of Aircraft Fleet Mix versus K-Score Predicted Group Membership
Predicted group membership

Original

Group

Bankrupt

Nonbankrupt

Bankrupt

Gemini (mixed)

Kitty Hawk (mixed)

Nonbankrupt

ABX Air (mixed)

Atlas Air (single)

Arrow Air (mixed)

Cargo 360 (single)

Atlas Air, Cargo 360, and Gemini operated only wide-body aircraft, whereas the
other three airlines operated a mixed fleet of both wide-body and narrow-body aircraft.
Narrow body aircraft are defined as a single aisle aircraft having a cargo carrying
capacity of less than 45 tonnes, whereas a wide-body aircraft has a carrying capacity of
over 40 tonnes and twin aisles in the passenger versions (Walton, 2011). Table 14
summarizes the type of aircraft operated by the carrier versus the actual and K-Score
prediction group. For the three cases in which the K-score model correctly predicted
bankruptcy or nonbankruptcy, the airlines all flew wide-body aircraft, and in the cases for
which the K-score did not provide an accurate prediction, these airlines all operated
narrow body aircraft as part of their fleet.
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Table 14
Type of Aircraft Versus K-Score Predicted Group Membership
Predicted group membership
Group
Original

Bankrupt

Nonbankrupt

Bankrupt

Gemini (MD 11 & DC 10)

Kitty Hawk (B737 & B727)

Nonbankrupt

ABX Air (DC-8, DC-9,

Atlas Air (B747)

B767)

Cargo 360 (B747)

Arrow Air (DC-10, DC-8,
B767)
Changing or integrating different aircraft into a fleet adds a significant cost to an
airline. In 2004 and 2005, officials of Kitty Hawk Air Cargo stated that it
incurred significant one-time costs to integrate these Boeing 737-300SF cargo
aircraft into our current fleet and operations, including, but not limited to, costs
relating to pilot training, maintenance training, purchases of additional tooling and
spare parts and costs to modify our operational manuals and maintenance
program. (SEC, 2006, p. 7)
Two years later Kitty Hawk Air Cargo declared bankruptcy and liquidated.
Along with fleet mix and the age of aircraft, maintenance, while considered part
of operations, can also affect an airlines competitive advantage by improving mechanical
reliability. All of the firms in this study performed their own lower-level maintenance.
The size of the company within any industry can also be a competitive advantage. With
increased size comes an increase in economy of scale for airline operation. Officials of
Kitty Hawk Air Cargo in their 2005 annual report noted that many of their “competitors
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have substantially larger freight networks, serve significantly more cities, and have
considerably more freight system capacity, capital and financial resources than we do”
(SEC, 2006, p. 6), whereas Atlas Air positions itself as “the world's leading provider of
outsourced cargo aircraft, crew, maintenance and insurance service to major international
airlines” (“Atlas Air Inc. Named Best Air Charter,” 2007, para. 1).
Dr. Gritta stated that size is important because you have more staying power and
carry more clout: “You're the big elephant in the room” (personal communication,
October 28, 2011). Dr. Gritta also indicated that some financial bankruptcy prediction
models use a log transformation variable for size. A successor model to the Altman ZScore, called the Altman ZETA credit score model uses a variable of firm size in
calculating bankruptcy potential (Gritta et al., 2006). The larger a company is, the more
operational economies of scale the firm has, leading to potentially higher revenues and
making the company less prone to bankruptcy. The next section discusses the categories
related to external factors.
External Factors
Categorized as external factors were the codes economics and regulations; the
codes of antitrust, environment, and taxation are listed under external factors. Cost is
also a code that falls under external factors; although management does have some
control over cost, managers are at the mercy of their suppliers. For example, the cost of
fuel steadily increased during the timeframe of the study, interspersed with large price
changes. In the 2009 annual report for Atlas Air, the impact of fuel prices on the aircargo business and the difficulties of management to project future operating cost are
discussed. While the cost of fuel is a variable cost that changes with utilization of an
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aircraft, it is the largest single operating expense for an airline and affects all airlines
equally (Atlas Air, 2010).
The 2009 annual report stated the following:
The average fuel price per gallon for the Scheduled Service and Commercial
Charter businesses was approximately $3.35 for 2008, compared with
approximately $2.24 for 2007, an increase of $1.11 or 49.6%. During 2008,
aviation fuel prices rose steadily during the first seven months of the year peaking
at an average of $4.33 per gallon in July before declining sharply from August
through the end of the year to an average of $2.13 per gallon for the month of
December. (Atlas Air, 2010, p. 41)
Under the external factor of regulation was environment. Environmental issues
are a growing concern to the public and to companies that must comply with
environmental regulations. Airlines and airports can affect the environment in a number
of ways. In 2010, a U. S. Government Accountability Office report on aviation and the
environment listed possible environmental impact factors from airlines as noise,
emissions, water pollution, and environmental sustainability (U.S. Government
Accountability Office, 2010). In the documents reviewed, all four types of impacts were
discussed; however, noise and emissions seemed to be of greatest concern to the airlines.
While quieter and lower emissions jets are being developed by the airline manufacturers,
the short-term effects of the clean air act, Kyoto treaty, and local and federal noise
compliance regulations are of greatest concern to the airlines (ABX Air, 2010). Cargo
airlines that fly noisier aircraft may be limited in the number of airports that they can
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serve or their operation may be restricted to certain times of the day, affecting their
revenue stream or limiting their route structure.
Under the category of regulation was the code antitrust, which refers to a criminal
investigation conducted by the U.S. Department of Justice for price fixing related to a
fuel surcharge charged by many cargo carriers between January 2000 and February 2006
(ABX Air, 2010). The investigation, started by the U.S. Department of Justice, has also
triggered regulators from Australia, the European Union, Korea, New Zealand, and
Switzerland to open price-fixing investigations (ABX Air, 2010). In addition to the
antitrust investigation, other lawsuits and claims were also filed. None of the cargo
airlines in this sample were a party to the investigation; however, Atlas Air’s sister airline
Polar LLC was a target of the investigation.
Industry economics is another external factor that affects all of the airlines.
Officials of ABX stated in their 2005 annual report that “An economic downturn in the
U.S. is likely to adversely affect demand for delivery services [and] during an economic
slowdown, customers generally use ground-based delivery services instead of more
expensive air delivery services” (ABX Air, 2006, p. 10). Officials of ABX also stated,
“Cargo volumes within the U.S. are highly dependent on the economic conditions and the
level of commercial activity [because] generally, time-critical delivery needs, such as
just-in-time inventory management, increase the demand for air cargo delivery” (ABX
Air, 2006, p. 6). In addition to being vulnerable to economic conditions, global trade
flows are typically seasonal and unbalanced. The peak season for air cargo traditionally
runs from September through mid-December to support the retail holiday season (Atlas
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Air, 2010), and there is a far greater flow of goods out of Asia, which limits the full
utilization of aircraft.
Co-Occurrence of Data
Co-occurrence can give an indication of related terms (Garcia, 2005). Cooccurrence is the idea that “concepts that co-occur more frequently tend to be related”
(Garcia, 2005, para. 4). Whenever a segment of text is coded with more than one code, a
co-occurrence of codes occurs (Garcia, 2005). Atlas.ti was used to produce a cooccurrence table that provided a co-occurrence coefficient for each code group. The cooccurrence coefficient ranges between zero (codes that do not co-occur) and one (codes
co-occur whenever they are used) (Muhr, 2009). A higher coefficient would indicate
more co-occurrence between codes and; therefore, a greater relationship. The cooccurrence data were used to extract a list of related codes generated by the study, and all
codes with a co-occurrence index of 0.1 or above are shown in Table 15. A list of the cooccurrence coefficients for all of the codes can be found in Appendix F.
Table 15
Co-Occurrence of Codes with Index of 0.1 or above
Code
Capacity
Price
Reliability
Revenue

Flight frequency
0.10
0.11
0.17
0.10

All of the codes with the co-occurrence index of 0.10 or above were related to
flight frequency, and no other codes reached this threshold. There was no intercooccurrence between the codes of capacity, price, reliability, and revenue. The lack of
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interco-occurrence indicates a high relationship between the code of flight frequency and
the codes capacity, price, reliability, and revenue.
Subject Matter Expert Interviews
Following the intermediate-coding phase of the research, two SMEs were
interviewed. The intent of the interviews was to provide data for the study in relation to
the codes that were developed during the open-coding and intermediate-coding phase of
the research. Using the data obtained during the initial- and intermediate-coding phase of
the research, open-ended questions were developed for use in the interviews. An
unstructured interview format was used in which the SMEs were asked open-ended
questions dealing with qualitative factors that may influence bankruptcy prediction
models and specifically about any insight into bankruptcies in the all-cargo airline
industry. An unstructured interview format was selected to allow for the direction of the
conversation to be dictated by the SME, thus allowing for the free flow of ideas (Birks &
Mills, 2011).
The main question posed to the SMEs was as follows: What qualitative factors do
you feel may influence quantitative bankruptcy prediction models such as the (K-score)
in the all-cargo industry? Follow-up questions asked SMEs to provide any possible
insight into the bankruptcy of Kitty Hawk Air Cargo or Gemini air cargo or of the merger
of Cargo 360 with Southern Air in 2008. Further, the SMEs were asked if they had any
thoughts on the operation of ABX Air, Arrow Air, or Atlas Air during the years 20052009. Finally, the SMEs were asked their thoughts on the 35 codes that were developed
in the initial coding round of this research study. A list of all of the questions posed
during the interview appear in Appendix G. These interviews were conducted by
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telephone and the interviews were recorded, and transcribed. The accuracy of the
transcriptions was verified by reviewing the recordings.
The first interview was conducted with Dr. Robert Tompkins. Dr. Tompkins
holds a doctorate from the University of Warwick and completed postdoctoral work at
the University Technology in Vienna Austria. Dr. Tompkins's postdoctoral work is in the
research area of financial management and option pricing. Dr. Tompkins is presently a
professor of finance at the Frankfurt School of Finance and Management in Frankfurt,
Germany, and an adjunct faculty member in the Business Department of Embry Riddle
Aeronautical University Worldwide. Dr. Tompkins is the author of several books and
many articles in peer-reviewed journals on finance and financial related subjects. The
consent form to serve as an SME for Dr. Tompkins is in Appendix H.
During the interview, Dr. Tompkins mentioned several items that seem to be
germane to this research project. Dr. Tompkins stated, “Well obviously the most
important qualitative factor is perception of that particular firm in the industry by
customers and suppliers” (R. Tompkins, personal communication, October 15, 2011).
Because if customers or suppliers feel that a company is in financial difficulties, they
may shy away from doing business with that particular firm potentially driving the firm
further into financial difficulties (R. Tompkins, personal communication, October 15,
2011). Perception of a particular firm can possibly be linked to the following codes that
were developed during the coding phase: service, management, customers, size,
bankruptcy, and reliability (R. Tompkins, personal communication, October 15, 2011).
Dr. Tompkins also noted that an increase in the flow of information on the Internet has
been shown to be an important indicator of changes in a firm (R. Tompkins, personal
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communication, October 15, 2011). The indicator of change is due to the fact that as a
firm has either positive or negative news to report, the Google Factor, that is the number
of hits or the number reports on the Internet increases, popularizing the firm's news and
influencing the company's customers and suppliers (R. Tompkins, personal
communication, October 15, 2011).
Regulating the flow of information, either negative or positive, can be linked to
the management code discovered during the initial round of coding (R. Tompkins,
personal communication, October 15, 2011). When discussing the codes that were
discovered in the first round of this research project, Dr. Tompkins noted that cash flow
is the most important element because “That's really what causes a company to go
bankrupt” (R. Tompkins, personal communication, October 15, 2011). Related to that,
deferred maintenance may also be an indication that an airline is having cash flow
problems (R. Tompkins, personal communication, October 15, 2011). While cash flow
has been identified as one of the codes during the initial round of research and
emphasized by Dr. Tompkins, cash flow is a quantitative factor and is often used in
qualitative financial distress models.
The second interview was conducted with Dr. Richard Gritta. Dr. Gritta is a
professor of finance at the University of Portland. He holds a master's of business
administration (MBA) from Indiana University and a doctorate from the University of
Maryland. Dr. Gritta teaches courses in financial management and investments and has
research interests that include air carrier bankruptcy forecasting and risk/return in air
transportation. Dr. Gritta has published over 90 refereed articles in such journals as the
Journal of the Transportation Research Forum, Transportation Journal, Financial
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Management, and others. He is currently an editor of air transportation for the Journal of
the Transportation Research Forum and acts as an advisor to U.S. Sen. Ron Wyden on
airline matters. Some of Dr. Gritta’s research was outlined in the literature review
section of this study. The consent form to serve as an SME for Dr. Gritta is in Appendix
H.
Dr. Gritta felt that one of the biggest qualitative factors that may influence
quantitative bankruptcy prediction models is the relationship between management,
unions, pilots, and mechanics (R. Gritta, personal communication, October 28, 2011). In
addition, the quality of the management team must be taken into account when exploring
qualitative factors. As also noted by Dr. Tompkins, Dr. Gritta noted that “cash flow is
highly correlated with bankruptcy” and “virtually all the models have some measure that
directly or indirectly measures cash flow” (R. Gritta, personal communication, October
28, 2011). So cash flow while not a qualitative measure, “makes sense, the more cash
flow you have the less probability you will go bankrupt and vice versa” (R. Gritta,
personal communication, October 28, 2011).
Dr. Gritta indicated that customers are also a key qualitative theme (R. Gritta,
personal communication, October 28, 2011). Also noted during the interview was the
importance of fleet mix, flight frequency, and fuel efficiency to determine the financial
health of a firm. In response to the code mergers, Dr. Gritta stated, “If there are mergers
in the works for the carrier that would be advantageous, because you're going to lower
the capacity of the industry and you're going to remove competition” (R. Gritta, personal
communication, October 28, 2011). Dr. Gritta was asked the following question: To
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what extent do you think airline management or airline leadership plays and success or
failure of an airline? In response, Dr. Gritta stated that it plays a
huge role; it’s like a football coach in American football, you know you have a
team that doesn't do anything and they hire this new coach and before you know it
they turned the program around. I don't think you can ever underestimate the
quality of your management team. (R. Gritta, personal communication, October
28, 2011)
Before the final step of delineation of the theory, we return to the published
literature. In grounded theory, scholarly literature is used not as a theoretical framework
to guide your research based on past research, as in traditional research methodologies,
but is data itself. Grounded theorists go to the literature when theoretical sampling
directs them to do so. The purpose of going to the literature in this research project was
to gather more data as ground theory requires, but also to review and compare how this
emergent theory relates to the published literature. Additionally, by returning to the
literature the data is triangulated, which gives the research more validity and allows for
the findings of the study to be compared and contrasted to other studies in the published
literature.
Evaluation of Findings
Through this grounded theory research process three ideas or themes have
emerged. For the sample group of six all-cargo airlines there appears to be a relationship
between aircraft fleet mix (single fleet versus mixed fleet) and the K-score predicted
group membership versus actual events. The airlines that were predicted nonbankrupt
and did not go bankrupt (Atlas Air and Cargo 360) both flew a single aircraft type,
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whereas the other four airlines in the sample flew a mixed fleet of different types of
aircraft. The relationship between aircraft fleet mix is supported by Dr. Gritta who stated
that he has “done some research that shows the fewer the types of aircraft you fly, the
lower your cost per unit, and that's an advantage” (R. Gritta, personal communication,
October 28, 2011).
Further, the research indicated there might be a relationship between the type of
aircraft flown by the airline and financial status. The financial status of the three airlines
that operated wide-body aircraft (Gemini, Atlas Air, and Cargo 360) was predicted
correctly by the K-score model, and the three incorrect predictions made by the K-score
model all involved airlines that flew narrow body aircraft (Kitty Hawk Air Cargo, ABX
Air, and Arrow Air). The finding of a relationship between type of aircraft flown and
financial status is closely related to the first finding on aircraft fleet mix.
The third idea that emerged during the research was there was a high cooccurrence of codes among flight frequency and capacity, price, reliability, and revenue.
Many of the codes and themes that emerged throughout the research come as no surprise.
The ideas of competitive advantage, operations, financial factors, risk, and many of the
other codes that emerged are germane not only to the airline industry, but to most
companies in general. The high co-occurrence of flight frequency with capacity, price,
reliability, and revenue is supported by the statement made by Dr. Gritta, that if flight
frequency
resulted in higher hours of utilization per aircraft, it would be a good thing. The
higher your average flight hours for each day of utilization of the aircraft, the
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lower cost that you have, so that would mean a lower probability of bankruptcy.
(personal communication, October 28, 2011)
The dominate research methodologies found in the literature on bankruptcy
prediction are “classical cross-sectional statistical methods and multivariate discriminant
analysis (MDA)… however, these methods have some major limitations” (Wetter &
Wennberg, 2009, p. 30). In addition, the performance of many of the failure prediction
models based on statistical methods is similar, so other methods of failure prediction
should be explored (Ooghe et al., 2009). Ooghe et al. (2009) suggested that to improve
the statistically based models it is important to understand first the nonstatistical variables
that may affect these existing models. This research has attempted to provide a better
understanding of the nonstatistical themes that may affect traditional statistical based
bankruptcy prediction models. One of the underlying tenets of grounded research is to
look at the data with an open mind and not be influenced by previous research; however,
once new theory has emerged, it is essential to explore the published literature to
determine where the new theory stands in relation to previous research.
The literature on research into nonstatistical themes that affect bankruptcy
prediction is limited; however, some research has been published. Sun and Li (2007)
developed a methodological framework for group expert decision making for predicting
financial distress using qualitative risk factors. The qualitative risk factors used by Sun
and Li are listed in Table 16. The qualitative risk factors used by Sun and Li fit well with
the categories developed in this study with the exception that several of the risk factors
used by Sun and Li are divided into several subcategories. For example, the financial
factors category, which emerged in this study, is divided into four categories by Sun and
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Li (financial ability, investment risk, consciousness of debt risk, and corporate
governance).
Kim and Han (2003) developed a bankruptcy prediction model using a genetic
algorithm based model and qualitative decisions by expert testimony. The experts
considered six qualitative risk factors (i.e., credibility, competitiveness, financial
flexibility, industry risk, management risk, and operating risk). Table 16 includes a
comparison of the qualitative factors used by Kim and Han with those of the current
study. There appears to be a match between the six qualitative risk factors of Kim and
Han in the categories developed in this study. With the exception, like Son and Li
(2007), the financial factors category of the study is divided into several qualitative
categories. The other deviation from Sun and Li (2007) and Kim and Han (2003) is that
both studies considered all of the factors risk, whereas this study provides a separate
category for risk. Both of these studies support the six categories that emerged in this
research.
Table 16 Comparison of Qualitative Factors Used in Other Studies

Current study
Management
Risk
Operations
Competitive advantage
Financial factors

External factors

Sun & Li (2007)
Management and control
All a risk factor
Management and control
Market information
Financial ability
Investment risk
Consciousness of debt risk
Corporate governance
Outside risk

Kim & Han (2003)
Management risk
All a risk factor
Operating risk
Competitiveness
Credibility
Financial flexibility
Industry risk

Kim and Han (2003) advocated for a combined approach of both qualitative and
quantitative methods to improve bankruptcy prediction model performance. Kim and
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Han noted that qualitative bankruptcy prediction models were limited because of the fact
that they used historical data, whereas qualitative methods and the use of SMEs were able
to provide better future predictions. While this research independently developed a
similar list of qualitative factors to Kim and Han that should be explored, it used subject
matter expert testimony to confirm and support the categories, whereas Kim and Han
used SMEs to provide an opinion on specific airline bankruptcies.
Management was one of the categories that emerged during this research, and it is
a central theme found in qualitative financial distress research. Dr. Gritta noted that
management was one of the biggest qualitative factors that influence financial distress in
a firm (R. Gritta, personal communication, October 28, 2011). Wetter and Wennberg
(2009) developed a model that used variables for human capital and social capital of their
management team, which performed better than the Altman Z-score model in a study of
1,735 Swedish firms. The variable for human capital took into consideration the
company founder’s years of education, years of industry experience, and years of
entrepreneurial experience, and for social capital used years of residency in a country and
a dummy variable for parents who were entrepreneurs. Using the variables human capital
and social capital, Wetter and Wennberg (2009) had a prediction accuracy of 65.88%
where as the Altman Z-score correctly classified only 52.56%. The findings in the study
showed that a variable for management in a bankruptcy prediction model should be
considered.
The first two themes that emerged in this research concerned aircraft fleet mix
(single fleet versus mixed fleet) and type of aircraft flown by the airline (narrow-body
versus wide-body aircraft). In addition, the third theme that emerged concerned the
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relationships among the following codes: flight frequency and capacity, price, reliability,
and revenue. Gudmundsson (2002) used a regression analysis with independent variables
that were related to the codes uncovered in this research in developing a bankruptcy
prediction model. Unlike most financial prediction models, Gudmundsson’s model
incorporates operating or traffic statistics instead of the traditional financial data.
Gudmundsson used an independent variable for different types of aircraft operated as one
of 10 independent variables. Three other independent variables of load factor, number of
passengers per departure, and number of departures per aircraft were used, all of which
are related to capacity and flight frequency. Gudmundsson also used the variables of
average age of aircraft fleet and annual inflation rate; both of these variables can be
related to fleet mix and economic factors uncovered in this research; therefore, six of the
10 independent variables used by Gudmundsson were independently uncovered in this
research. Of the 10 independent variables used by Gudmundsson, only two were
significant in the model; average age of fleet and the number of employees per aircraft.
The findings of Gudmundsson provide credence that issues surrounding the makeup of
the fleet may be significant.
In another study by Gudmundsson (2004), productivity was positively related to
financial distress in airlines. Productivity in the aviation industry does not just refer to
labor issues. Economies of scale productivity increase related to the use, makeup, and
deployment of the aircraft fleet as well (Gudmundsson, 2004).
Gudmundsson (2002) found that airlines that fly single fleet wide-body aircraft
are less prone to bankruptcy; however, Gudmundsson (1999) indicated in previous
research “that carriers operating smaller equipment fared better than those operating
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larger equipment” (p. 173). The difference in results may be attributed to the fact that
Gudmundsson’s findings were from a sample of passenger airlines between 1978 and
1992. This 5-year sample was immediately following airline deregulation in the United
States, and 9 years before the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Both events caused
many changes and upheaval within the aviation industry (Walton, 2011).
The third theme that emerged concerned the relationships among flight frequency
and capacity, price, reliability, and revenue. The third theme is related to the utilization
of an aircraft in a process called revenue management. Revenue management is the plan
for the maximization of the cargo scheduled to fly full aircraft and the optimization of the
route structure to ensure full utilization of the aircraft (Walton, 2011). Airlines can only
increase capacity in large increments, so optimization of the capacity of the aircraft is
critical to the maximization of revenue (Hellermann, 2006). Airlines that are able to
maximize the revenue are less prone to bankruptcy (Dr. Gritta, personal communication,
October 28, 2011). In addition, airlines that are able to maximize their utilization have
higher economy of scale and lower cost per unit (Hellermann, 2006), making them less
prone to bankruptcy.
Emergent Theory and Theoretical Integration
Three themes have emerged from this grounded theory research process. There
appears to be a relationship between aircraft fleet mix and the K-score prediction model;
there appears to be a relationship between the type of aircraft flown by an airline and the
K-score prediction model; and there is a high co-occurrence of codes among flight
frequency and capacity, price, reliability, and revenue, which indicates the importance of
flight related factors in qualitative financial distress prediction models.
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While the literature is limited on qualitative financial distress prediction research,
this study has confirmed the importance of considering fleet mix and type of aircraft
flown as part of qualitative study. In addition, the high co-occurrence of flight frequency
and capacity, price, reliability, and revenue are also qualitative indicators that have been
explored in other research. Most published financial distress prediction models use a set
of quantitative financial ratios; however, this research has shown that qualitative and
traffic statistics should be considered in prediction models.
Summary
This research used grounded theory to explore the nonfinancial factors that may
affect quantitative bankruptcy prediction models. The results of a published bankruptcy
prediction model (K-score) accuracy on 17 U.S. all-cargo airlines between 2005 and 2009
were used as a starting point to draw a sample of six airlines. The K-score model was
originally developed to predict bankruptcy in the passenger airline industry for the years
1999-2003. Uncalibrated, for the air-cargo airlines, the model was able to correctly to
classify 1 of the 2 bankrupt firms (50.0% correctly classified) as bankrupt. For the
nonbankrupt air-cargo airlines, the original Kroeze model predicted seven of the
nonbankrupt firms correctly (46.7% correctly classified) for an overall accuracy of 47.1%
of the original grouped cases correctly classified. In total, 34 documents were coded and
35 unique codes or ideas emerged from the documents. Two SME interviews were
conducted to provide additional background on financial distress in the all-cargo airline
industry.
Three relationships emerged from the data that provide insight into some of the
qualitative factors that should be considered in financial prediction models. First, there is
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a relationship between aircraft fleet mix in the K-Score prediction model. Second, there
is a relationship between the type of aircraft flown by an airline and the K-Score
prediction model. Third, there is a relationship between traffic statistics relating to flight
frequency and capacity, price, reliability, and revenue.
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Chapter 5: Implications, Recommendations, and Conclusions
The problem addressed in this study was the inability of published financial
prediction models to account for nonstatistical factors that may influence the models.
Financial prediction models, typically quantitative in nature, are used to determine the
financial stability of the company. These quantitative, statistical based models have been
refined to a point where they provide similar results, so further improvement may be
obtained through exploration of the nonstatistical variables that affect these models
(Ooghe et al., 2009; Youn & Gu, 2010). The population for the study was the U.S. allcargo airline industry between 2005 and 2009. There were 17 U.S. all-cargo airlines in
operation during this period. Using grounded theory, the purpose of this research was to
explore the nonstatistical factors influencing a published bankruptcy prediction model,
the K-score. A basic grounded theory research processes was followed in this study as
outlined by Corbin and Strauss (1990) in which constant comparison analysis was used
throughout the data collection process.
Validation of grounded theory is questioned by some researchers; however,
validity was maintained through the use of triangulation of data from multiple sources.
Additionally, validity was added through the detailed description of the data that was
provided in chapter 4. Publicly available data was used in this study and did not involve
any human subjects so there was no risk to humans; however, Northcentral University's
Institutional Review Board approval was obtained prior to any data collection.
In this chapter, the research question and the theory that emerged during the study
will be summarized. The chapter includes the limitations of the study and where it fits
with existing literature. The chapter will continue with a discussion of the managerial

119
implications of this research and its findings; moreover, the chapter will end with a
discussion of recommendations and conclusions.
Implications
This research uncovered six categories (management, risk, operations,
competitive advantage, financial factors, and external factors) that relate to the financial
stability of an all-cargo airline. The categories that emerged from the data are relevant
not only to the all-cargo airline industry, but to most companies in general. Several
studies (Kim & Han, 2003; Sun & Li, 2007) have used similar qualitative factors in
bankruptcy prediction modeling. Figure 4 graphically displays the six categories that
emerged during this research and their interrelations. Financial factors, operations, risk,
and competitive advantage are all part of management, and management has direct
control over these categories; however, all of these categories are influenced by external
factors outside of the control of management and set the parameters in which the firm
must operate. All of these factors influence the financial stability of the firm, and the
long-term health of the company.
The research question that was explored in this study was as follows: What
nonstatistical factors influence the K-score bankruptcy prediction model in the all-cargo
airline industry? The findings of this research uncovered three themes that address the
research question. For the six all-cargo airlines examined in this study the research found
a relationship between aircraft fleet mix and the K-score predicted group membership.
The two airlines (Atlas Air and Cargo 360) both operated single fleet type of aircraft and
both were correctly predicted nonbankrupt, whereas all of the airlines, except one
(Gemini), that flew a mixed fleet of different type aircraft were correctly predicted as
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either bankrupt or nonbankrupt by the K-score model. The second relationship
uncovered in this research was between the type of aircraft flown by an airline and the Kscore model. Of the six airlines in this sample, three flew only a single body type aircraft
(Gemini, Atlas air, cargo 360). All three of these airlines were correctly classified by the
K-score model. The other three airlines (Kitty Hawk, ABX Air, and Arrow Air) all flew
at least some narrow-body aircraft, and all three were incorrectly classified by the Kscore model. The fleet type and mix of aircraft that an airline flies is a strategic decision
for all-cargo airlines. Although flying a mixed fleet may allow an airline to better size
aircraft on certain routes, it increases the overall operational cost of an airline.
Although the literature on qualitative financial distress modeling is limited, most
qualitative research attempts to account for the type of fleet that an airline flies. For
example, Gudmundsson (2002) used an independent variable of different types of aircraft
operated in a qualitative model that he developed. The independent emergence of this
data separately from previously published research adds validity to this study and to the
previous work of Gudmundsson and others and indicates that the type of aircraft fleet
affects the financial success or failure of an airline. Airlines that operate older fleets tend
to have higher fuel and maintenance costs and lower overall reliability, whereas airlines
that fly newer aircraft have the advantage of fuel savings, reduced maintenance cost, and
improved reliability.
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Figure 4. Six categories that affect financial distress in a firm.
The third theme that emerged in this research concerns the relationships between
flight frequency and capacity, price, reliability, and revenue. These factors are related to
the utilization of an aircraft. To maximize revenue an all-cargo carrier strives for full
utilization of its aircraft on all legs of a flight. Full utilization of aircraft is difficult to
manage because of the complexity of network planning and capacity allocation. Unlike
passenger airlines where a passenger can be assigned to exactly one seat, cargo shipments
have multiple dimensions (volume and weight) that must be taken into account in an
attempt to maximize utilization of an aircraft. Additionally, cargo shipments typically are
not round-trip, and imbalances in the trade lanes may require a cargo airline to operate a
less than full aircraft in one direction (e.g., from China to the United States the aircraft is
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full, but on return to China the aircraft is not fully utilized). By maximizing revenue, an
airline reduces its probability of bankruptcy. The importance of the theme of revenue
maximization was confirmed by Dr. Gritta (personal communication, October 28, 2011)
who stated that airlines that have a higher utilization of their aircraft have a lower
probability of bankruptcy.
Figure 5 graphically illustrates the three themes that emerged during this research.
These themes act as pillars to financial prediction models in the all-cargo airline industry.
All three of these themes, fleet mix, type of aircraft, and aircraft utilization deal directly
with the production unit of the firm, the aircraft. Just as with a manufacturing company
with a factory, the production unit is where the firm's key competency must be focused to
maximize revenue and control cost in an attempt to maximize profits for all of the
shareholders. The three themes have emerged as the key factors that influence financial
distress in all-cargo airlines and therefore affect financial distress models. Qualitative
bankruptcy prediction models have been unable to account fully for qualitative factors
that affect their prediction capability. The three pillars of fleet mix, type of aircraft
flown, and aircraft utilization have not been taken into consideration by qualitative
bankruptcy prediction models; however, this research has shown that these factors are
important to improving bankruptcy predictions for the aviation industry.
This research explored the nonstatistical factors that influence the accuracy of the
Kroeze K-score model. Using grounded theory, this research contributes to the body of
literature. This study indicates the importance of qualitative factors in financial distress
prediction and provides some of the factors that may be important in improving
bankruptcy prediction accuracy; additionally, this research confirms the importance of
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the type of fleet, aircraft type mix, and maximizing aircraft utilization to profitable
operation.

Financial Prediction Models

Fleet mix

Type of
Aircraft

Aircraft
Utilization

Figure 5. Factors that influence financial distress.
Recommendations
The qualitative factors uncovered in this research can be used to improve financial
prediction models. These findings can be used to identify themes and relationships and
provide a better understanding of the failure process. This research determined there are
six themes (management, risk, operations, competitive advantage, financial factors, and
external factors) that relate to the financial stability of an all-cargo airline. Previous
research has used some of these same themes in financial distress prediction modeling,
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but not all of them (Kim & Han, 2003; Sun & Li, 2007). Future research should explore
the incorporation of all six themes into all-cargo airline financial distress prediction
models to verify their relevance. The six themes may be relevant to companies outside of
the aviation industry, and their use in financial distress prediction of nonaviation-related
firms should be explored to determine the transferability of the categories between
industries.
Factors that influence financial distress models in the all-cargo airline industry
were determined to be related to fleet mix, type of aircraft, and aircraft utilization.
Previous qualitative financial distress research has attempted to account for some of these
factors (Gudmundsson, 2002). These three factors make up the production unit of an
airline and should be the focus of airline management to maximize revenue and minimize
cost. Because of the importance of these three factors to airline profitability, additional
research on the relationship of these factors to financial distress modeling should be
conducted.
The main limitation of this study was the small population available, which
precluded the possibility of testing the findings, which was, in any case, outside the scope
of this research. Future research should be conducted to verify these findings on a larger
population. The study researched U.S. all-cargo airlines, and used a sample of six of the
17 all-cargo carriers in operation from 2005 to 2009. Since the total population of U.S.
all-cargo carriers is small, future research could be conducted on the entire population.
Non-U.S. all-cargo airlines operate under a different financial reporting regime that may
affect financial prediction models that are calibrated using U.S. company data, so future
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studies should be conducted which consider these factors in relation to airlines which
operate outside the United States.
This research includes secondary data augmented by two interviews conducted
with subject matter experts. The use of secondary data in the grounded theory process
has many obstacles and limitations for its use in theoretical sampling (Birks & Mills,
2011). The limitations of using secondary data are that it removes the researcher from
the generation and collection of data, which is counter to the idea of grounded theory that
the researcher will have some influence over the nature of the data that is gathered.
When generating theory using secondary data, the researcher's philosophical position
may impact how the data is interpreted, and “gaps may subsequently exist in the
theoretical constructions” (Birks & Mills, 2011, p. 84) that hinder the generation of a
cohesive theory. Although the use of secondary data may hinder a comprehensive theory
development, Birks and Mills (2011) noted that “attention to the application of essential
grounded theory methods in your treatment of secondary data will minimize the potential
disadvantages” (p. 85) and that the use of secondary data can provide a cost and time
advantage in research.
Traditional quantitative bankruptcy prediction models that use past data are
limited in predicting financial distress that might occur in the future, whereas the use of
qualitative data and SMEs may provide improved predictions further into the future. The
factors and the qualitative models; however, have not been fully developed. Future
research focused on the use of qualitative data and SMEs may be able to improve
prediction performance.
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In addition to a theoretical or research interest, this research also provides a list of
factors that should be considered by airline managers when making decisions. Most
senior managers, no matter what industry, are trained to examine external factors that
may affect their firm along with considerations of competitive advantage, financial
factors, and risk factors. In addition, one of the primary functions of management is
overseeing operations. These factors all emerged as part of six categories that may affect
financial distress and a firm and confirms the importance to the company. Specific to the
aviation industry are the factors of fleet mix, type of aircraft flying, and aircraft
utilization, which influence financial distress in a company. Fleet decisions are strategic
multimillion-dollar decisions that airline managers must make. If management makes the
correct fleet decisions they may avoid future financial turmoil; get it wrong and
management may set firm on a path to destruction. The third theme uncovered in this
research in relation to flight frequency also impacts management’s decisions. Managers
must determine the price of providing air cargo services, and through fleet decisions
determine the capacity and reliability of their aircraft. These factors will affect the final
revenue stream of company and therefore the financial health firm.
Conclusions
“Firms which cannot recognize financial distress and take measures at an early
stage will run into bankruptcy, which not only brings great lost stockholders, creditors,
managers and other interested parts, but also affects the stability of social economy” (Sun
& Li, 2007, p. 885). The findings in this study provide information that is important to
both the theoretical academic community and the practical, managerial, day-to-day
operations of an airline. The research on bankruptcy prediction modeling is extensive,
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and the findings from this research can be used to improve the financial distress modeling
process. For airline managers, an understanding of the factors that may cause bankruptcy
will help avoid financial distress in their company. The categories identified in this
research that relate to the financial distress of a firm were management, risk, operations,
competitive advantage, financial factors, and external factors. Company managers must
deal with many issues on a daily basis; however, this research has indicated that these six
categories are related to the financial health of the company, so an effort should be made
by management to specifically focus on these factors.
The profit-making unit of an airline is its fleet. The fleet mix, type of aircraft, and
utilization are key to operating a profitable airline. The findings showed that these three
factors also influence the financial health of all-cargo airlines. The decision on what
types of aircraft and the proper mix of aircraft to support the route structure of an airline
is a multimillion-dollar decision and can affect the long-term financial health of an
organization.
The theory that emerges from the data as discussed in this dissertation lead back
to the fact that the qualitative themes uncovered in the course of this research have not
been widely used in bankruptcy prediction models. These themes influence the financial
well being of an airline and should improve the prediction capability of financial
bankruptcy models if incorporated into future model.
This research has confirmed, but not quantified, there is a relationship between
aircraft fleet mix, type of aircraft flown by airline, and a published prediction financial
model. The findings of the study have also confirmed the importance of aircraft
utilization and revenue management and provided a list of categories (management, risk,
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operations, competitive advantage, financial factors, and external factors) that influence
the financial stability of an all-cargo airline industry. The all-cargo airline industry in the
as a whole operates on tight margins and is prone to bankruptcy. The results of this
research add to the body of knowledge on financial distress modeling and can be of
benefit to governments, lenders, academics, and investors. Additional research is
recommended to verify the results using a larger population of all-cargo airlines and on
companies outside of the aviation industry.
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Appendix A
List of Cargo Airlines
List of all-cargo U.S. airlines in business 2005-2009
•

Abx Air, Inc.

•

Aloha Air Cargo

•

Amerijet International

•

Arrow Air Inc.

•

Astar USA, LLC

•

Atlas Air Inc.

•

Capital Cargo International

•

Cargo 360, Inc.

•

Centurion Cargo Inc.

•

Evergreen Int'l Inc.

•

Gemini Air Cargo Airways

•

Kalitta Air LLC

•

Kitty Hawk Air Cargo

•

Lynden Air Cargo Airlines

•

Northern Air Cargo Inc.

•

Polar Air Cargo Airways

•

Southern Air Inc.

Source: RITA TranStats database
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Appendix B
Documents Reviewed
Table B1
Title
Oak Hill to buy Southern Air and merge it with
Cargo 360

Source
Air Transport
Intelligence

Published
2007

Southern Air drops plans to add 747-400SF

Air Transport
Intelligence

2008

Cargo 360, Southern Air merger chugging along
Oak Hill Capital Partners to acquire Southern Air;
Southern Air to be combined with Cargo 360 to
create a leading global Air cargo company

Aviation Daily
PR Newswire

2007
2007

US DOT grants Cargo 360 air operator’s
certificate

Air Transport
Intelligence

2006

Cargo 360: proving by selling

Traffic World

2006

Oak Hill Capital Partners to acquire Southern Air

Press release Oak Hill
Capital Partners

2007

ABX Air 2005 Annual Report

ABX Air

2006

U.S. SEC form 10-K for Air Transport Services
Group, Inc annual report 2009

U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission

2010

Atlas Air annual report 2005

Atlas Air

2006

Atlas Air annual report 2009

Atlas Air

2010

Atlas Air profits surge

Journal of Commerce

2009

Atlas Air, Inc. named best air charter/ACMI
operator

Business Wire

2007

Atlas Air recovery aids B747-400F values

Aircraft Value News

2005

Panalpina, Atlas Air renew freighter pact

Journal of Commerce

2009

ABX air cargo says Florida-based rival offering
buyout

Dayton Daily News

2007

138
Title
U.S. SEC form 10-K for Kitty Hawk, Inc. annual
report 2005

Source
U.S. Securities and
Exchange commission

Published
2006

U.S. SEC form 10-K for Kitty Hawk, Inc. annual
report 2006

U.S. Securities and
Exchange commission

2007

U.S. SEC form 10-K for Kitty Hawk, Inc.
quarterly report ending June 2007

U.S. Securities and
Exchange commission

2007

U.S. SEC form 10-K for Kitty Hawk, Inc.
quarterly report ending March 2007

U.S. Securities and
Exchange commission

2007

MatlinPatterson takes majority stake in Arrow
Cargo parent

Air Transport
Intelligence

2008

New appointments announced by Arrow Air

Airline Industry
Information

2008

Cargo carrier Arrow Air bankrupt, to liquidate

Reuters

2010

Arrow air exits chapter 11 bankruptcy protection

Air Transport
Intelligence
Air Transport
Intelligence

2004

PR Newswire

2008

Arrow Air expands DC-10 fleet, buys Miami
facility
MatlinPatterson Global Opportunities Partners III
acquires controlling interest in Arrow Air
Holdings Corporation
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Arrow air is ready to ascend cargo carrier rebounds South florida Sun –
from bankruptcy
Sentinel

2005

US cargo operator Gemini emerges from Ch 11
bankruptcy

Air Transport
Intelligence

2006

Is outsourced air out?

Traffic World

2008

Gemini Air Cargo closes

Journal of Commerce

2008

Gemini Air reorganizes

Traffic World

2006

Gemini Air Cargo, Inc. announces emergence from Business Wire
Chapter 11; Bayside Capital takes majority stake;
company eliminates approximately $50 million of
Debt

2006
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Title
Gemini cleared for takeoff

Source
Traffic World

Gemini files for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection

Air Traffic Intelligence

Published
2006
2008
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Appendix C
Financial Data
Financial data used to calculate the K-Score for each airline
ABX Air, Inc.

2009
2008
2007
2006
2005
Total Current Assets
2,386,866
1,960,010
775,645
421,493
469,713
Total Assets
3,894,583
4,108,751
3,175,464
2,248,354
1,976,776
Total Current Liabilities
653,641
681,774
538,835
570,729
585,362
Total Noncurrent Liabilities
2,470,165
2,797,912
2,065,288
1,168,788
971,926
Retained Earnings
-1,103,466
-1,108,654
-1,161,636
-1,214,914
-1,298,537
Net Stockholders Equity
767,447
627,401
571,341
508,837
419,488
Kroeze K-score
-0.091
-0.123
-0.262
-0.438
-0.536
Note. Company considered not in financial distress if K-Score is >0.0, and in financial distress if K-Score is =<0.0. Financial
figures shown is Thousands of US$. Source of data RITA Schedule B1 data.

Aloha Air Cargo

2009
2008
2007
2006
Total Current Assets
36,605
98,282
290,345
346,820
Total Assets
90,282
259,315
891,046
691,650
Total Current Liabilities
16,444
274,364
840,468
617,645
Total Noncurrent Liabilities
176
35,250
126,563
383,513
Retained Earnings
3,904
-150,628
-334,973
-594,882
Net Stockholders Equity
73,663
-51,595
-78,893
-310,215
Kroeze K-score
0.588
-0.687
-0.490
-0.860
Note. Company considered not in financial distress if K-Score is >0.0, and in financial distress if K-Score is =<0.0.
figures shown is Thousands of US$. Source of data RITA Schedule B1 data.

Amerijet International

2009
2008
2007
2006
Total Current Assets
152,624
163,466
148,605
138,690
Total Assets
207,916
214,505
195,982
186,052
Total Current Liabilities
163,975
172,308
123,337
133,260
Total Noncurrent Liabilities
14,293
16,727
39,613
32,460
Retained Earnings
17,561
13,383
21,255
9,490
Net Stockholders Equity
29,648
25,470
33,031
20,332
Kroeze K-score
0.075
0.056
0.148
0.064
Note. Company considered not in financial distress if K-Score is >0.0, and in financial distress if K-Score is =<0.0.
figures shown is Thousands of US$. Source of data RITA Schedule B1 data.

2005
412,782
646,287
834,060
472,606
-704,271
-666,155
-1.144
Financial

2005
129,227
175,840
122,461
30,636
12,270
22,743
0.085
Financial
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Arrow Air Inc.

2009
2008
2007
2006
2005
Total Current Assets
138,341
132,325
134,793
118,162
87,210
Total Assets
308,147
274,241
278,921
269,265
179,665
Total Current Liabilities
139,679
199,912
135,056
173,097
99,763
Total Noncurrent Liabilities
142,467
56,425
154,015
90,832
66,101
Retained Earnings
-255,170
-145,096
-58,154
-26,243
-9,009
Net Stockholders Equity
26,001
17,904
-10,150
5,336
13,801
Kroeze K-score
-0.685
-0.502
-0.179
-0.134
-0.052
Note. Company considered not in financial distress if K-Score is >0.0, and in financial distress if K-Score is =<0.0. Financial
figures shown is Thousands of US$. Source of data RITA Schedule B1 data.

Astar USA, LLC

2009
2008
2007
2006
Total Current Assets
219,810
296,731
360,424
248,677
Total Assets
645,512
860,859
895,120
717,032
Total Current Liabilities
458,151
500,552
496,590
453,189
Total Noncurrent Liabilities
360,974
478,246
501,556
465,472
Retained Earnings
-327,781
-264,753
-242,518
-246,609
Net Stockholders Equity
-175,165
-118,715
-103,442
-206,609
Kroeze K-score
-0.548
-0.335
-0.279
-0.390
Note. Company considered not in financial distress if K-Score is >0.0, and in financial distress if K-Score is =<0.0.
figures shown is Thousands of US$. Source of data RITA Schedule B1 data.

2005
227,898
599,642
353,973
359,326
-172,140
-132,140
-0.317
Financial

Atlas Air Inc.

2009
2008
2007
2006
2005
Total Current Assets
965,782
1,061,519
1,005,798
933,473
790,368
Total Assets
4,813,940
4,521,675
3,478,215
3,320,763
3,344,655
Total Current Liabilities
567,000
619,961
619,520
790,640
716,711
Total Noncurrent Liabilities
2,595,933
2,523,616
1,669,756
1,760,189
2,234,215
Retained Earnings
1,247,695
1,136,399
895,478
421,985
115,108
Net Stockholders Equity
1,386,432
1,265,478
1,167,960
713,965
308,473
Kroeze K-score
0.288
0.281
0.302
0.149
0.046
Note. Company considered not in financial distress if K-Score is >0.0, and in financial distress if K-Score is =<0.0. Financial
figures shown is Thousands of US$. Source of data RITA Schedule B1 data.

Capital Cargo International

2009
2008
2007
2006
2005
Total Current Assets
10,407
8,616
15,281
14,942
19,280
Total Assets
120,488
116,660
59,972
60,917
70,163
Total Current Liabilities
19,185
12,359
9,256
17,078
22,286
Total Noncurrent Liabilities
3,755
2,431
3,867
17,977
27,183
Retained Earnings
-21,429
-7,657
-65,116
-137,651
-51,375
Net Stockholders Equity
83,736
97,511
46,567
25,789
20,675
Kroeze K-score
0.237
0.668
-0.489
-1.821
-0.579
Note. Company considered not in financial distress if K-Score is >0.0, and in financial distress if K-Score is =<0.0. Financial
figures shown is Thousands of US$. Source of data RITA Schedule B1 data.
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Cargo 360, Inc.

2009
2008
2007
2006
2005
Total Current Assets
56,056
46,269
Total Assets
1,052,861
55,092
Total Current Liabilities
73,055
15,113
Total Noncurrent Liabilities
978,429
44,467
Retained Earnings
-20,171
-36,215
Net Stockholders Equity
927
-4,488
Kroeze K-score
-0.020
-0.408
Note. Company considered not in financial distress if K-Score is >0.0, and in financial distress if K-Score is =<0.0. Financial
figures shown is Thousands of US$. Source of data RITA Schedule B1 data.

Centurion Cargo Inc.

2009
2008
2007
2006
2005
Total Current Assets
112,258
324,809
156,338
15,971
Total Assets
164,355
394,486
190,186
33,837
Total Current Liabilities
113,372
287,995
171,236
27,361
Total Noncurrent Liabilities
24,321
23,324
8,257
255
Retained Earnings
-122,517
-60,601
-137,979
-66,437
Net Stockholders Equity
25,162
81,995
7,996
6,220
Kroeze K-score
-0.606
-0.074
-0.624
-1.711
Note. Company considered not in financial distress if K-Score is >0.0, and in financial distress if K-Score is =<0.0. Financial
figures shown is Thousands of US$. Source of data RITA Schedule B1 data.

Evergreen International Inc.

2009
2008
2007
2006
2005
Total Current Assets
127,069
156,702
123,372
112,851
103,591
Total Assets
1,892,330
1,958,743
1,958,510
1,869,958
1,809,637
Total Current Liabilities
326,200
306,477
277,831
281,827
259,332
Total Noncurrent Liabilities
339,060
322,078
370,260
328,987
372,556
Retained Earnings
450,294
503,344
477,500
451,727
366,943
Net Stockholders Equity
739,897
792,947
767,103
741,330
656,547
Kroeze K-score
0.295
0.335
0.315
0.313
0.262
Note. Company considered not in financial distress if K-Score is >0.0, and in financial distress if K-Score is =<0.0. Financial
figures shown is Thousands of US$. Source of data RITA Schedule B1 data.

Gemini Air Cargo Airways

2009
2008
2007
2006
Total Current Assets
97,497
Total Assets
275,986
Total Current Liabilities
187,916
Total Noncurrent Liabilities
184,532
Retained Earnings
-401,878
Net Stockholders Equity
-97,099
Kroeze K-score
-1.337
Note. Company considered not in financial distress if K-Score is >0.0, and in financial distress if K-Score is =<0.0.
figures shown is Thousands of US$. Source of data RITA Schedule B1 data.

2005
83,619
251,933
184,581
302,547
-747,150
-235,194
-2.646
Financial
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Kalitta Air LLC

2009
2008
2007
2006
Total Current Assets
704,687
483,413
603,640
468,565
Total Assets
1,921,402
1,766,426
1,414,689
1,193,751
Total Current Liabilities
462,234
274,243
212,636
225,123
Total Noncurrent Liabilities
304,829
302,389
0
0
Retained Earnings
1,249,259
1,277,617
1,288,904
1,052,830
Net Stockholders Equity
1,154,339
1,189,794
1,202,052
968,627
Kroeze K-score
0.746
0.867
1.465
1.271
Note. Company considered not in financial distress if K-Score is >0.0, and in financial distress if K-Score is =<0.0.
figures shown is Thousands of US$. Source of data RITA Schedule B1 data.

2005
357,869
976,391
174,575
0
885,582
801,816
1.320
Financial

Kitty Hawk Aircargo

2009
2008
2007
2006
2005
Total Current Assets
12,056
12,517
36,742
Total Assets
22,833
12,443
29,228
Total Current Liabilities
12,021
8,031
16,218
Total Noncurrent Liabilities
0
0
0
Retained Earnings
10,812
4,412
13,010
Net Stockholders Equity
10,812
4,412
13,010
Kroeze K-score
0.497
0.455
0.650
Note. Company considered not in financial distress if K-Score is >0.0, and in financial distress if K-Score is =<0.0. Financial
figures shown is Thousands of US$. Source of data RITA Schedule B1 data.

Lynden Air Cargo Airlines

2009
2008
2007
2006
Total Current Assets
40,592
68,758
53,653
39,915
Total Assets
215,341
240,597
243,897
243,466
Total Current Liabilities
33,932
59,469
43,414
54,894
Total Noncurrent Liabilities
1,025
6,131
2,017
537
Retained Earnings
141,163
139,910
167,498
160,910
Net Stockholders Equity
180,460
175,019
198,496
188,144
Kroeze K-score
1.131
0.794
1.072
0.914
Note. Company considered not in financial distress if K-Score is >0.0, and in financial distress if K-Score is =<0.0.
figures shown is Thousands of US$. Source of data RITA Schedule B1 data.

Northern Air Cargo Inc.

2005
31,306
226,941
51,720
17,192
134,752
157,924
0.728
Financial

2009
2008
2007
2006
2005
Total Current Assets
19,413
20,904
22,401
25,186
27,916
Total Assets
126,506
129,161
141,000
99,983
73,734
Total Current Liabilities
46,292
49,735
39,478
29,848
41,737
Total Noncurrent Liabilities
331
0
0
0
9,726
Retained Earnings
31,781
14,529
3,640
16,810
21,471
Net Stockholders Equity
79,883
79,426
101,522
70,135
22,271
Kroeze K-score
0.344
0.212
0.275
0.389
0.242
Note. Company considered not in financial distress if K-Score is >0.0, and in financial distress if K-Score is =<0.0. Financial
figures shown is Thousands of US$. Source of data RITA Schedule B1 data.
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Polar Air Cargo Airways

2009
2008
2007
2006
2005
Total Current Assets
180,665
424,983
320,911
674,409
721,426
Total Assets
190,409
437,228
378,641
922,572
1,133,029
Total Current Liabilities
123,566
246,587
168,871
208,659
226,300
Total Noncurrent Liabilities
4,551
124,098
135,882
69,665
64,685
Retained Earnings
-89,483
-69,490
-14,316
30,075
83,346
Net Stockholders Equity
62,293
66,543
67,293
644,247
842,044
Kroeze K-score
-0.259
-0.004
0.100
0.420
0.500
Note. Company considered not in financial distress if K-Score is >0.0, and in financial distress if K-Score is =<0.0. Financial
figures shown is Thousands of US$. Source of data RITA Schedule B1 data.

Southern Air Inc.

2009
2008
2007
2006
2005
Total Current Assets
74,888
216,801
37,976
29,945
23,574
Total Assets
1,338,371
1,974,298
211,149
164,409
142,284
Total Current Liabilities
123,980
163,837
107,731
42,497
23,310
Total Noncurrent Liabilities
1,157,932
1,123,473
14,989
35,182
47,400
Retained Earnings
-918,298
-251,643
70,292
74,731
59,574
Net Stockholders Equity
53,643
685,966
88,032
86,731
71,574
Kroeze K-score
-0.580
-0.040
0.270
0.484
0.464
Note. Company considered not in financial distress if K-Score is >0.0, and in financial distress if K-Score is =<0.0. Financial
figures shown is Thousands of US$. Source of data RITA Schedule B1 data.
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Appendix D: Definition of Codes
Accidents. This code denotes mention of aircraft accidents.
Antitrust. This code refers to the impact of the fuel surcharge antitrust lawsuits started
in Feb 2006.
Bankruptcy. This code is used when the segment of text discussed bankruptcy or the
discussion of any sort of restructuring that has taken place or is being considered.
Capacity. This code indicates capacity issues related to air-cargo operations. Capacity
can be either the carrying capacity of the particular aircraft or the overall capacity of the
airline.
Cash flow. This code represents cash flow issues within a firm.
Competition. This code is used to examine competition within the air-cargo industry
Competitive Advantage. This code indicates the competitive advantages a company
may have over a competitor.
Cost. This code refers to cargo airline cost issues such as fuel and salaries.
Credit_markets. This code indicates when a carrier is looking to the credit markets for
funding.
Customers. This code signifies issues related to customer service and customers in
general.
Earnings. This code explores the earnings of an airline.
Economics. This code looks at the external economics that may affect an all-cargo
operation (i.e. world GDP...).
Environment. This code is for all environment issues such as environmental protection
agency (EPA), noise, or emissions regulations.
Fleet mix. This code is used to identify the fleet mix that the airline is operating in any
issues with the current or future aircraft fleet.
Flight_frequency. This code represents flight frequency issues related to air-cargo
operations.
Fuel_efficiency. This code signifies fuel efficiency issues related to air-cargo operation.
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Geographic location. This code represents the physical location of a company's
operations and the geographical reach or airports serviced and issues related to air-cargo
operations.
Labor_Issues. This code indicates labor issues or union agreements/issues.
Maintenance. This code outlines aircraft maintenance issues.
Management. This code is used to identify managers, owners, and management issues.
Market. This code looks at market factors in the industry.
Merger. This code is used to identify issues related to a merger.
Operations. This code looks at issues in the day-to-day or short-term operations of the
airline.
Ownership. This code indicates ownership and ownership issues.
Price. This code is for pricing issues related to air-cargo operations
Regulation. This code identifies issues with government regulations, both national and
international.
Reliability. This code is for reliability issues related to air-cargo operations, such as ontime delivery.
Revenue. This code refers to the revenue, imcome, or financial issues in an airline.
Risk. This code signifies issues of potential or real risk for the company.
Routes. This code designates routes the airlines fly and location served.
Security. This code symbolizes cargo security cost and issues.
Service. This code refers to the level of service and airline provides.
Size. This code indicates the size of the airline within the industry.
Tax. This code relates to taxation issues.
Utilization. This code signifies the amount of time and aircraft is used.
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Appendix E
Table E1

Categories With Examples of Quotations

Categories with Examples of Quotations Linked to Codes
Category
Management

Examples of quotations (preceded by code name)
Management - “We announced an operational excellence program
focused on cost savings and revenue enhancement. This program,
if successfully implemented, could benefit our operating
performance by more than $100 million over the next several
years.” (Atlas Air, 2006, p. 4)
Management –“Gemini will keep its current management team,
and should quickly show further improvement because "if you
take out all the debt service, Gemini has been performing very
well for over a year." (Boyd, 2006, p. 2)
Management – “In the course of its ongoing evaluation, our
management has identified certain areas requiring improvement,
which we are addressing.” (SEC, 2006, p. 53)
Management – “Our senior management team has extensive
operating and leadership experience in the airfreight, airline…”
(Atlas Air, 2010, p. 30)
Management – “Our business depends on highly qualified
management and flight crew personnel.: (Atlas Air, 2010, p. 30)

Operations

Operations - “Outsourcing provides a cost-effective and efficient
alternative for passenger airlines to maintain and expand the aircargo portion of their business.” (Atlas Air, 2006, p. 2)
Maintenance - “Maintenance is our third-largest operating
expense…” (Atlas Air, 2006, p. 4)
Security - “The TSA extensively regulates aviation security
through rules, regulations and security directives.” (Atlas Air,
2006, p. 6)

Financial factors

Fuel_efficiency - “Aviation fuel is one of the most significant
expenses for an airline.” (Atlas Air, 2006, p. 8)
Earnings - “We reported strong earnings, and we made
tremendous progress in our efforts to strengthen our
business.”(Atlas Air, 2006, p. 5)
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Category

Examples of quotations (preceded by code name)
Revenue - “ACMI minimizes yield and traffic demand risk in the
air-cargo business and provides a more predictable annual
revenue and cost base” (Atlas Air, 2006, p. 3)
Bankruptcy - “Chapter 11 filing had also helped facilitate the
issuance of the new equity securities required by certain of the
restructuring agreements” (Atlas Air, 2006, p. 10)
Cost - “In addition, if fuel costs increase significantly, our
customers may reduce the volume and frequency of cargo
shipments or find less costly alternatives for cargo delivery, such
as land and sea carriers” (Atlas Air, 2006, p. 11)
Merger – “increased competition, including the possible impact of
any mergers, alliances or combinations of competitors” (SEC,
2007, p. 14)

Competitive
advantage

Fleet Mix - “After all, our fleet consisted of 20 Boeing 747-400s
and 23 Boeing 747 Classics” (Atlas Air, 2006, p. 4)
Competitive Advantage - “The primary competitive factors in the
Scheduled Service market are price, geographic coverage, flight
frequency, reliability and capacity.” (Atlas Air, 2006, p. 8)
Competitive Advantage - “With a sizeable fleet and sophisticated
operations, we had a competitive advantage compared with
smaller carriers.” (Atlas Air, 2006, p. 4)
Fleet Mix - “renewing the fleet is at the heart of our multi-year
strategy” (Atlas Air, 2006, p. 5)
Competition - “The market for outsourcing cargo ACMI services
is highly competitive.” (Atlas Air, 2006, p. 8)
Competition - “We are the only service provider in the Boeing
747-400 ACMI market, as there are presently no direct
competitors.” (Atlas Air, 2006, p. 8)
Competitive Advantage – “We believe that the most important
elements for competition in the air-cargo business are the range,
payload and cubic capacities of the aircraft and the price,
flexibility, quality and reliability of the cargo transportation
services provided.” (Atlas Air, 2006, p. 13)
Size – “Atlas Air, Inc., the world's leading provider of outsourced
cargo aircraft, crew, maintenance and insurance service to major
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Category

Examples of quotations (preceded by code name)
international airlines” (Business Wire, 2007, para. 1)
Customers – “In 2006, our top 25 customers accounted for more
than 59.3% of our scheduled freight revenue, and our top five
customers accounted for more than 27.4% of our scheduled
freight revenue.” (SEC, 2007, p. 6)

Risk

Risk - “We rely on DHL for substantially all of ABX’s revenues
and the majority of ABX’s net operating cash flows.” (ABX Air,
2006, p. 10)
Accident – “We are vulnerable to potential losses that may be
incurred in the event of an aircraft incident or accident including
damage to the aircraft due to FOD.” (SEC, 2007, p. 13)
Risk – “increased competition, including the possible impact of
any mergers, alliances or combinations of competitors” (SEC,
2007, p. 14)

External factors

Economics - “An economic downturn in the U.S. is likely to
adversely affect demand for delivery services…” (ABX Air,
2006, p. 10)
Economics - “We depend on worldwide demand and any
economic decrease in the demand for cargo transport could
adversely affect our business and operations.” (Atlas Air, 2006, p.
11)
Economics – “The as-needed nature of our scheduled freight
business and the types of industries we serve subject our business
to significant market fluctuations that are beyond our control, and
a downward market fluctuation could have a material adverse
effect on our results of operations.” (SEC, 2007, p. 15)
Economics – “…overall demand for our freight services is
primarily influenced by the health of the U.S. economy, which is
cyclical in nature, the seasonality and economic health of the
industries generating the freight we transport in our network and
the availability, reliability and cost of alternative freight
services…” (SEC, 2007, p. 15)
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Appendix F
Co-Occurrence Table of All Codes
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Appendix G
Subject Matter Expert Questions
What qualitative factors do you feel may influence quantitative bankruptcy prediction
models such as the (K-score) in the all-cargo industry?
Do you have any insight into the bankruptcy of Kitty Hawk Air Cargo or Gemini air
cargo or of the merger of Cargo 360 with Southern Air in 2008.
Do you have any insight into the operation of ABX Air, Arrow Air, or Atlas Air during
the years 2005-2009.
What are your thoughts on the following terms as they relate to bankruptcy or financial
distress in the all-cargo airline industry?
Accidents
Antitrust
Bankruptcy
Capacity
Cash flow
Competition
Competitive advantage
Cost
Credit_markets
Customers
Earnings
Economics
Environment
Fleet mix
Flight frequency
Fuel_efficiency
Geographic location
Labor_Issues
Maintenance
Management
Market
Merger
Operations
Ownership
Price
Regulation
Reliability
Revenue
Risk
Routes
Security
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Service
Size
Tax
Utilization
Is there other insight you would like to provide in relationship to bankrupticy or financial
distress?
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Appendix H
Signed Consent Forms for Subject Matter Experts
Consent form for Dr. Robert G. Tompkins
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Consent form for Dr. Richard Gritta

